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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This chapter includes a motivation for the research presented in this thesis (1.1), a 
description of the industrial setting in which the research takes place (1.2), the research 
aim (1.3), the research objectives (1.4) and the outline of this thesis (1.5). 
 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
Reliability, safety and sustainability of capital assets is of major importance to our society.  
Maintenance has an important role in assuring the integrity of assets and thereby in 
assuring the reliability, safety and sustainability of these capital assets (Moubray, 1992). 
The importance of Maintenance (MRO, Maintenance Repair and Overhaul) is also 
represented by a yearly turn-over of 18 billion euro and employment for around 300.000 
people which is 4% of the working population in the Netherlands (NVDO, 2011). The total 
value of the Dutch capital assets is being estimated at 400 billion euros (Veenman and 
Besselink, 2010). Plant maintenance is therefore a major operational activity, the cost of 
which typically represents some 4% of the capital employed, in the process industry this 
can be 6% (Haarman and Delahay, 2005).  
 
Maintenance concepts  
Given the significance of maintenance for operational excellence as well as health, safety and 
environment, the importance of a good maintenance concept is paramount. A maintenance 
concept can be seen as the policy, or the approach that governs the amount of maintenance 
and type of maintenance actions to be performed on an asset.  For example, the maintenance 
concept determines the choice between planned maintenance with fixed intervals or planned 
maintenance with variable intervals for an asset. 
 
Asset definition 
In the remainder of this thesis, the terms plant/ installation, equipment and products are 
grouped under the term ‘asset’.  
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For asset management we use the definition of Mitchell and Carlson (2001), cited in 
Schuman and Brent (2005), where asset management is defined as a strategic, integrated 
set of comprehensive processes to gain greatest lifetime effectiveness, utilisation and 
return from physical assets, whereby assets are defined as production and operating 
equipment and structures. 
 
The maintenance concept of an industrial asset is nowadays seen as an essential part of 
the design (phase) of the asset (Dongen, 2011), but can also be determined or improved in 
the operations and maintenance phase of an asset. The importance of a life-cycle 
approach to the design, management and continuous improvement of assets is well 
described (INCOSE, Dreverman, 2005, Schuman and Brent, 2005). 
 
Maintenance and asset information 
Only with effective maintenance the assets continue to do what the users want them to do 
(Moubray, 1992). An important aspect in determining the maintenance concept is the 
information that is available and how this asset information is used.   
Some authors mentioned a number of problems with the information management in a 
maintenance environment:  
1. uncertainty of future information needs: it is unclear which data has to be registered 
or maintained for future asset management (Tsang et al., 2006, Veldman et al., 2010),  
2. maintenance knowledge is insufficiently accessible: much of the information is 
embodied in persons (Moubray, 1992, Mobley and Smith, 2002, Bloom, 2006), 
3. information cannot be used without additional knowledge: asset data is stored 
without sufficient context to be interpreted correctly and used effectively, (Pot, 2007, 
Tsang et al., 2006, Teoh and Case, 2005),  
4. maintaining high quality asset data is complex and costly: the quality of asset 
information is difficult to establish, which is further complicated by often terabytes of 
data which need to be maintained (Garg and Deshmukh, 2006, Tsang et al., 2006),   
5. heterogeneity of storage applications: data is stored in several non-integrated systems, 
e.g. Computerized Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS), process data and RCM 
data which complicates analysis which needs several data sources (Garg and 
Deshmukh, 2006, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Haarman and Delahay, 2005). 
6. data hand-over problems: the breaking-point (caused by the hand-over) of asset 
data between maintenance and engineering (Dreverman, 2005)  




Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)  
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) is currently seen by many authors as an 
important approach to design /develop a maintenance concept (Moubray, 1992, Mobley 
and Smith, 2002, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2002, Stamatis, 2003, Bloom, 2006, 
Seyed-Hosseini et al., 2006). RCM also described in the SAE JA1011 standard starts with 
a zero-based review to determine the maintenance requirements of any physical asset in 
its operating context (Moubray, 1992).  
 
RCM was developed over a period of thirty years, its origins go back to a report 
commissioned by the US department of Defense describing the application of RCM in the 
civil aviation industry (Nowlan and Heap, 1978). The application of RCM forms a basis for 
preventive maintenance activities and can therefore influence a significant part of the 
operational expenses.  
 
A very important aspect of the RCM methodology is Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA). FMEA was developed in 1949 by the American Army to evaluate the impact of 
system and equipment failures on mission success and the safety of personnel and 
equipment (Teoh and Case, 2005). FMEA can be defined as “a method of reliability 
analysis intended to identify failures affecting the functioning of a system and enable 
priorities for action to be set” (BS5760, 2009). The FMEA method is a qualitative 
assessment of risk, predominantly relying on the judgment of experts (Moubray, 1992). 
 
By performing FMEAs, failure modes are identified. Failure modes are the ways, or 
modes, in which an asset can fail. The severity, probability of occurrence and risk of non-
detection are estimated and used to rate the risk associated with each failure mode. Usual 
practice is to combine these elements in a ‘risk priority number’ or RPN (Dieter, 2000). 
Three factors are usually taken into account when evaluating the risk of failure: the 
severity; the probability of occurrence; and the likelihood of detecting the failure (Dieter, 
2000, Stamatis, 2003). 
 
FMEA can be performed in various phases of the life-cycle. Depending on the object of 
study they are called (1) system FMEA, (2) design FMEA, (3) process FMEA and (4) 




The relationship between RCM and FMEA is illustrated in figure 1.1, amended from 
Picknell (1999). Part II, is the FMEA part of the RCM analysis. The end result of an FMEA 
is used as input to make a RCM based decision (Part III) which determines the optimal 
maintenance policy of an asset (part). Assessments and decisions taken within FMEA 
(Part II) therefore heavily influence the RCM decisions and thus the quality of the 


















Important parts of the RCM/FMEA process but not depicted in the above figure is the 
context in which the RCM/FMEA process is conducted: the selection and composition of 
the RCM/FMEA team and the chosen level of analysis (e.g. on system, subsystem or 
component level).  
 
1.2 Feedback is essential for FMEA-based maintenance 
According to seminal authors, feedback is essential for the success of a living FMEA and 
an effective and efficient maintenance program (Bloom, 2006, Teoh and Case, 2005, 
Moubray, 1992). The FMEA is however not reviewed or updated anymore after its initial 
use (Braaksma et al., 2012a, Teoh and Case, 2005, Teng and Ho, 1996). In other words, 
FMEA is regarded as a one-time only exercise: not as an object of development (Braaksma 
et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1: FMEA as part of the RCM process, amended from Picknell (1999) 
5 
 
Because of the importance of asset information, asset information management can be 
viewed as enabler of feedback on FMEA and thereby as a precondition for continuous use 
of FMEA for maintenance improvement. 
 
Therefore, the preventive maintenance plan might be inaccurate when used in practice. It 
is difficult to assess the exact impact of the inaccuracies, but it is likely that they will lead 
to unnecessary costs.   
 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to study the possibilities to improve asset information 
management in order to allow feedback in FMEA-based maintenance. 
 
1.3 Industrial setting 
In the following paragraphs the support of Stork Technical Services, USPI-NL and the 
focus on the process industry are discussed. 
 
1.3.1  Stork Technical Services  
Stork Technical Services, supported the research presented in this thesis. Stork Technical 
Services is actively engaged in maintenance management and is constantly evaluating and 
improving their (maintenance) practices. As a large Dutch maintenance contractor Stork 
Technical Services is responsible for the maintenance of often large complex, capital-
intensive physical assets such as buildings and industrial plants.  
 
Stork Technical Services has in-depth asset management expertise built up by many years 
of experience and cooperates with world class corporations within Chemical, Oil, Gas and 
Power industries. Stork Technical Services has in-depth asset management expertise in, 
Project Management Services, Maintenance Management Delivery, Turnaround 
Management, Relocations and Brownfield Engineering.  
 
One of the frequently used tools Stork Technical Services is using for the improvement of 
maintenance concepts of their customers is FMEA or Failure Mode and Failure Mode 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Stork Technical Services therefore expects to 





USPI-NL, a formal Association of process industry actively supported the research 
presented in the thesis. The mission of USPI-NL is to develop, promote and maintain 
international asset information standards and best practices for the process industry 
plant engineering supply chain. Key standards actively supported today are ISO 15926, 
ISO 8000, STEP/ISO10303, NE100 for product and plant life cycle information. Best 
practices cover As-built information and Specification of handover information in the 
plant supply chain.  
 
The plane engineering life cycle phases range from design to maintenance and finally 
demolition of the plant. USPI-NL is therefore also interested in the engineering 
knowledge about the use of international standards and practices, currently with a 
particular focus on maintenance knowledge management.  
 
 
1.3.3  Focus on the process industry 
This study focuses on the process industry, which has some specific characteristics when 
compared to other industries: (1) the need to use complex and expensive installations 
efficiently and safely (Fransoo and Rutten, 1994, Dennis and Meredith, 2000, Hu et al., 
2009), (2) the design of the plant and equipment tends to be important for safety and 
operational performance when compared to other industries (Gunasekaran, 1998) and (3) 
Structured preventive maintenance, including the use of FMEA, is therefore important for 
companies in the process industry (Azadeh et al., 2010).  
 
Because of the aforementioned importance of good structured maintenance in the process 
industry and since the process industry is one of the strategic focus areas of Stork 
Technical services we concentrated our research on the process industry. 
 
1.4 Research aim 
As we described the importance of maintenance and more specifically the importance and 
current problems with information management in a maintenance context,  
 
the research aim of this thesis is to contribute to the academic knowledge on asset 




1.5 Research objectives 
To achieve the research aim we identified several research objectives. Each research 
objective has a main research question which is described in the following paragraphs. 
 
1.5.1   Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in asset maintenance:  
a multiple case study in the process industry 
FMEA is an important method for determining maintenance programs.  However, there 
has not been much empirical research on the actual use of the method. The aim of the 
first research question below is to examine whether common assumptions found in 
literature on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and its use for (preventive) 
maintenance can be supported by empirical evidence and to explore reasons why 
companies would deviate from what is generally assumed in the literature. A multiple 
case study design is applied for theory-building from an exploratory perspective 
(McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993, Meredith, 1987). Exploratory research is applicable 
when researchers have no solid ideas on the exact behavior and causal relationships of the 
concepts in practice. In the multiple case study, we aim to develop knowledge that can 
serve as a stepping stone towards such theory building (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993, 
Meredith, 1987).  
 
RO1: To what extent are common assumptions on the use of Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis for (preventive) maintenance supported by empirical evidence? 
 
1.5.2  A quantitative method for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
In literature it has been reported, that despite its popularity, the FMEA method lacks the  
repeatability and the ability to continuously improve maintenance routines (Teoh and 
Case, 2005). There is a need for a quantitative method which enables the probability of 
asset failure to be expressed as a function of explanatory variables, such as age, operating 
conditions or process measurements. Our aim is therefore to develop a quantitative 
method which improves the repeatability of the FMEA for the purpose of asset 
maintenance. 
 
RO2: How can the repeatability of the FMEA method be improved and how can the 




1.5.3  Design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) method for 
continuous FMEA-based maintenance 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an important method to design and 
prioritize preventive maintenance activities. Within a reliability-centred maintenance 
used as a basis for preventive maintenance planning (Moubray, 1992, Bloom, 2006). The 
FMEA is however not reviewed or updated anymore after its initial use (Braaksma et al., 
2012a, Teoh and Case, 2005, Teng and Ho, 1996) when it is been hand-over from design 
engineering to maintenance engineering as part of a larger maintenance program. 
However, according to seminal authors, information feedback is essential for the success 
of a living FMEA and an effective and efficient maintenance program (Bloom, 2006, Teoh 
and Case, 2005, Moubray, 1992). The aim of our third research objective is therefore to 
explore the context for feedback in maintenance strategies, and to come up with 
requirements and design principles which can be used for a method which enables 
information feedback.  
 
RO3: What are requirements and design principles for continuous FMEA-based 
maintenance? 
 
1.5.4  A review of the use of asset information standards for collaboration 
in the process industry 
For effective asset information management and continuous FMEA-based maintenance 
management there is presumably a need for all data and information of the installation to 
be up-to-date, consistent and complete. Successful exchange of asset design information 
between disciplines and parties is therefore a prerequisite for the success of the 
optimization processes in later life-cycle phases. Fragmentation of the information 
management processes and the information sources can lead to failure in terms of data 
integrity. Asset information standards are believed to enable effective information 
management, however asset standards adoption is lacking pervasiveness in the process 
industry. In order to investigate other possible causes for lack of adoption, as well as 
possible solutions, a comparison is sought with other industries, in which asset 
information standards are important (and important progress was made): the aerospace 
industry and automotive industry. 
 
RO4: What are the causes for the lack of pervasiveness of asset information standards 
in the process industry compared to the aerospace industry? 
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1.6 Thesis outline 
In the next four chapters, an investigation into FMEA-based maintenance improvement 
and related aspects of this theme are reported: 
 
(i) the use of FMEA for asset maintenance in the process industry: chapter 2 
summarizes the main descriptions and assumptions found in the literature on 
FMEA into six postulates, and compares the postulates to industrial practice,  
(ii) a quantitative method to support Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: chapter 3 
proposes an enhancement to the FMEA method which enables the probability of 
asset failure to be expressed as a function of explanatory variables, such as age, 
operating conditions or process measurements.  The probability of failure and an 
estimate of the total costs can be used to determine maintenance routines. The 
procedure facilitates continuous improvement as the dataset builds up, 
(iii) the design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) for continuous FMEA-
based maintenance: chapter 4 presents the design of a Maintenance Feedback 
Analysis method (MFA) extending the RCM/FMEA approach. The aim of MFA is 
to improve FMEA related information management for continuous use of 
RCM/FMEA logic., 
(iv) the use of asset information standards for the exchange and storage of asset 
information: chapter 5 reviews the use of asset information standards for 
collaboration in the process industry this is based on a survey of the literature 
and two case studies in which a comparison with the aerospace industry is made. 
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Publication of chapters in journal articles 
The chapters included in this thesis are based on journal articles that either published, or 
are under review by a journal. The following articles are included in this thesis:  
 
Chapter 2 – Braaksma, A.J.J., Klingenberg, W., Veldman, J., 2011, Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis in asset maintenance: a multiple case study in the process industry, 
International Journal of Production Research, in press. 
Chapter 3 – Braaksma, A.J.J., Meesters A.J., Klingenberg, W., Hicks, 2011, C., A 
Quantitative method for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, International Journal of 
Production Research, in press. 
Chapter 4 – Braaksma, A.J.J., Wortmann, J.C., 2011, Design of a Maintenance Feedback 
Analysis (MFA) method for continuous FMEA-based maintenance. In process of 
submission to International Journal of Production Research. 
Chapter 5 – Braaksma, A.J.J., Klingenberg, W., Exel, P.W.H.M van, 2011, A review of 
the use of asset information standards for collaboration in the process industry, 
Computers in Industry, Volume 62, Issue 3, Pages 337-350. 
Finally, Chapter 6 includes a summary of the main findings, future research directions 






Chapter 2   
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in asset 
maintenance: a multiple case study in the process 
industry 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an important method to design and 
prioritize preventive maintenance activities and is often used as the basis for preventive 
maintenance planning. Although FMEA was studied extensively, most of the published 
work so far covers FMEA concept design. Not much detailed comparison to industrial 
practice regarding the application of FMEA can be found in the literature, which is the 
contribution of this study. This chapter summarizes the main descriptions and 
assumptions found in the literature on FMEA into six postulates, and compares the 
postulates to industrial practice. This was done in a multiple case study conducted at six 
companies in the process industry. Some postulates were supported by empirical 
evidence, whereas for others, limited or no support could be found. The results suggest a 
fundamental problem in the FMEA procedure, namely the reliance upon expert judgment 
in general and the reliance upon design engineering expertise for keeping the FMEA up-
to-date in particular. Also a number of operational and information management 
problems that companies suffer from when conducting an FMEA were identified. 
Practitioners can use this chapter to assess their potential for implementing FMEA and to 
learn from the insight into the identified pitfalls. Researchers can use the findings to 






2.1  Introduction 
Plant maintenance is a major operational activity in the process industry, the cost of 
which typically represents some 4% of the capital employed (Veenman and Besselink, 
2010). Preventive maintenance is an important element of plant maintenance. Several 
authors have described Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) and Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) as an important method to define preventive maintenance 
programs (Bloom, 2006, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2002, Mobley and Smith, 2002, 
Stamatis, 2003, Seyed-Hosseini et al., 2006, Moubray, 1992) and this was also witnessed 
by the current authors. The application of RCM/FMEA therefore forms a basis for the 
preventive maintenance activities and influences a significant part of the operational 
expenses. This chapter examines how the RCM/ FMEA method is applied in practice and 
whether a number of common assumptions found in the literature on the way 
RCM/FMEA programs are implemented can be supported by empirical evidence.   
 
2.1.1  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)  
FMEA is a method of reliability 
analysis intended to identify 
failures affecting the functioning 
of a system and enable priorities 
for action to be set (BS5760, 
2009). FMEA is used to identify 
failure modes. Failure modes are 
the ways, or modes, in which an 
asset can fail. The severity, 
probability of occurrence and risk 
of non-detection are estimated 
and used to rate the risk 
associated with each failure 
mode. Usual practice is to combine these elements in a ‘risk priority number’ (Dieter, 
2000). FMEA is an important part of Reliability-centered maintenance, defined by 
Moubray (1992, p.8) as a “process used to determine what must be done to ensure that 
any physical asset continues to do what its users want it to do in its present operating 
context”. The steps within RCM are shown in Figure 2.1 (Moubray, 1992, Picknell, 1999). 
The FMEA process has been adapted for use in many international standardized quality 
systems including IEC60812, QS9000 and ISO 9001. 
Figure 2.1: FMEA as part of the RCM process,  
















Some authors have criticized the approach because it is said to be complex, time 
consuming and ignores existing barriers between asset management processes (Dow and 
Endersby, 2004, Gabbar et al., 2003, Tsang, 2002). Nevertheless, the method is 
described as an important practice in asset management and presented as one of the key 
advanced maintenance methods (Bloom, 2006, August, 2003, Moubray, 1992).  
 
The current literature predominantly covers progress in FMEA process and concept 
design, in which implicit or explicit assumptions are made regarding the use of FMEA in 
maintenance planning in practice. However, detailed comparison of the practical use of 
the FMEA procedure in industry has not received as much attention yet. We have 
searched the International Journal of Production Research; Journal of Quality in 
Maintenance Engineering; Reliability Engineering & Systems Safety; International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management; International Journal of Production 
Economics and Computers in Industry among others, and were not able to identify a 
broad study comparing the descriptions in the academic literature to industrial practice.  
 
2.1.2  Aim and scope 
The aim of this chapter is to help fill that gap by examining whether a number of common 
assumptions found in the literature on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and its 
use for (preventive) maintenance can be supported by empirical evidence and to explore 
reasons why companies would deviate from what is generally assumed in the literature. 
We will do so by conducting a multiple case study.  
 
Our study focuses on the process industry. According to the American Production and 
Inventory Control Society (APICS) process production is defined as: “production that 
adds value to by mixing, separating forming, and/or chemical reactions” (Cox and 
Blackstone, 1995). Process industries are characterized by the need to use complex and 
expensive installations efficiently and safely (Fransoo and Rutten, 1994, Dennis and 
Meredith, 2000, Hu et al., 2009). Capital investments tend to be high and expenses for 
downtime tend to be large, which puts pressure on the maintenance function and causes 
the need for sophisticated maintenance procedures (Tan and Kramer, 1997, Arts et al., 
1998, Gunasekaran, 1998, Ketokivi and Jokinen, 2006, Veldman et al., 2011). Structured 
preventive maintenance, including the use of FMEA, is therefore important for companies 




The chapter is organized as follows. The chapter starts with an explanation of the 
methodology in Section 2. In Section 3, our theoretical framework is presented. The 
theoretical framework consists of six postulates that are based on the main descriptions 
and assumptions found in literature is presented. The postulates are structured according 
to the three phases within the RCM/FMEA process. Section 4 presents the multiple case 
study and the comparison of the postulates to industrial practice in the process industry. 
The chapter ends with the discussion and conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2.2  Methodology 
Our primary aim is theory-building from an exploratory perspective (McCutcheon and 
Meredith, 1993, Meredith, 1987). The research is exploratory since we have no solid ideas 
on the exact behavior and causal relationships of the concepts in practice and we aim to 
develop knowledge that can serve as a stepping stone towards such theory building 
(McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993, Meredith, 1987). The confirmation or disconfirmation 
of conceptual insights found in the literature is organized around a set of postulates. The 
term 'postulate' is used for a commonly accepted truth and serves as a starting point for 
deducing and inferring other (theory dependent) truths. For this study it is appropriate to 
use a multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1994, Dul and Hak, 2008, Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). At a more detailed level the methodology we follow is very similar 
to that of Meredith (1987) and Veldman et al. (2011).  
 
2.2.1  Sample selection 
Our sample consists of six companies in the process industry. The number of cases 
exceeds the minimum number of four required for multi-case research (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Case selection based on a set of specific criteria is considered important in case 
research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Siggelkow, 2007). The criteria employed for 
case selection are (also see Veldman et al., 2011):  
(1) Company size, whereby companies were selected with a minimum number of 
employees of 50. This is based on the assumption that larger companies have more 
resources and other possibilities for the development of advanced maintenance 
routines, including Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Azadeh et al., 2010); 
(2) The degree to which the companies consider plant maintenance as an important area 
for achieving excellent overall performance. This was measured by interviewing key 
personnel prior to the actual case study; 
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(3) In addition, a selection was made of companies that are not carrying out 
maintenance activities on the same assets and that do not have a direct supply 
relationship, in order to avoid any ‘double dipping’.  
 
At six case companies, interviews were conducted with relevant staff, including 
maintenance manager(s) and reliability engineer(s) (see below). Follow-up telephone 
interviews were used for validation. The interview data was structured and labeled per 
company to allow for cross-case analysis. Additional data sources included written 
documents and presentation material. Measures taken to ensure the validity and 
reliability are summarized in Table 2.1 (Yin, 1994). 
 
Criterion Implementation 
Construct validity Multiple documents, multiple informants, informants were asked to 
provide additional information in follow-ups 
Internal validity Pattern matching using cross-tabulations, careful attention for rival 
explanations; both theoretical as well as in interview protocol 
External validity Selection of case companies typical for process industry, use of authors’ 
expert opinions on uniqueness of case companies 
Reliability  Structured interview protocol, careful write-up of interview data 
Table 2.1: Ensuring validity and reliability 
 
2.2.2  Interview protocol and data collection 
To maintain consistency in the data from each company, we used a structured interview 
approach and used a tape-recorder to make transcriptions if this was allowed by the 
interviewee. The interviewer used the same interview protocol to gather data for the 
study. The protocol was pre-tested to make sure that the questions were sufficiently clear. 
At each company, the interviewer met with the maintenance manager(s), reliability 
engineer(s) and other interviewees who were in some cases contracted from a specialized 
company. Interviewees were selected based on in-depth knowledge of the company, the 
assets, the way FMEAs were conducted and used for subsequent maintenance planning 







In this section, we will summarize the current assumptions and descriptions of FMEA 
found in the literature into six postulates.  
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In this section we present the postulates that are based on a comprehensive review of the 
current literature on FMEA and its use in asset maintenance. The postulates basically 
cover the steps of RCM as also shown in Figure 2.1. We have divided the RCM/FMEA 
process into three parts: (i) the identification and selection process (step 1), (ii) the actual 
FMEA process (steps 2 to 5), and (iii) the derived actions (steps 6 and 7). Careful 
attention to each of these three parts is of paramount importance (Moubray, 1992, 
Mobley and Smith, 2002, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Bloom, 2006). We will therefore 
propose postulates for each of the three parts.  
 
2.3.2.1 RCM/FMEA identification and selection process postulates (Part I) 
This section describes postulates on the use of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis within 
RCM, with regard to the identification and selection of assets to be analyzed with FMEA 
as this is the first step in Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Moubray, 1992, Bloom, 
2006, Riezebos et al., 2009). 
 
Postulate 1: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied on a limited selection of assets 
In the recent literature, it is generally assumed that a limited number of assets for 
RCM/FMEA are to be selected, for instance assets that are critical to safety and plant 
performance (e.g. Bloom, 2006, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2009, Rosqvist et al., 2009, 
Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2004). Moubray (1992, p.16) 
mentions that assets should be selected that ‘most likely benefit from the RCM process’ 
and to make clear how the asset parts will benefit from the RCM process. Bloom (2006, 
p.143) argues that all parts should be part of the analysis as vulnerabilities otherwise may 
stay unidentified.  
 
An important assumption in FMEA and a prerequisite for identifying the assets is the 
existence of a plant register or maintenance database (Mobley and Smith, 2002, 
Moubray, 1992, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2002, Tsang, 2002, Bloom, 2006, Gabbar et 
al., 2003, Kans, 2008). Moubray (1992) explains that a plant register is required to 
identify the assets and their location and that the plant register should be designed in 
such a way that it is possible to keep track of the assets that have been analyzed, those 
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that have yet to be analyzed and those that are not going to be used. This would include 
coding each asset uniquely and in such a way that selection and administration is fully 
supported. Asset information standards can be used for this (Braaksma et al., 2011).  
 
2.3.2.2 FMEA process (Part II) 
This section describes postulates with regard to the accuracy and standardization of the 
FMEA process. 
 
Postulate 2: Failure modes and effects are identified with sufficient accuracy 
A failure mode can be defined as any event that is likely to cause a functional failure of an 
asset (Moubray, 1992). Failure modes can be classified into three categories: (1) when the 
capability falls below the desired performance, (2) when the desired performance rises 
above initial capability and (3) when the asset is not capable of doing what is wanted from 
the outset (Moubray, 1992). 
 
Expected future failure modes are implicitly or explicitly assumed by many authors to be 
identifiable with considerable accuracy (Moubray, 1992, Mobley and Smith, 2002, Smith 
and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Down et al., 2008). In particular, Moubray (1992 p.64) points out 
that failure modes should be defined in sufficient detail for selecting a suitable failure 
management policy. The literature proposes the identification of failure modes to take 
place through facilitated group sessions, bringing together knowledge and expertise 
(Moubray, 1992, Mobley and Smith, 2002, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Down et al., 
2008). The best sources of information according to (Moubray, 1992) are the people who 
operate and maintain the equipment. To support the process, information from industry 
databases and standards may be used (SINTEF, 2002, Azadeh et al., 2010). 
 
Failure effects can be defined as the consequences of each failure mode on operation, 
function or status of an asset (DoD, 1980). Moubray (1992) recognizes three types of 
consequences; safety and environmental, operational and non-operational consequences. 
A number of authors have assumed that the effects of failure modes can also be identified 
and described accurately (Moubray, 1992, Mobley and Smith, 2002, Smith and 
Hinchcliffe, 2004, Down et al., 2008).  
18 
 
Postulate 3: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied according to a clearly 
defined paper- or software-based procedure 
FMEA procedures are described by a large number of authors (Stamatis, 2003, Moubray, 
1992, McDermott et al., 2009, Down et al., 2008) as being highly structured and are 
implemented in numerous standards (e.g. IEC60812, QS9000, BS 5760, MIL-STD 1843 
and ISO 9001). The importance of the structured nature of the approach is stressed by 
several authors (e.g. Bloom, 2006, McDermott et al., 2009). The main advantages are 
that it provides a common language (McDermott et al., 2009) and that it forces an 
organization to systematically evaluate equipment and system weaknesses and their 
interrelationships (Mobley and Smith, 2002). 
 
The standardization and structure of FMEA is enhanced by tools supplied by software 
vendors. The University of Maryland (UMD, 2010) made a comprehensive list of more 
than 20 software packages. These software packages incorporate the use of FMEA 
standard procedures such as MIL-STD-1629, MIL-STD-1388, QS-9000 and SAE J1739 
(UMD, 2010).  
 
2.3.2.3 RCM logic application (Part III) 
This section describes postulates on the 
selection of (appropriate) maintenance 
actions by using FMEA. 
 
Postulate 4: Following the FMEA 
method ensures consistency in 
maintenance decision-making, e.g. the 
design of maintenance routines and 
maintenance planning  
The result of conducting an FMEA 
procedure is to design preventive 
maintenance routines and planning 
(Mobley and Smith, 2002, Moubray, 
1992, Bloom, 2006) as also visualized in 
Figure 2.2 (after Bloom, 2006).  
Figure 2.2:  Relationship FMEA, RCM  and 
maintenance planning (Bloom, 2006) 
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FMEA is generally seen as a method to ensure that the decisions are consistent, i.e. that 
the (priority in the) preventive maintenance actions clearly relate to the potential failure 
modes and effects, registered in plant records (Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2002, 
Moubray, 1992, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Bloom, 2006).  
 
Postulate 5: FMEA enables continuous improvement 
Various authors emphasize the importance of periodically or occasionally reviewing and 
improving the FMEA findings and conclusions, e.g. Moubray (1992), Bloom (2006), 
Down et al. (2008), Waeyenbergh and Pintelon (2002 p.307), and Stamatis (2003). 
Moubray (1992 p.316) states that an RCM/FMEA database (which is the result of a RCM 
review) enables “tracking the reason for every maintenance task right back to the 
functions and the operating context of the asset. As a result, if any aspect of the operating 
context changes, it is easy to identify the tasks which are affected and to revise them 
accordingly”. 
 
Bloom (2006) states that the RCM/FMEA process must remain a ‘living’ one, never to 
become static. New failure modes may become evident, and additional information 
relative to equipment performance may present itself at any time. Oftentimes, the 
preventive maintenance schedule may need to be adjusted. Periodicities may need to be 
increased or decreased. Newly identified tasks may need to be added, while others may 
need to be deleted based on new or different operating conditions or plant modifications. 
A living program includes a feedback loop, which is important because it helps to 
maintain the viability of the program (Bloom, 2006).  Down et al. (2008 p.63) explain 
that the focus should always be on continuous improvement: “After the 
preventive/corrective action has been completed, the (risk) priority indicator  should be 
calculated again and revised rankings should be reviewed. If further action is considered 
necessary, then repeat the analysis”. Stamatis (2003 p.xxvii): “The push for this continual 
improvement makes the FMEA a dynamic document, changing as the system, design, 
process, product, and/or service changes”.  
 
Postulate 6: FMEA relies predominantly on expert judgment. The use of historic failure 
data or other measured data is generally not possible for conducting an FMEA.  
It is argued in the literature that it may not be worthwhile to look at historic data. This is 
because  most historic data and records are assumed to be of insufficient quality for this 
purpose (Moubray, 1992, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Garg and Deshmukh, 2006). 
Moubray (1992) mentions the following problems: (1) the data/records are often incomplete, 
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(2) more often than not, the data/records describe what was done to repair the failure 
rather than what caused it, (3) they do not describe failures which have not yet occurred 
and (4) they often describe failure modes which are really the effect of some other failure. 
In addition, the use of quantitative optimization models (employing historic data) is 
considered very limited in industry (Garg and Deskmukh, 2006). 
 
Therefore the reliance on expert judgments is advocated in the FMEA literature, Moubray 
(1992 p.17): “many (if not most) of the answers can only be supplied by production or 
operations people. This applies especially to questions concerning functions, desired 
performance, failure effects and failure consequences”. (Bloom, 2006 p.19) states that it 
takes the cumulative knowledge from all associated parties to affect a premier analysis but 
does recognize other sources of information.  
 
2.4 Multiple case study 
First we will briefly introduce the case companies, after which we will discuss the results 
of the multiple case study. 
 
2.4.1 General case company descriptions 
1 is a consortium of companies, delivering engineering, renovation and maintenance 
services for a series (>5) of fossil fuel production facilities of a major energy company.  
2 produces various fillers and cleaning chemicals. The production process consists mainly 
of mixing and packaging processes. For our research we focus on the mixing processes. 2 
is part of a major international chemical company. 
3 provides custom contract manufacturing services to the pharmaceutical industries. We 
focus on one of the production facilities. 3 is part of a major international chemical 
company (different from 2). 
4 is an electricity producer. We focus on five power stations. The investigated power 
stations are traditional power station consisting of a boiler and a steam turbine connected 
to a generator. The plants investigated are coal and gas fired plants.  
5 is a consortium of companies, delivering engineering, renovation and maintenance 
services for a series (>5) of fossil fuel production facilities of a major energy company. 
Companies 1 and 5 are not the same. 
6 is a major producer of minerals for both industrial and consumer markets. The plant, on 




At a general level, the companies are comparable since that they are all (part of) major 
companies in the process industry with an international perspective. Access to knowledge 
on RCM/FMEA is sufficient and comparable across the case companies. Also the physical 
production technologies are comparable in the sense that they are all typical examples of 
the process industry, although the plants differ in age, asset heterogeneity, level of 
redundancy and size. Table 2.1 summarizes the case companies. As will become apparent 
in the discussion of the postulates, many of the findings are illustrated by quotes from the 
interviewees, who were usually very frank. For reasons of confidentially, we have named 
the six companies (A) through (F) during the discussion of the postulates, whereby the 
letters do not correspond to the numbers used in Table 2.2.  
 
       
Company 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Main output Fossil fuel Fillers and 
cleaning 
chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals Electricity Fossil fuel Minerals 
Asset owner No Yes No (group is 
owner) 
Yes No Yes 
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In the next paragraphs our research findings will be presented. Detailed additional 
information and a cross case overview can be found in Table 2.3. 
 
2.4.2.1 RCM/FMEA identification and selection process postulates (Part I) 
This section describes our empirical findings with regard to the formulated postulates on 
the RCM selection process (Part I in Figure 2.1). 
 
Postulate 1: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied on a limited selection of 
assets/parts 
This postulate was confirmed during the case studies. Our finding was that all of the 
companies selected a limited number of ‘critical’ asset parts for RCM/FMEA, as other 
researchers have proposed (e.g. Bloom, 2006, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2009, Rosqvist 
et al., 2009, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2004). The reason 
for this is the resource intensity of the FMEA procedure, combined with the complexity of 
the assets. As a reliability engineer of (B) stated: 
 
“It is too much effort to conduct an FMEA on all parts of our 
installations. This would imply that e.g. 200.000 parts multiplied by a 
conservatively estimated time for analysis of 1 hour per part would yield 
approximately 100 man years of analysis work.” (reliability engineer B) 
 
Bloom (2006) described the risks of following an approach in which only critical assets 
are assessed. Interviewees at the case study companies commented that they are aware 
that some (small) risks might be taken by not including all assets in the scope of the 
FMEA, but that the required investment would be considered too large and the exercise 
unmanageable. As a reliability engineer of (B) stated: 
 
“We know that by not including all asset parts we take a risk but we 
have assessed these risks to be negligible. Besides the FMEA we also do 
other extensive analyses including HAZOP1 and SIL2 assessments.” 
(reliability engineer B) 
 
                                                 
1 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study (Summers, 1998) 
2 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment (Summers, 1998) 
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These findings are in line with recent literature on following a pragmatic approach in 
executing FMEA (e.g. Bloom, 2006, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2009, Rosqvist et al., 
2009, Smith and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Waeyenbergh and Pintelon, 2004).  
 
An important assumption made in the literature and a prerequisite for identifying the 
assets, is the existence of an asset register. In all of the companies an asset register3 was 
used as a reference in identifying (parts of) assets for the FMEA. All companies used an 
internal coding standard, three companies based their coding on external standards i.e. 
the KKS4 coding system, and the STEPlib5 standard. 
 
However, the policies for filling the asset register appeared to differ between companies. 
Some6 companies made a first selection of critical parts when filling the asset register. 
This means that not all assets end up in the (maintenance) asset register. As a reliability 
engineer of (B) stated: “You only want assets in your register that you actually maintain”. 
Others select from parts in the asset registry. As the FMEA facilitator of (A) stated:  
 
“The asset tree was already available in the asset register from the 
engineering phase. The existing tagging made it possible for us to 
identify and select the critical assets from the register. This selection 
depended upon the expected gains in terms of safety, production 
performance, environment/reputation and product quality. For (A) the 
highest impacts were expected in the first production stages, which 
therefore received most attention.” (FMEA facilitator A) 
 
The definition of ‘critical’ was based by all companies upon possible impacts on safety, 
environment, operational performance and quality. The selection of ‘critical’ assets was in 
all cases described as the outcome of a strategic (investment) decision process in which 
dominant stakeholders (the management of the firm, government (legislation) and 
maintenance management) play an important role. We tried to find quantitative criteria 
for the selection, we could however not find proof for the existence of such criteria.  
                                                 
3 The asset register, as we called it in section 2.3.2.1., was called differently by each company. In most cases, it was 
named by the software vendor of the system, e.g. “The asset parts are registered in SAP.”. In most cases, such a 
system contains more functionality than required for an asset register. 
4 The KKS Power Plant Classification System is a standardized system for the classification of power stations. It 
serves during engineering, construction, operation and maintenance of power stations for identification and 
classification of the equipment. 
5 STEP/ISO 10303 is an ISO standard for the computer-interpretable representation and exchange of product 
manufacturing information (Braaksma et al, 2011) 
6 Please see Table 2.3 for a detailed overview and cross case analysis. 
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A summary of the results regarding the first postulate on the selection of assets is given in 
Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Selection of assets at the six case study companies  
 
2.4.2.2 FMEA process postulates (part II) 
This section describes our empirical findings with regard to the postulates on the FMEA 
process (Part II in Figure 2.1). 
 
Postulate 2: Failure modes and effects are identified with sufficient accuracy 
We could only find limited support for this postulate. The case study reveals that there are 
problems with the accuracy in identifying and describing failure modes. In fact, 
identifying the failure modes was described as one of the main challenges for conducting 
an FMEA. Identified problems include a lack of information on the actual or potential 
asset failure, which in turn lead to difficulties in making detailed distinctions between 




“During the expert sessions there is generally a lack of detailed 
information on the actual failure modes. In fact, such information is 
usually absent. This is partially due to the nature of FMEA: one is 
anticipating possible failures, not only analyzing past occurrences. In 
addition, past maintenance activities may have prevented us from 
gathering useful information on actual failure modes.” (reliability 
engineer D) 
 
Particularly in cases where only limited specific information on failure modes is available 
(as was generally the case in this study), the accuracy of the analysis seems to be largely 
related to the knowledge and experience of the experts involved. Also the FMEA 
facilitator has an important role. This can be concluded from the following statements: 
 
“It is easy to get bogged down in long lists of possible failure modes. A 
danger is that the potential failure modes are too theoretical. In the 
minds of people there is often no specific difference between the 
various failure modes. In the end the challenge is to identify a limited 
number of credible and specific failure modes, based on which 
maintenance actions can be identified.” (reliability engineer B) 
and  
“You have to keep asking, what is the real problem? By repeatedly 
asking simple questions you can find out what the problems are. 
Involvement of all people invited to the meeting is crucial and social 
skills are very important. For example you have to calm a manager, or 
encourage someone else, perhaps a knowledgeable engineer, who is not 
saying much.” (FMEA facilitator A) 
 
Naturally, it is difficult to assess the precise impact of the inaccuracies, but it is likely that 
they will lead to unnecessary costs, since the case companies showed a tendency to widen 
their safety margins and apply extra maintenance in case of inaccuracies or uncertainties 
in the analyses.   Despite the inaccuracies, interviewees replied that the identification of 




With regard to the effects of the failure modes, the following challenges were found to be 
significant: (1) Effects are often described in a qualitative way. The quantification of 
effects was not always attempted, which led to problems in determining the level at which 
preventive action is necessary; (2) The relevance of the effects of failure modes may 
change over time due to changing circumstances, whereas the findings and subsequent 
maintenance activities are usually not adjusted; (3) The FMEA results were not stored in 
a way that made them suitable for constant updating. Moreover, the FMEA procedure was 
treated as a one-off exercise by four of the six companies. This aspect is also covered by 
Postulates 5 and 6. 
 
The consequences of the combination of aspects (2) and (3) – the FMEA procedure is 
treated as a one-off exercise while circumstances change – are illustrated by:   
 
“Often there is a historic background which is relevant in the analyses. 
Sometimes this background is no longer valid. For example; we use a 
certain pipeline protection system designed for high pressure. Over 
time, the applied pressure is lowered. However, the special safety 
systems are still being inspected and maintained as if the pressure was 
very high, while in reality that is not the case anymore.” (Focal point 
maintenance D) 
 
Postulate 3: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied according to a clearly 
defined paper- or software-based procedure 
We could only find limited support for this postulate, because we found that some 
companies do apply FMEA in a fairly structured way, but others do not. Also the use of 
software tools and asset information standards (also discussed in Braaksma et al., 2011) is 
not always as structured as the literature suggests. For the companies that do follow a 
structured approach, the procedure is supported by clear corporate guidelines and/or 
structured software and/or by the coordination of a person managing the steps in the 
procedure. In some cases the abstraction level at which corporate guidelines for FMEA 
were defined appeared to be inadequate. For example at B and F corporate guidelines do 
require the execution of FMEA, but not define the procedure or the required steps to 
implement FMEA. This led to the use of different risk estimation methods and criteria 




Using standard software is seen by some as a good way to comply to the predefined steps 
in the FMEA procedure, whereas by others, this was seen as less important and the 
emphasis was placed on other aspects: 
 
“The SAP system or other software systems are not that important. We 
use a simple spreadsheet into which it is easy to copy the asset 
structure. It is more important to have an active chairman who leads 
the sessions in a structured way.” (FMEA facilitator A) 
 
A summary of the postulate regarding the FMEA process (part II) is given in Table 2.4. 
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2.4.2.3 RCM logic application (Part III)  
This section describes our empirical findings with regard to the postulates on the 
application of RCM logic (Part III in Figure 2.1). 
 
Postulate 4: Following the FMEA method ensures consistency in maintenance decision 
making, e.g. the design of maintenance routines and maintenance planning  
We could not find sufficient support for this postulate, because we found that the FMEA 
procedure was in four out of six cases executed as a one-off exercise, after which changes 
were usually made to the preventive maintenance plan without reference to the original 
FMEA assumptions and outcome. An important reason is that the knowledge involved in 
the FMEA is usually tacit and documentation is scarce or distributed across a number of 
locations and systems. One important complication is that the original FMEA tended to 
involve design and process engineers and further optimizations to the maintenance plan 
are carried out by maintenance engineers. These two disciplines were usually not in close 
contact, for e.g. the simple fact that the design engineers were usually only or mostly 
involved during the design stage of the asset life cycle. This aspect also affects Postulates 6 
and 7 and appears to be quite a fundamental problem in the FMEA procedure. One of the 
interviewees confirmed:  
 
“If we get feedback from the maintenance people in the field that 
maintenance practices can be improved we use this feedback to update 
the maintenance routines and change the planning in our maintenance 
management system.” (Team leader maintenance C)  
 
Another interviewee described the difficulty of tracing back the original FMEA decision 
making:   
 
 “We tried to ask the experts who were involved in the original FMEA 
sessions ten years ago. If we were able to contact them, in most cases 
they could not provide the required insights as they could not recall the 





Also a lack of integration between the asset register, the maintenance management 
system and the FMEA software tools being used poses a problem for maintaining 
consistency, because information was stored at different aggregation levels in terms of the 
bill of material, and information had to be kept up-to-date in more than one place.  
 
The absence of consistency between the FMEA assumptions and findings and the actual 
maintenance planning can lead to some failure modes unnecessarily receiving abundant 
attention, which may lead to excessive maintenance cost, or insufficient attention, which 
may lead to unnecessary risk. However, we have not witnessed any direct evidence of that.  
 
Postulate 5: FMEA enables continuous improvement  
We could only find limited support for this postulate, since at four of the six companies, 
the FMEA was primarily treated as a one-off exercise. Thereafter, other maintenance 
routines are being used, such as e.g. Root Cause Analysis (RCA) (Wilson et al., 1993). The 
difference is quite fundamental: RCA is in principle reactive in nature, while FMEA aims 
to be pro-active, before a failure is occurring. One example: 
 
“The FMEA provides us with the original maintenance program. 
Thereafter, we solve the operational problems by conducting Root 
Cause Analyses based on problems that we have encountered in the 
field. People are flown in to help and analyze to see what happened and 
what has gone wrong.” (Maintenance focal point D) 
 
The fact that operational problems are solved using Root Cause Analyses does not remove 
the risk of having a sub-optimal maintenance plan, since this plan is still based on the 
original FMEA. Oftentimes, the solutions implemented after an RCA result in a change to 
the design of the installation (engineering change) or a local improvement of the 
maintenance routine, rather than a broad optimization of the maintenance plan. In 
addition, the original FMEA findings may become out-of-date if they are not maintained 
in subsequent RCA and other activities. 
 
In summary, difficulties in enabling continuous improvement using FMEA are: 
(1) The inability to re-access the expertise applied in the original FMEA procedure due 
to e.g. the design and process engineers only being present in this early phases of the 
asset life cycle; 
30 
 
(2) Use of other maintenance routines, such as Root Cause Analysis, and ad-hoc changes 
to the maintenance plan, whereby the original FMEA findings are not updated, 
rendering them out-of-date; 
 
(3) Absence of (the use of) standards describing the FMEA procedure and output, so 
that consistent repetition is difficult, as was described earlier. Also various 
information management problems were identified, e.g. (a) Insufficient detail in the 
reports of the original FMEA. In one case, current users only received the result of 
the procedure (i.e. the maintenance planning) whereby the assumptions and 
analyses were lost. (b) Limited integration between the register used for the FMEA 
and other information systems containing asset information, hindering the use of all 
information necessary for the analysis. (c) The use of different FMEA 
databases/systems for the same purpose. (D) not all users were allowed access to the 
systems required for FMEA. (e) The FMEA procedure does not consider the prior 
existence of a maintenance planning. The value of existing practices can therefore 
potentially be underestimated. 
 
At two companies we did find some evidence of improvements made to the original 
FMEA results. (B) did update FMEA findings at some point. This was possible because of 
the presence of design and process engineers within the organization at that time (team 
integration). Also (E) was showing efforts of updating the findings: 
   
“Of 50% of our assets we know the maintenance history, we store the 
maintenance findings in individual MS-Office files and we use this to 
review our maintenance plans. We are working towards the 
implementation of a central maintenance management system and we 
are also trying to extend this to all our assets. After every large revision 
we review what we have done and ask questions like: What did you see? 
What should we do next time? What was easier than expected and what 
was more difficult than we thought it would be. We always do this in the 
same consistent way and take some time for every piece of equipment.” 
(Reliability Engineer E)” 
 
However, for most companies, ‘continuous improvement’ would not be an appropriate 
description, since the FMEA is not constantly improved nor is the FMEA procedure a 
‘living’ one (Bloom, 2006).  
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Postulate 6: FMEA relies predominantly on expert judgment. The use of historic failure 
data or other measured data is generally not possible for conducting an FMEA.  
We observed that most companies find it very difficult or even disregard the option of 
conducting quantitative analysis, because of difficulties in acquiring sufficient reliable 
data. However, we did find some evidence of successful use of failure data and other 
measured data. First some comments on reasons why measured data should be 
disregarded: 
“Using data is very nice in theory, but very difficult in practice. How do 
we define a ‘failure’? Should we include preventive maintenance? Do we 
treat all failures (electrical, mechanical) as equal? In addition, there is 
noise in the data, the data may not be registered properly. Maintenance 
operators are not IT-people.” (Focal point maintenance and 
maintenance engineer D) 
 
Particularly one company that indicated to have a lot of problems and to be ‘fire-fighting’, 
also claimed that data analysis was not appropriate: 
 
“Perhaps it can be used for the final 20%, but first we have to get our regular 
processes in order. We have an older installation so we get more failures. We 
have to cut costs and reduce PM activities and we therefore have to make 
choices. People are critical, data are not.”  
This all appeared to be in line with the current postulate. However, not all companies 
shared this experience and opinion. Some companies did want to use more measured 
data, or see opportunities and two companies already do.  
 
“You need people and data, preferably both. I would like to use historic 
data, but at (A) there are no historic failure data available. Nor do we 
have the possibility to retrace historic corrective work orders. 
Sometimes I can use my own experience or work from memory, but 
that is more to trigger answers or thoughts.” (Reliability engineer A) 
 
“We just invested in the integration of our SAP system with one central 
FMEA database. The two-way communication will enable improvement 
of our FMEA. Our procedures also changed, we now have to update the 
FMEA before we change the maintenance plan. This connects the why 
and how of our maintenance, in the past the why was never asked.  
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The FMEA analysis is now transparent and accessible directly from the 
SAP system. Mechanics or operators can see where their reports are 
used for, this encourages accurate input. We are implementing this for 
two of our new plants, for our old plants we will determine focus areas.” 
(Team leader maintenance C) 
 
The case study showed that data needed for quantitative analyses is not always collected 
or the quality of data is assessed to be insufficient, e.g. data is not representative or valid. 
The absence of a ‘clear business case’ makes it difficult for the interviewees to invest time 
and money in improving this situation. However, (B) has founded a dedicated center for 
data management and analysis. The types of data being analyzed are process data (flow, 
temperature, pressure, among others) and failure data. A number of monitoring and 
management applications were developed, whereby the operational activities are 
constantly monitored and improved if opportune. Some of these applications use 
condition-based maintenance. In other applications, failure patterns are investigated. In 
addition, cross-disciplinary co-operation between engineers and maintenance experts is 
facilitated. In the case of (B), the business case justified this investment. Ensuring the 
quality of reported failure data and the integration of data are challenges being managed.  
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Table 2.5: Summary of the postulates of Part III 
 
2.5 Summary, discussion and implications 
The large body of knowledge found in the literature on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
indicates that it is an important topic in maintenance management. Other researchers 
have described that the method is widely used in industry, and we have witnessed six of 




Postulate Statement Results 
1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied on a limited 
selection of assets/parts 
Supported 
2 Failure modes and effects are identified and analyzed 
with sufficient accuracy 
Limited support 
3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied according to 
a clearly defined paper or software procedure 
Limited support 
 
4 Following the FMEA method ensures consistency in 
maintenance decision making, e.g. the design of 
maintenance routines and maintenance planning 
Not supported 
5 FMEA enables continuous improvement Limited support 
6 FMEA relies predominantly on expert judgment. The use 
of historic failure data or other measured data is 
generally not possible for conducting an FMEA 
Largely supported  
(2 companies do use 
data)  
Table 2.6: Summary of results 
 
The results of the multiple case study are summarized in Table 2.6.  
 
Contrary to the original proposals on RCM/FMEA (e.g. Moubray, 1992), but in line with recent 
literature (Dow and Endersby, 2004, Gabbar et al., 2003), the case companies followed a 
pragmatic approach in which the most critical assets are identified and analyzed. We have not 
witnessed any direct evidence that this particular approach has led to problems which could 
have been prevented by accepting a larger scope.  
 
FMEA is regarded as a one-off exercise by four out of the six companies investigated. A 
fundamental problem appears to be that that the FMEA procedure may solely rely upon expert 
judgment (postulate 6 was confirmed by four out of six companies in this study) and that the 
expert knowledge required for this judgment is often not available because of isolation 
between design and process engineers, involved in the first phases of the asset life cycle and in 




The maintenance engineers tend to update the maintenance plan, using e.g. feedback from the 
maintenance operators and Root Cause Analyses, without reference to the original FMEA 
findings, which then become out-of-date. One case company recently invested in the 
integration of the asset register and the FMEA database and another in founding a dedicated 
data management center. 
 
In addition, the FMEA-procedure is hindered by operational (e.g. lack of a clear procedure) 
and information management (e.g. inaccuracy in failure reporting by the maintenance 
operators, relevant information distributed across various systems) problems in practice. This 
problem is not necessarily caused by the nature and structure of the FMEA procedure itself, 
but does limit its usefulness in practice. A pro-active and influential facilitator may address or 
limit this problem. 
 
This study yields a number of opportunities for further research. Firstly, the study has laid 
bare a fundamental problem related to the nature of the RCM/FMEA procedure as well as 
operational and information management problems, such as data quality problems, e.g. 
accuracy of (failure) registration. These problems may be a good starting point for further 
research and development work.  
 
Possible improvements we propose are: (1) establish data gathering policy and processes based 
on criticality, (2) registration of uncertainties in FMEA analysis, (3) precise registration of 
failure data and failure modes and (4) education on the use of quantitative analysis." 
 
The design and use of a criticality based approach for data collection, analogues to the broadly 
used criticality based maintenance approach (RCM), may help to reduce efforts and improve 
return on investment by focusing data collection on (asset) information of asset parts that have 
the highest ‘criticality’. 
 
Secondly, this study may be extended to industry segments outside of the process industry. 
Thirdly, we have witnessed an effort to install a multi-disciplinary group with advanced data 
management practices and systems. Such initiatives, if successful, may prove to contain future 




A number of limitations can be identified in the current study. Firstly, we have to recognize 
that plant and human safety are the most important goals for process industry firms and that 
this might affect the choices made in the use of FMEA results and the subsequent maintenance 
planning. For example, when there are uncertainties in the assumptions and findings of the 
analysis, then the company may decide to opt for more frequent or different maintenance than 
the FMEA-results would suggest. This would add to the problems described earlier in 
organizing continuous improvement. Secondly, the findings are all derived from process 
industry firms. Other industries will differ in terms of operations strategy, dominating 
technologies, organizational arrangements and availability of software and hardware thereby 
affecting the RCM and FMEA approaches. However even for those industries the results may 
be useful since they indicate that various types of difficulties appear in the planning of 
maintenance by using RCM and FMEA approaches. For instance, the importance of actively 
managing process engineering, maintenance engineering and operations knowledge for use in 
the FMEA procedure in the process industry may have its peer in other industries.  
 
In summary, this study provided an empirical perspective on RCM and FMEA. We would like 
to encourage researchers to further develop practical ways to maintain the regulative cycle of 
continuous improvement envisaged by the developers of RCM/FMEA. Acquisition of data 
from the assets is generally not regarded as a useful activity, which in turn makes analysis, 
feedback and improvement very difficult. This stalemate situation needs to be resolved.   
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A Quantitative method for Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is commonly used for designing maintenance 
routines by analyzing potential failures, predicting their effect and facilitating preventive 
action. It is used to make decisions on operational and capital expenditure. The literature 
has reported that despite its popularity, the FMEA method lacks repeatability and the 
ability to continuously improve maintenance routines. In this chapter an enhancement to 
the FMEA method is proposed, which enables the probability of asset failure to be 
expressed as a function of explanatory variables, such as age, operating conditions or 
process measurements. The probability of failure and an estimate of the total costs can be 
used to determine maintenance routines. The procedure facilitates continuous 
improvement as the dataset builds up. The proposed method is illustrated through two 
datasets on failures. The first was based on an operating company exploiting a major gas 
field in the Netherlands. The second was retrieved from the public record and covers 






3.1   Introduction 
One of the most established and 
widely used maintenance 
methods is Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM), which 
originates from the defense and 
airline industries (Gabbar et al., 
2003, Garg and Deshmukh, 
2006, Moubray, 1992, Riezebos 
et al., 2009, Bloom, 2006). 
Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) is a part of 
RCM. FMEA is described in at 
least four (international) 
standards, MIL-STD 1629A 
(DoD, 1980) which is used in 
the United States military, IEC 60812 (IEC, 1985), BS EN 60812 (BSI, 2006) and the 
SAE-J1739 (SAE, 2002) standard. A recent study of the current authors suggests that 
FMEA is indeed regularly used in practice as a basis for preventive maintenance policies 
(Braaksma et al., 2012a). The steps within Reliability Centered Maintenance, including 
FMEA, are shown in Figure 1.1, which is reprinted for convenience in Figure 3.1 (Picknell, 
1999). After selecting the equipment to be analyzed, the next step is Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), which is used to identify potential failures that could have 
consequences affecting the functioning of a system within the limits of its application. It 
provides a framework for selecting appropriate maintenance or engineering actions. 
Failure modes are the possible ways, or modes, in which an asset can fail. Effects analysis 
involves predicting the effects of each failure mode (Dieter, 2000). 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was developed in 1949 by the American Army 
to evaluate the impact of system and equipment failures on mission success and the safety 
of personnel and equipment (Teoh and Case, 2005). The FMEA method is a qualitative 
assessment of risk, predominantly relying on the judgment of experts (Moubray, 1992). 
For large or complex assets, it may be very difficult to replicate or improve the analysis. 
This is because of the complex nature of the exercise, which results in the model being 
static, rather than a working tool which is updated as and when required (Garg and 
Deshmukh, 2006, Teoh and Case, 2005).  
Figure 3.1: FMEA as part of the RCM process, 
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Teoh and Case (2005) described the complexity in terms of knowledge management 
related to the FMEA and stated (p. 280): “when the FMEA grows, the information will be 
increasingly difficult to find. Eventually users will prefer to recreate their own FMEA 
rather than reuse existing knowledge with a risk of repeated failures”. Because all experts 
have to be consulted again, the process can become troublesome. There is also no 
guarantee that the new assessment will be an improvement. From a multiple case study in 
the process industry, we can confirm that this complexity can indeed be found in practice.  
 
Three factors are usually taken into account when evaluating the risk of failure: the 
severity; the probability of occurrence; and the likelihood of detecting the failure (Dieter, 
2000, Stamatis, 2003). These are estimated through expert judgment. Previous research 
has proposed approaches that make the FMEA method less reliant on expert judgment 
and more suitable for continuous improvement (Franceschini and Galetto, 2001, Teoh 
and Case, 2005). Most of the existing literature has focused on quantifying the severity of 
failures and relationships between failures, sometimes including cost consequences. The 
literature offers several ways to value the severity of risk (or chain of risks) appropriately. 
Kmenta and Ishii (2000b) stated that the detection index does not accurately measure the 
contribution to risk and the Risk Priority Number is an inconsistent risk prioritization 
approach. They proposed that FMEA should be arranged around failure scenarios rather 
than failure modes and that risks should be evaluated in terms of probabilities and cost. 
Franceschini and Galetto (2001) proposed a method for calculating Risk Priority 
Numbers that used the ordinal features of qualitative scales to collect information from 
design teams. Seyed-Hosseni et al. (2006) proposed the Design Making Trial and 
Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method that analyzed the relationships between 
components of a system in respect to their failure modes and severity. Failure Mode 
Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is an extension of FMEA that includes severity 
and ‘criticality’ as the two risk elements. Criticality represents an indication of the sum of 
the probabilities of occurrence of all failure modes for a certain part or asset (DoD, 1980).  
 
Monitoring the probability of occurrence has received relatively little attention in the 
FMEA-literature so far. If it is included in FMEA, then it is usually estimated in a 
qualitative way similar to the other elements. One possible reason for this could be that 
FMEA is often seen as a one-off exercise (Braaksma et al., 2012a). A maintenance plan for 
addressing potential failures that fall in the category of preventive maintenance is then 
decided upon at the start of the plant life-cycle. As explained, monitoring and optimizing 
of such a plan is difficult.  
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We will present a proposal that includes a quantitative model for establishing the 
probability of failure occurrence and severity that is based on monitored dependencies 
(such as time and other variables) that is expressed in terms of cost. Our proposal can be 
used as an enhancement to step 6 of the FMEA method shown in Figure 3.1. Our scope is 
limited to analyzing and maintaining a group of identical assets or asset parts, although 
some comments are provided regarding the management of non-identical assets. 
 
Section 2 describes the proposed methodology and presents the procedure. Section 3 
demonstrates the approach in two practical applications; the first is based on an operating 
company exploiting a major gas field in The Netherlands. The second is using a dataset 
retrieved from public record that describes degradation occurrences of nuclear power 
plants in the United States. This is followed in Section 4 by the discussion and 
conclusions as well as a summary of the contribution of the chapter.  
 
3.2 Modeling the Probability of the Failure of Assets 
This section outlines the methodology of the design of the proposed enhanced FMEA method. 
 
3.2.1  Procedure 
Our model will focus on predicting the probability of occurrence of failure and the severity 
in terms of cost. Regression analysis is commonly used to examine the relationship 
between variables in probabilistic models (Hair et al., 2006, Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, 
Verbeek, 2000). In our approach, a probabilistic model of failure is built using logistic 
regression. Let us assume that we have a column vector y with failure data from identical 
(parts of) assets that contains the value 0 if an asset i did not fail and a value of 1 if it did. 
Please note that we use the term ‘asset’ and that we could have chosen the ‘part’ or 
‘component’ instead.  
Let us also assume that we have a matrix X with 
characteristics of the assets that may affect the 
probability of failure (e.g. age, temperature, 
elapsed running hours) and a column vector β 
with values that show the effect of X on the 
probability of failure  1iyp of asset i. β has to 
be estimated, y and X are assumed to be available 
(failure data).  Figure 3.2: Logistic relationship 
dependent and independent variables 
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With the logistic model as shown in eq. (1) one can test if asset failure can be related to 
the measured data (Hair et al., 2006, Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  1iyp  is the 
probability of failure of asset i.  




1     (1) 
 
The right hand side of eq. (1) is the standard logistic distribution, which is non-linear, 
which allows changes of the same magnitude to have different impact depending upon the 
value of the explanatory variables. It also ensures that probability of predictions is in the 
range 0 to 1. This is illustrated in the basic example in Figure 3.2. The impact of a change 
in X depends not only on the size of the change, but also on the value of X. The estimation 
of the values in the column vector β in eq. (1) is accomplished through the use of 
maximum likelihood theory. The log-likelihood function for the logistic model (Verbeek, 
2000) is given in eq. (2).  
 









            (2) 
 
Where F(.) is the standard logistic distribution function (Verbeek, 2000) given by eq. (3): 
    w
w
e
ewLwF  1     (3) 
 
After commissioning of the plant, the amount of measured data will initially be limited. 
The advantage of the FMEA method is that it can be used when there is not enough data 
for quantitative analysis (Teoh and Case, 2005). When sufficient records are available our 
method can be used in addition. The quantitative nature of our method makes repetition 
of the FMEA more easily and a ‘living FMEA’ as proposed by e.g. Moubray (1992), Bloom 




Two types of data are required for our method: asset characteristics (X) and failure data (y). 
For the acquisition of failure data, one has to choose the time-interval. Within this interval, 
a sufficient number of failures should have been recorded. There is no strict rule for the 
number of failures to justify the logit model. However, in case one doubts if the number of 
failures is sufficient a complementary log-log regression can be estimated as a robustness 
analysis. This complementary log-log regression was especially developed to examine rare 
events (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). One caveat is that the data in X should be based on 
measurements from before the respective failures. 
 
The number of observations required to apply the logistic model depends on the influence of 
the characteristics on the probability of failure. If the engineer knows which variables are to 
be included in the model, power analysis can be used to estimate the number of 
observations that is necessary for an accurate analysis (Cohen, 1988). Long (1997) stated 
that analyses with less than 100 observations should be avoided and that 500 observations 
should be enough for most logistic models. If the number of assets is less than required, one 
can increase the number of observations by using multiple time intervals in which an asset 
fails (value 1 in y) or not (value 0 in y). 
 
If the assets received time-based preventive maintenance and there is sufficient failure data, 
but little data on asset characteristics, one could still use the model by including 
maintenance activities in X of eq. (1) and estimating β. For example, the elapsed time 
between the last maintenance activity and the end of the measured time interval, or the time 
between maintenance and failure could be used provided that failure occurred before the 
end of the interval in X of eq. (1). The result reveals an estimate of the probability of failure 
of an asset against the elapsed time since the last maintenance activity. If there are no 
failure data available, one could base the probability of failure on expert opinions. Even in 
that case, the remainder of our procedure could be useful.  
 
Naturally, the data used for our suggested analysis should be trustworthy, i.e. appropriately 
reflecting actual events. One way to achieve this is by involving operations representatives 
or other subject matter experts (Moubray, 1992). A potential drawback of this approach is 
that they can have a biased opinion and may be inclined to remove outliers, which are 
potentially informative. Another way is to use standard data cleansing techniques, such as 
trimming and ‘winsorizing’. In a trimmed estimator, the extreme values are discarded; in a 
winsorized estimator, the extreme values are replaced by certain percentiles (the trimmed 




After the model, containing values of y, X and an estimated β has been established, the 
next step is to evaluate the order of fit of the model. We propose the use of a Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) analysis for this purpose, which is a commonly used 
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Figure 3.4: tp-rate and 1– fp-rate  
per threshold 
 
ROC-analysis takes into account the false positive rate (fp-rate) and true positive rate (tp-
rate). A false positive in the context of failures is that the model produced an incorrect 
prediction of asset failure (i.e. in practice the asset did not fail). A true positive is a correct 
prediction of failure in a period. This failure prediction depends on the probability 
estimated by the model and the threshold probability set by the engineer (e.g. if the model 
predicts a failure probability of eighty percent and the engineer sets a threshold value of 
seventy percent, the engineer predicts that the asset will fail). If in reality the asset did 
fail, it is called a true positive. However, if the asset did not fail, it will be called a false 
positive. In the ideal situation, the number of true positives should be equal to the 
number of failures and the number of false positives should be nil and the ROC-curve, 
Figure 3.3 should ideally show a 90 degree line up to a tp-rate of one, after which it runs 
horizontally. Therefore the fp-rate (eq. (4), also called 1-specificity) is more informative 
than the number of false positives. The same goes for the tp-rate compared to the number 
of true positives, eq. (5). In eqs. (4) and (5) pfalse and ptrue are the number of false and true 
positives in a certain period; ntot is the total number of negatives in that period and ptot is 










ptp-rate                               (5)  
 
The fp- and tp-rates lie both between 0 and 1. It is interesting to examine the relationship 
between the fp-rate and tp-rate, since the fp-rate should be as low as possible while the 
tp-rate should be as high as possible. The relationship between the fp-rate and tp-rate 
can be plotted in a so-called ROC-curve (Fawcet, 2006), an example of which is shown in 
Figure 3.3. An ROC-curve starts at the origin, which represents the situation in which 
failures were predicted not to happen in a certain period (therefore pfalse = 0 and ptrue = 0). 
The curve ends at (1,1). This point represents the situation in which each asset is 
predicted to fail in a given period (tp-rate = 1, since all the correctly predicted failures 
have occurred and also fp-rate = 1, because all the incorrectly predicted failures did not 
happen). In the ideal case the tp-rate will immediately rise to 1 (i.e. even at a low fp-rate, 
the tp-rate is 1). However, in the example-graph in Figure 3.2, as in most practical 
applications (Fawcet, 2006), the tp-rate gradually increases to 1 with an increasing fp-
rate. The area under the ROC-curve is a measure of fit of the model (Fawcet, 2006). This 
area is related to a Mann-Witney U and Wilcoxon signed rank test and should not be 
confused with an R-square, i.e. an increase of say 0.1 does not mean that the model has 
ten percent better explaining power (Fawcet, 2006). The ROC has the advantage over R-
squared, since more information can be deducted from it. By looking at the ROC it can be 
seen in which part the model performs well and for which part the performance is not as 
good. The ROC-curve can be applied to any probabilistic model and shows the benefit of 
using the model instead of randomly assigning failure to a certain asset (which is 
represented by the 45 degree line in Figure 3.3)(Fawcet, 2006). 
 
The next step in the procedure is to determine appropriate threshold values for failure. 












  (6) 
 
faili is a Boolean variable with the expectation of failure of asset i and ipˆ is the predicted 
probability of failure of asset i. Although an ROC-curve shows the relationship between the 
fp-rate and the tp-rate, it does not generally convey any information for determining 
appropriate threshold values.  
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To help determine a threshold, one can plot the fp-rate and tp-rate separately7, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.4, which shows the trade-off of true positives and false 
positives, denoted as the sensitivity (tp-rate) and the specificity (1 – fp-rate) against all 
possible threshold values. If both the sensitivity and specificity are weighted equally 
important, 0.25 would be an appropriate threshold in the example of Figure 3.4 (the 
theoretical optimal threshold value would where sensitivity and specificity are both equal 
to 1). The maintenance cost should be taken into account when rating the importance of 
the sensitivity and specificity. 
 
One could specify breakdown cost and preventive maintenance cost and calculate what 
the total cost of the sample would be for each threshold value. Let us assume that if faili = 
1 in eq. (6), asset i will undergo preventive maintenance with cost cm (with the preventive 
maintenance assumed to be effective) and if faili = 0, yet asset i fails, it causes a cost cf. 
The total costs can then be calculated with eq. (7).  
 
    totftottotmtot ptp-ratecnfp-rateptp-ratecc  1  
  (7) 
 
In this equation ctot denotes the total costs. Since the tp-rate and fp-rate depend on the 
threshold value, ctot does also. Figures 3.5-3.7 show the total costs per threshold value for 
three specifications of cm and cf. Figure 3.5 and 3.7 show two extreme cases. Figure 3.5 
shows a situation where preventive maintenance is never advisable, since ctot decreases if 
the threshold value increases. This is because the failure cost is relatively low compared to 
the maintenance cost. Figure 3.7 shows the other extreme; the cost of failure is so high 
compared to the cost of maintenance that failure has to be avoided even if this means that 
each asset is to be maintained in each interval. Figure 3.6 shows an intermediate case, in 
which the point of minimum ctot (0.4) can be selected as optimum. Thus each asset with a 
predicted probability of failure ≥ 0.4 has to be maintained. 
 
                                                 
7 Common practice is to plot 1- fp-rate (specificity) to the threshold value but for the interpretation this does not 
matter (Fawcet, 2006) 
 




The ratio of cm/cf can be seen as a quantitative measure of the severity. If the cost of 
failure is high compared to the cost of maintenance, i.e. severity is high, it is important to 
make sure that the asset should never fail and therefore to carry out sufficient preventive 
maintenance (Figure 3.7). Management can decide on which costs of failure should be 
included and how much this should be. The Hidden failure, Safety consequence, 
Environmental consequences and Operational consequences (HSEO) described in the 
RCM decision diagram (Moubray, 1992 p.204) can be used for this. 
 
The model presented here adds value by improving the decision on whether to apply 
preventive or corrective maintenance in non-trivial cases such as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Moreover, if the model very accurately predicts failure it might be reasonable (from a cost 
perspective) not to undertake preventive maintenance on every asset, even if the severity 
is relatively high.  
There is not a direct tradeoff between accuracy and severity. In the use of the model, the 
accuracy cannot be altered by the decision maker, but the (estimate of) the severity can be 
altered through the estimation of the various costs involved.  
It is important to note that the model is maintainable. New data can first be used to 
predict failures. Secondly, the new data can be used to re-estimate the model and redo the 
analysis. The model may prevent actual failures and therefore cause new input data to 
diminish, and therefore the scope for further improvement in the model may diminish. 
 
3.2.1.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In contrast to the traditional FMEA method, the current regression procedure makes it 
possible to specify several models and compare them. It is possible to include additional 
asset characteristics and assess if these have a significant effect on the prediction of the 
probability of failure, or establish the impact of certain variables on the probability of 
failure. The ROC-analysis can help to examine the fit of the models. A caveat is that it may 
be possible to specify a model that best fits the observed data, yet it may not behave well 
with future data. One way to analyze the likelihood of this is by performing sensitivity 
analyses, by firstly determining a possible model and later to assess if the estimated 





3.3 Pumps in a European gas field and US nuclear power plants  
This section presents two examples of the 
procedure applied to datasets, which are used to 
illustrate the procedure which is summarized in 
Figure 3.8. The procedure is based on the steps 
described in the previous section. Some of the 
information which can identify the assets was 
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Figure 3.5: cost vs. probability per threshold 
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Figure 3.6: cost vs. probability per threshold 
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Figure 3.7: cost vs. probability per threshold 
















Figure 3.8: Outline of procedure 
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3.3.1        Pumps in a European gas field 
The Netherlands Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM) is a joint venture between Shell and 
ExxonMobil which is operating the Groningen gas field, which is the largest gas field in 
Europe. There are currently 20 gas production plants in operation that were designed using 
generic design standards.  
 
The designs included redundancy for some key units (e.g. two units operating in parallel 
to execute one function). As an example, we will review failure data relating to one type of 
centrifugal injection pump, called P5A for confidentiality. Each plant is fitted with two 
P5A pumps that operate in parallel; therefore 40 P5A pumps are in operation, each 
executing the same function. Our procedure is used to analyze the occurrence of failure 
and the total costs of failure and maintenance and due to age (calendar time) of these 
pumps. Failure data was used for the period July 2006 until March 2010.  
  
Because new equipment experiences ‘childhood diseases’ it is recommended that only 
assets running in so-called ‘normal life’ or ‘steady-state’ are analyzed (Mobley, 2004 p.3) 
the break-in or startup period is thus excluded. Our initial analysis confirmed that failure 
patterns of pumps younger than 2 years were significantly different compared to pumps 
older than 2 years. Therefore we focused our analysis on pumps older than 2 years. The 
number of observations is 1186, based on 40 pumps x 46 months (1840 observations) not 
including the observations of pumps below the age of two (654 observations were 
dropped). The number of observations we used is higher than the minimum number 
required for logistic modeling (Long, 1997).  
 
3.3.1.1 Estimate logistic model and ROC analysis  
We constructed a logistic model using eqs. (1-3) including the variable AGEi, which was 
the age of pump i (i=1..40). Our X matrix of eq. (1) should therefore contain two columns, 
the first with observations on the age and the second with values 1 that represents the 
constant. Our y vector contains information on FAILURESi, which has the value of 1 if 
pump i failed in the time interval July 2006 until March 2010 and a value of 0 if it did 
not. All pumps were maintained, after failure they got mended, no pump was replaced 
during the sample period. This model is represented by eq. (8). The estimated β of this 















The results in Table (3.2) show that AGE does indeed have a positive significant impact 
on the probability of failure.  
 
The ROC-curve belonging to the model in Table 3.1 is given in Figure 3.9, the 1- fp- and 
















0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
fp-rate
Area under ROC curve = 0.6354
 






























Table 3.1: Regression results 
LOGISTIC Β 





Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 1%. 
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Table (3.2) shows the predictions of failures for the entire sample. 
 
Table 3.2: Predicted probability of failures 
Variable Nr of Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Predicted failure (p) 1186 .029 .013 .017 .088 
 
 
3.3.1.2  Cost minimization by determining the optimal threshold value 
If both the sensitivity and specificity are weighted equally, 0.03 would be an appropriate 
threshold. To rate the importance of the sensitivity and specificity, the maintenance cost 
should be taken into account. For the purpose of demonstrating the procedure, we have shown 
possible examples in Figures 3.11 and 3.12. It is possible that in the case of the investigated 
pumps the cf greatly exceeds cm as shown in Figure 3.11. However, if an optimum, i.e. a 
minimum ctot exists, as shown in Figure 3.12, then the corresponding value of the x-axis is the 
optimum threshold value. This value can be used to plan preventive maintenance according to 
procedure described. With a cost ratio cm/cf = 10/100 the asset should not receive preventive 
maintenance whilst with a cost ratio cm/cf = 10/250 a threshold can be identified for the 
optimum. Again the expected expenditures for preventive maintenance activities and costs of 
failure can be determined for this optimum. 
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Figure 3.11: cost vs. probability per threshold 
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Figure 3.12: cost vs. probability per threshold8 
(Example cm/cf = 10 / 250) 
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3.3.2 US nuclear power plants 
The information and dataset were retrieved from the literature, in which degradation 
occurrences (i.e. discrete events) in US nuclear power plants were reported and important 
aging characteristics were identified (Braverman et al., 2004, Nie et al., 2008, Nie et al., 
2009). The number of observations is higher than the minimum number required for 
logistic modeling (Long, 1997) and applying the data provides basic insight in applying 
the steps of the procedure and possible results. This is intended as an example of the 
procedure, not as an assessment of the reliability and maintenance strategy of the power 
plants. 
 
3.3.2.1 Estimate logistic model and ROC analysis  
Braverman et al. (2004) demonstrated a relationship between degradation occurrences of 
safety-related structures and passive components and the age of the plants as explanatory 
variable. The dataset consists of data on 104 nuclear power plants, which are of two 
different types: Pressurized water reactors (PWR) and Boiling water reactors (BWR). In 
our example we show the PWR type, which is the most frequently used (69 plants). The 
timeframe chosen in this example is a period of two years (2000-2001), during which 37 
out of 69 nuclear power plants produced a degradation occurrence. All reported 
degradation occurrences were included in our example. The selected assets that produced 
a degradation occurrence had a mean age of 31 years and the assets that did not do so had 
a mean age of 29 years (see Figure 3.2). We constructed a logistic model using eqs. (1-3). 
We have included the age of the plant AGEi as a variable in our model i (i=1..69). The X 
matrix of eq. (3) should therefore contain two columns, the first with the observations on 
age and the second with values 1 that represents the constant. Our y vector contains 
information on FAILURESi, which has the value of 1 if plant i produced a degradation 


















The results in Table (3.3) show that AGE does indeed have a positive significant impact 
on the probability of failure, the relationship would resemble Figure 3.2. The ROC-curve 
corresponding to the model in Table (3.3) is given in Figure 3.13). The area under the 
ROC-curve is 0.66 and would have been 0.5 if the model would not have added any value 
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Figure 3.14: tp-rate and 1 – fp-rate  
per threshold 
 
Table 3.3 Regression results 
LOGISTIC β 





Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 1%. 
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=  so the probability of a degradation 












Indeed, the probability of degradation increases with age, as shown in Table (3.4). Table 
(3.5) shows the predictions of degradation occurrences for the entire sample. 
 
Table 3.4: Example of calculated probabilities of a degradation occurrence in a yearly 
period 
AGE 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 35 
  1FAILURESp  0.09 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.48 
 
Table 3.5: Predicted probability of degradation occurrences 
Variable Nr of obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
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Figure 3.15: cost vs. probability per 
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Figure 3.16: cost vs. probability per threshold 




3.3.2.2 Cost minimization by determining the optimal threshold value 
Figure 3.14 shows the sensitivity and the specificity against threshold values as in eq.(6). 
If both the sensitivity and specificity are weighted equally, 0.37 would be an appropriate 
threshold. To rate the importance of the sensitivity and specificity, the maintenance cost 
should be taken into account. Since Braverman et al. (2004) conveyed only very limited 
information on maintenance cost, we could not include exact values. For the purpose of 
demonstrating the procedure, we have shown possible examples in Figures 3.15, 3.16 and 
3.17. It is possible that in the case of nuclear power plants, the cf  greatly exceeds cm as 
shown in Figure 3.17. However, if an optimum, i.e. a minimum ctot exists, as shown in 
Figure 3.16, then the corresponding value of the x-axis is the optimum threshold value as 
defined in eq. (6). This value can be used to determine which assets should receive 
preventive maintenance. Figure 3.15 and 3.17 illustrate extreme cases. Figure 3.16 shows a 
cost ratio of cm/cf = 10/12 and an optimum ctot at approximately 0.33. This value can be 
used to plan preventive maintenance according to procedure described. The expected 
expenditures for preventive maintenance activities (cm) and costs of degradation 
occurrence (cf) can be determined for this optimum. 
 
3.4 Discussion, summary and implications  
In this chapter we have developed a procedure which enhances the traditional method of 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The enhancement is aimed at minimizing or 
compensating the weaknesses in the traditional method: reliance on expert judgment is 
diminished by providing a way to use historical failure data. The primary application of 
the model is to use the estimated probability of failure occurrence, combined with the 
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Figure 3.17: cost vs. probability per 




This list can be used in the traditional FMEA analysis. Also the Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC) analysis is demonstrated, in which the estimated probabilities are 
used to determine an improved corrective/ preventive maintenance policy resulting in the 
lowest costs.  
 
The method is based on the use of measured data. This means that the method can be 
repeated in a consistent way, and can improve as the dataset builds up. In a start-up 
situation, with little or no measured data, the user would have to take assumptions and 
expert judgment as a guide to develop the maintenance routines, in a way similar to the 
original FMEA method.  
  
In the development of our method we made some assumptions. Firstly, the model is of a 
probabilistic nature, and the results are therefore estimations based on trends rather than 
deterministic calculations. In case of more than one asset, data of multiple comparable 
assets is assumed to be available. All distributions are assumed to be normal. Secondly, it 
is assumed that failures do occur or have occurred, i.e. that failure data is available. If 
failures are avoided, for example through Condition-based maintenance (CBM) (Veldman 
et al., 2010), then it may still be possible to use approximate failure data by assuming that 
failure would have happened if the condition-based maintenance actions would not have 
prevented it. Such combined CBM-FMEA routines are outside of the scope of this chapter. 
Thirdly, just as in FMECA method (DoD, 1980) it is assumed that all failures are detected, 
which avoids problems associated with the interpretation and measurement of the term.  
 
For measuring it is important that the environment in which failure of parts occurs is 
stable for the measurement period (e.g. fixed costs resulting from failure). Fourthly, while 
continuous monitoring of assets is promoted in the current literature (Gorjian et al., 
2009) we focused on discrete occurrences. Although the concept of continuous 
monitoring can be included in our model by using e.g. ordered logistic models, this is left 
for future research. In the two real-life examples, time and cross sections are taken as 
equal, i.e. all physical assets are assumed to be identical. However, if data for similar but 
different assets is available over a certain period, it is possible to relax this assumption. 
Consider the situation that assets have unobservable characteristics that cause differences 
in the failure rate (comparable to e.g. the problem of ‘Monday morning products’). There 
is a way to cope with such unobservable characteristics by using a panel logistic model. It 
is possible to estimate the logistic model with e.g. fixed effects (Allison, 2009). 
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We have not explored this further since it is outside of the scope of this chapter, but it 
may serve as suggestion for further research. 
In our model we used fixed time periods; future research could explore the influence of 
varying time periods and varying data sets on the results. In future research we aim to 
further investigate the relation between explanatory variables and asset failures in 
practice. In addition, we discussed our model using fictitious cost-ratios. For future 
research it is suggested to test our model using a dataset with cost data. 
Finally, we suggest to do further work on testing with small sample sizes, as in practice, 
companies may only have limited data. We tested our model using small subsamples and 
found that the stability and the accuracy of some of the subsamples are diminished and 
that β becomes upward biased, in line with (Nemes et al., 2009). Data improvement 
techniques may be relevant to improve the quality of the data in this respect. Validation of 
the model could also be done by examining the out of sample performance of the model. 
 
3.4.1 Managerial implications 
The implications of the current development are that the enhanced FMEA method can 
improve or verify an existing FMEA analysis and subsequent maintenance planning 
actions. The analysis can provide valuable feedback on the reliability of assets and its 
possible consequences and potential waste or damage in terms of unnecessary 
maintenance or failures resulting from improper maintenance. The quantitative nature of 
the model makes it easier to repeat than a qualitative judgment of experts; continuous 
improvement is therefore easier to achieve and the quantitative nature of the results 
makes it easier for a board of directors to be transparent to stakeholders about asset 
performance and the mitigation of risks.  
The main practical implication of the enhanced FMEA method is that it offers 
Maintenance Managers and engineers a practical tool to help solve two well-known 
problems currently seen in practice: firstly, serious analysis is often hindered by the 
reliability modeling techniques offered in the academic literature being (perceived to be) 
too complex to use in practice, and secondly, data gathering and data management are 
being neglected, thus rendering analysis attempts meaningless (Garg and Deshmukh, 
2006). The proposed method aims to motivate companies to start collecting relevant and 
high-quality data by offering a procedure that is practically applicable and adds value 




p probability of failure of asset i 
 values that show the effect of X on the probability of failure of asset i 
i index assets 
faili Boolean with the expectation of failure of asset i and ipˆ  
fp-rate false-positive rate 
tp-rate  true-positive rate 
pfalse, ptrue  the number of false and true positives in a certain period 
ntot  the total number of negatives in a period  
ptot  the total number of positives 
ctot total costs 
cm cost of preventive maintenance (assumed to be effective) 
cf cost of failure 
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Appendix 3:  
Application quantitative modelling results within 
FMEA procedure 
 
The calculated probabilities and insights in cost of preventive and corrective maintenance 
policies related to actual calculated probabilities can be used as an additional input in 
FMEA sessions by subject matter experts. As stated, this proposal can be used as an 
enhancement to step 6 of the FMEA method shown in Figure 3a.1. 
 
Application quantitative modelling results within FMEA procedure (step 6) 
a. Determine the estimated cost of corrective maintenance for a failure mode in the 
selected asset in a period of time.  
b. Determine the estimated cost for preventive maintenance for a failure mode in the 
selected asset in a period of time.  
c. Construct a logit model to calculate asset failure based on the available failure  (or 
degradation) data and possible explaining variables (e.g. age). 
d. Perform a ROC analysis on the aforementioned logit model to determine tp-rates and 
fp-rates and determine if ROC analysis shows statistical significance. 
e. Use the cost data and tp-rate and fp-rate to determine optimal threshold values  
and make threshold graphs. 
 
Figure 3a.1: Application quantitative modelling as part of the RCM/FMEA process, 






(to select appropriate maintenance 
or engineering actions 
 and determine task frequencies)
 
7. Document results 




a. Determine the estimated
CM cost
b. Determine the estimated
PM cost
c. Construct a logit model
d. Perform a ROC analysis
and determine statistic signficance
e. Determine optimal treshold values
and make threshold graphs
f. Use threshold graphs to 
determine PM or CM 




f. Use the threshold graphs to determine the ex-ante optimum and if a preventive or 
corrective maintenance plan should be preferred. 
g. Use the outcome as input for subject matter experts who can compare the outcome of 
the ex-ante optimum with other quantitative or qualitative assessments. 
N.B. The determined probabilities can also be used as part of a criticality assessment (step 
5, figure 3.1), the calculated probabilities can be used to make an ordinal judgment on the 








Chapter 4  
 
Design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis 




Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an important method to design and 
prioritize preventive maintenance activities. It is the basis for preventive maintenance 
planning in reliability-centred maintenance (RCM). From a theoretical perspective, the 
resulting preventive maintenance plan should be regularly reviewed based on the existing 
FMEA. However, preventive maintenance planning in current practice is directly 
updated, without use of RCM/FMEA logic, because information management is not 
appropriate. This brings companies to widen their safety margins and apply extra 
maintenance. This paper presents the design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis method 
(MFA) extending the RCM/FMEA approach. The aim of MFA is to improve FMEA related 
information management for continuous use of RCM/FMEA logic. A design based 
research methodology is used. The maintenance feedback process and resultant 
information architecture is investigated in a case study, which leads to design principles 
and design requirements. The design of the MFA method is based on these design 






Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an important method to design and 
prioritize preventive maintenance activities. Within reliability-centred maintenance  it is 
used as a basis for preventive maintenance planning (Moubray, 1992, Bloom, 2006). In 
current practice the FMEA plays a role when it is handed-over from design engineering to 
maintenance engineering. The FMEA is however not reviewed or updated anymore after 
its initial use (Braaksma et al., 2012a, Teoh and Case, 2005, Teng and Ho, 1996). In other 
words, FMEA is regarded as a one-time only exercise: not as an object of development 
(Braaksma et al., 2011). However, according to seminal authors, information feedback is 
essential for the success and an effective and efficient maintenance program based on a 
living FMEA (Bloom, 2006, Teoh and Case, 2005, Moubray, 1992).  
 
The preventive maintenance plan might be inaccurate when used in practice. It is difficult 
to assess the precise impact of the inaccuracies, but it is likely that they will lead to 
unnecessary costs. Earlier research (Braaksma et al., 2011) showed that companies have a 
tendency to widen their safety margins and apply extra maintenance in case of 
inaccuracies or uncertainties in their analyses.   
 
Focus on the process industry 
Our study focuses on the process industry, which is characterized by the need to use 
complex and expensive installations efficiently and safely (Fransoo and Rutten, 1994, 
Dennis and Meredith, 2000, Hu et al., 2009). The design of the plant and equipment 
tends to be relatively important for safety and operational performance as compared with 
other industries (Gunasekaran, 1998). Structured preventive maintenance, including the 
use of FMEA, is therefore important for companies in the process industry (Azadeh et al., 
2010).  
 
Aim and scope 
The aim of this chapter is threefold: 1) explaining and exploring the RCM/FMEA related 
information management problems, 2) determining asset information management 
design principles for and 3) design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis method (MFA) 





Organization of the chapter 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 a literature review on FMEA-based 
maintenance is presented which outlines the main problems with regard to the 
continuous use of FMEAs for maintenance. This is followed in section 4.3 by a discussion 
of the research methodology applied. In section 4.4, a case study is used to explore the 
precise context in which feedback is collected and used for updating FMEAs. In section 
4.5 the case study and literature are used for deriving design principles. In section 4.6, 
our Maintenance Feedback Analysis method based on the described design principles is 
presented. The chapter ends with a conclusion and discussion of the results in section 4.7. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
In this section FMEA, RCM methodologies and the need for a living RCM/FMEA program 
are discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)  
FMEA is a method of reliability analysis intended to identify failures affecting the 
functioning of a system. It enables priorities for action to be set (BS5760, 2009). FMEA is 
used to identify failure modes. Failure modes are the ways, or modes, in which an asset 
can fail. The severity, probability of occurrence and risk of non-detection are estimated 
and used to rate the risk associated with each failure mode. Usual practice is to combine 
these elements in a ‘risk priority number’ (Dieter, 2000).  
FMEA is widely used and described in at least four (international) standards, MIL-STD 
1629A (DoD, 1980), which is used in the United States military, IEC 60812 (IEC, 1985), 
BS EN 60812 (BSI, 2006) and the SAE-J1739 (SAE, 2002) standard. 
 
FMEA is an important part of Reliability Centred Maintenance, RCM, defined by 
Moubray (1992, p.8) as a process used to determine what must be done to ensure that 
any physical asset continues to do what its users want it to do in its present operating 
context. The steps of FMEA within RCM are shown in Figure 1.1, which is reprinted for 
convenience as Figure 4.1 (amended from Picknell 1999).  
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Some authors have 
criticized the approach to 
use the FMEA in RCM 
because it would be 
complex and time 
consuming. Also, it would 
ignore existing barriers 
between asset 
management processes 
(Tsang, 2002).  
 
There were also quite 
some critiques on the 
calculation of the Risk 
Priority Number (RPN), which is the output of an FMEA. Various altered approaches 
were proposed such as the FMECA (DoD, 1980), which measures criticality by translating 
impact into costs and ignores Detection for various reasons stated (DoD, 1980, Kmenta 
and Ishii, 2000a, Rhee and Ishii, 2003, Seyed-Hosseini et al., 2006, Teoh and Case, 
2005, Braaksma et al., 2012b). 
 
Nevertheless, the method is described as an important practice in asset management and 
presented as one of the key advanced maintenance procedures (Bloom, 2006, August, 
(2003 p.193), Moubray, 1992). The current literature predominantly covers progress in 
FMEA process and concept design (e.g. Sharma and Sharma, 2010, Bertolini et al., 2006, 
Selvik and Aven, 2011), whereas the use of FMEA in a maintenance context in the process 
industry has been researched by Braaksma et al. (2012a) summarises the main 
descriptions and assumptions found in the literature on FMEA into six postulates, and 
compares the postulates to industrial practice.  
 
The results suggest a fundamental problem in the FMEA procedure, namely, the reliance 
upon expert judgement in general and the reliance upon design engineering expertise for 
keeping the FMEA up-to-date in particular. To conclude: despite some criticism, 
















Figure 4.1. FMEA as part of the RCM process, amended 
from Picknell (1999) 
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4.2.2  RCM/FMEA as a living program 
Bloom (2006) states that the RCM/FMEA process must remain a ‘living’ one, never to 
become static. New failure modes may become evident, and additional information 
relative to equipment performance may present itself at any time. Oftentimes, the 
preventive maintenance schedule may need to be adjusted. Periodicities may need to be 
increased or decreased. Newly identified tasks may need to be added, while others may 
need to be deleted based on new or different operating conditions or plant modifications. 
A living program includes a feedback loop, which is important because it helps to 
maintain the viability of the program (Bloom, 2006). Down et al. (2008 p.63) explain that 
the focus should always be on continuous improvement: “After the preventive/corrective 
action has been completed, the (risk) priority indicator should be calculated again and 
revised rankings should be reviewed. If further action is considered necessary, then repeat 
the analysis”. Stamatis (2003 p.xxvii) writes: “The push for this continual improvement 
makes the FMEA a dynamic document, changing as the system, design, process, product, 
and/or service changes”. Accordingly, literature agrees that the FMEA should be a living 
program in RCM. 
 
4.2.3  Information management as an enabler of a living FMEA 
The information and knowledge brought together in an FMEA expert session is critical for 
the success of FMEA. Asset information management can therefore be viewed as enabler 
of feedback on FMEA and thereby as a precondition for continuous use of FMEA for 
maintenance improvement. Research of Braaksma et al. (2012a) shows however that 
FMEA is in practice used for one-off exercises. The FMEA-procedure is hindered in 
practice by operational problems (e.g. lack of a clear procedure) and information 
management problems (e.g. inaccuracy in failure reporting, relevant information 
distributed across various systems). These problems are not necessarily caused by the 
nature and structure of the FMEA procedure itself, but do limit its usefulness in practice.  
 
Several authors have identified information management as a root cause for neglecting 
the FMEA update. They mention a number of problems with the information 
management of FMEA in a maintenance environment:  
1. uncertainty of future information needs: it is unclear which data has to be registered 
or maintained for future asset management (Tsang et al., 2006, Veldman et al., 
2010),  
2. maintenance knowledge is insufficiently accessible: much of the information is 
embodied in a person (Moubray, 1992, Mobley and Smith, 2002, Bloom, 2006), 
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3. information cannot be used without additional knowledge, asset data is stored 
without sufficient context to be used effectively, (Pot, 2007, Tsang et al., 2006, Teoh 
and Case, 2005, Braaksma et al., 2012a),  
4. maintaining high quality asset data is costly and complex: the (potential) value and 
quality of the often terabytes of asset information is not known, which complicates 
data maintenance (Garg and Deshmukh, 2006, Tsang et al., 2006) (Braaksma et al., 
2012a), Dreverman 2005, 
5. heterogeneity of storage applications: data is stored in several non-integrated 
systems, e.g. Computerized Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS), process 
data and RCM data which complicates analysis (Garg and Deshmukh, 2006, Smith 
and Hinchcliffe, 2004, Haarman and Delahay, 2005). 
6. data hand-over problems: the breaking-point (caused by the hand-over) of asset 
data between maintenance and engineering (Dreverman, 2005)  
7. lack of information standards: which complicates the exchange of asset data 
(Dreverman, 2005).  
 
A literature review shows that some research has been done aimed at improving the 
repeatability of the FMEA analysis. Leger et al. (Leger et al., 1999) describe a method for 
the automatic induction from functional analysis to FMEA and HAZOP. Teoh and Case 
(2005) developed the (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Generation (FMAG) method 
which uses a knowledge based approach connecting the FMEA with functional diagrams. 
For the same purpose Dittmann (2006) proposed an ontology (OntoFMEA) for FMEA to 
standardize the way knowledge is described in FMEA. Braaksma et al. (2012b) see also 
chapter 3 propose a quantitative method to be used in addition to the existing method to 
improve the repeatability of the FMEA analysis. Veldman et al. (2010) describe the 
possible use of approximate failure data for combined CBM-FMEA routines.  
 
From a general information system perspective Garg and Deshmukh (2006) emphasize  
more work needs to be done to link Computerized Maintenance Management Systems 
(CMMS) design and use with actual maintenance performance. “CMMS systems appear to 
be focused on storing equipment information and as a maintenance work-planning tool 
instead of use for analysis and coordination.”  
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In line with the aforementioned research, Kans (2008) suggests that Information 
technology (IT) could be an important tool for reaching efficiency and effectiveness within 
maintenance, provided that correct and relevant IT is applied. In this chapter, a 
conceptual model for identifying maintenance management IT requirements is 
developed.  
Present research does however not address the requirements or a method enabling 
feedback on earlier FMEAs. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
The methodology of the chapter fits within the description of Design Science by 
Holmström et al. (2009), Hevner et al (2004), Van Aken (2004) and Wang and Hannafin 
(2005). Wang and Hannafin (2005) captures its critical characteristics: a systematic but 
flexible methodology aimed to improve practices through iterative analysis, design, 
development, and implementation, based on collaboration among researchers and 
practitioners in real-world settings, and leading to contextually-sensitive design 
principles and theories (Wang and Hannafin, p. 6). 
 
As for the methodology of the research work reported in this chapter, the first three 
phases of (Holmström et al., 2009) are followed: (1) Solution Incubation; Clarifying the 
problem, (2) Solution refinement; Identifying criteria for the intended solution, (3) 
Explanation I - Substantive Theory; Presentation of a proposed solution making use of  
identified criteria and design principles; (4): Explanation II - Formal Theory; Formal 
theories are aimed at broader generalizability, both in terms of theoretical abstraction and 
statistical generalizability.  
 
The present case study extends on this earlier work and is aimed at further exploring the 




One of the companies was selected out of the companies investigated in Chapter 2. It was 
selected for its relative maturity with regard to FMEA information management as 
determined during the (previous) case study: the company has mature information 
management processes, has achieved a high level of information system integration, is 
actively using asset information standards and is continuously improving their (asset 
management) processes. 
 
At the case company, additional interviews were conducted with relevant staff, including 
a maintenance manager and reliability engineers who were in some cases contracted from 
a specialized company. Interviewees were selected based on in-depth knowledge of the 
company, the assets, the way FMEAs were conducted and used for subsequent 
maintenance planning and the use of support systems.  
After the interviews and follow-up interviews, the reports were confirmed with the 
interviewees. The interview data was structured and labelled. Additional data sources 
included earlier research, written documents and presentation material. Triangulation via 
multiple documents and multiple informants was used to ensure validity and reliability. 
 
4.3.1 Clarifying the problem 
For clarifying the problem and identifying criteria for the intended solution it is 
appropriate to use a case study (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1994, Dul and Hak, 2008, 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This research work is part of a larger program; 
(Braaksma et al., 2012a) an earlier multiple case study has been conducted on the use of 
FMEA in the process industry (Braaksma et al., 2012a). This study concluded that there is 
a fundamental problem in the FMEA procedure, namely, the reliance upon expert 
judgement in general and the reliance upon design engineering expertise for keeping the 
FMEA up-to-date in particular. 
 
4.3.2 Identifying criteria for the intended solution 
For the identification of design criteria and design principles for the proposed solution we 
use the information management problems identified in the case study and the literature 
study reported above. 
 
For our case study we tried to get insight in the way existing FMEAs were used for review 
of the maintenance planning, the bottlenecks especially with relation to the information 




In the context we had attention for the triggers that led to the maintenance planning 
review, the (quantitative) data or (qualitative) insights used for the review of the 
maintenance planning, how the FMEA results were recorded and managed over time and 
how the FMEA was used for the first preventive maintenance program. 
 
4.3.3 Presentation of the proposed solution 
Based on the clarified problem and identified criteria we present a design framework, 
which consist of “design guidelines” for a Maintenance Feedback Method. A design 
framework is described by Edelson (2002) as a “design solution” that provides a set of 
“design guidelines for a particular class of design challenge” (Edelson, p. 114). 
4.4 Case study  
In this section the case study is presented. After the case study approach (4.4.2), the 
FMEA process and maintenance feedback process of the studied company will be 
described. The company was already presented in Chapter 2 (referred to as Company B) 
in Table 2.3 and further. 
 
4.4.2 Case study approach 
The current FMEA process and information architecture were investigated to further 
explore the causes for the lack of feedback on earlier FMEA analysis. Accordingly, the 
research focussed on the way the earlier FMEAs were used for review of the maintenance 
planning. Special attention was paid to the bottlenecks in particular relation to the 
information (systems) used.  
 
Therefore, the research had special attention for the (re-use of) FMEA data, the use of 
available (quantitative) asset data for analysis (e.g. failure data, process data), the way 
this data is used for the review of the maintenance planning and the way FMEA results 




4.4.3 Description current FMEA process and maintenance feedback 
process  
In this section we describe and compare the current FMEA process of the company with 
the three parts of RCM/FMEA analysis (see figure 1): (1) selection of assets, (2): FMEA 
procedure and (3) RCM process, reporting and feedback. We made a distinction between 
initial RCM/FMEA procedures and later use of FMEA for improvement of the 
maintenance planning. In our description of the FMEA process we focus on the 
information management of FMEA data.  
 
4.4.3.1 Part 1: Identification and selection of assets  
 
a) Initial FMEA 
At the company various (critical) assets have been identified and selected for RCM/FMEA 
procedures through a period of 10 years. According to interviewees this has been based on 
criticality of the assets. There were however no records on the exact criteria or 
circumstances which led to the selection of assets. 
 
b) Update maintenance planning 
After some years parts of the assets have been reselected for a direct update of the 
maintenance planning. Careful maintenance reviews were expected to lead to more 
efficiency and effectiveness of the maintenance program. Another trigger was the 
promising use of the gathered failure data and process data in a data management 
system. 
 
While the assets were reselected for a maintenance planning update they were not all 
reselected for a renewed FMEA analysis, this was only done when the criticality of the 
assets was determined as high.  
 
4.4.3.2 Part 2: FMEA procedure: FMEA registration is limited 
 
a) Initial FMEA 
The initial FMEA approach followed by the company very much reflects the theory on 
RCM/FMEA procedures as described by (Moubray, 1992) and are according to the 




During the sessions the responsible maintenance engineer in the FMEA session makes 
notes. The resulting failure modes and RPN estimates are calculated and put into a 
special spreadsheet or FMEA software. 
 
Some of the notes are personal notes of the reliability engineer for later use. The 
registration of uncertainties or the rationale that led to certain assessments are not 
described in the FMEA procedures of the company which is according to findings of 
(Selvik and Aven, 2011).  
 
b) Update maintenance planning 
When the maintenance planning is updated, the intention at the company is to make best 
use of the available information sources. Important available information sources at the 
company are: failure data stored in the computerized maintenance management system 
(CMMS), process data on a large number of components stored in a data management 
system, FMEA data, configuration data, engineering data, knowledge of reliability 
engineers and performance reports (see Table 4.2).  
 
For the update, the performance reports and knowledge of engineers are the main 
information sources. Other data which is available is collected asset data, e.g. process data 
and failure data. The use of these data leads to different results. Some of the data is 
successfully used for innovative condition-based estimation of preventive maintenance. 
However, often the available data is not precise or representative enough for the intended 
data analysis. This results as a rule in neglecting (i.e. not using) the available data, but in a 






Process data FMEA data Configuration 
data 
Description data types 
Three types of failure 
data can be 
distinguished:  
(1) Failure data 
generation, e.g. 
process data which 
describes off-line or 
fault states,  
(2) failures registered 
in a CMMS, e.g. 
operator failures,  
(3) no failure data 
because nothing is 
failing. 
Process data is  
collected during the 
production process 
and is used for 
control of the 
process. The process 
data can also be used 
for maintenance 
analysis. 
FMEA reports with 
recognized failure 
modes and Risk 
Priority estimations  




Data which identifies 
and controls 
versioning of asset 





Data availability for analysis 
Failure data is 
registered in CMMS. 
To use it for analysis 
it is uploaded to a 
data warehouse. 
Process data is 
automatically collected 
and stored. Data from 
a large number of 
components are 
directly accessible for 
analysis in a data 
system 
 
FMEA reports are 
stored in special 
FMEA databases 
and excel reports.  
The data is available 
in multiple formats. 
The originating tools 
which can read the 
data are often 
unavailable. Excel 










However the CMMS 
used does not record 
maintenance history. 
Table 4.2 (see also next page): Main types of data used for feedback on maintenance 








Description data types 
Engineering data includes, 
CAD documents, P&ID 
schemes, test reports, etc. 
Knowledge and experience of 
reliability engineers 
Exception reports which state 
under performance (e.g. too 
high maintenance costs, low 
performance) of certain assets 
or components 
Data availability for analysis 
Engineering data and output 
reports of FMEA are stored 
in a centralized Document 
Management System. 
Depending on the used tool, 
data is available in multiple 
formats. 
 
Knowledge and experience of 
reliability engineers: 
a) tacit (personal notes and 
archives)   
b) implicit knowledge 
(knowledge built up as a result 
of experience with the assets).   
Reports are based on cost data 
generated by the SAP system. 
 
Reports are distributed by 
electronic systems (e-mail) to a 
number of reliability and 
maintenance engineers. 
Table 4.2: (continued) 
 
4.4.3.3 Part 3: RCM process, reporting and feedback: no closed feedback loop 
At the time the FMEA is done and the maintenance planning is determined, a future 
improvement of the analysis and planning is not considered (in the FMEA report).  
 
The Risk Priority Number (RPN) outcomes of the FMEA are registered in the centrally 
used CMMS, underlying documents made in spreadsheets and FMEA software are stored 




Update of maintenance planning without FMEA logic  
Based on performance exception reports of assets (e.g. high maintenance costs no 
failures, too many failures) the maintenance planning is directly changed/updated 
without use of the earlier FMEA results (see Figure 4.2). By doing so the FMEA logic is 
not used for the maintenance planning anymore. It is therefore difficult to appraise past 
decisions or to have sufficient insight in the impacts of changes to the maintenance 
planning.   
 
The consequence of this might be undesirable as the criticality of assets is not necessarily 
included in the analysis anymore. The company indicated that this problem is prevented 












Figure 4.2: Maintenance updated without feedback on initial FMEA results  
(The  company) 
 
4.4.4 Analysis of information feedback problems  
For a closer analysis of the case study there is looked at the information inputs and 
outputs of the complete RCM/FMEA process. The identified problems are linked to the 
five main information management problems mentioned in section (4.2.3); 1) Uncertainty 
of future Maintenance information needs, (2) Maintenance knowledge is insufficiently 
accessible, (3) Information cannot be used without additional knowledge, (4) Maintaining 
high quality information: costly and complex and (5) Heterogeneity of storage. Our case 
study research revealed an additional problem: (6) Information process disconnects. 
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4.4.4.1 Uncertainty of future Maintenance information needs  
At the time the FMEA is done and the maintenance planning is determined, a future 
improvement of the analysis and planning is neither explicitly considered in the FMEA process 
nor in the FMEA reports. The responsible maintenance engineer often makes some (personal) 
notes for later use. The contents and quality of these notes is however not guaranteed and if a 
maintenance engineer leaves or gets appointed at another place often this information is lost.  
 
4.4.4.2 Maintenance knowledge is insufficiently accessible 
Despite several attempts and investments in a document management system to centrally store 
the FMEA reports, the company did not succeed in a useful reuse of earlier FMEAs. One of the 
first difficulties was accessing the digital FMEA documents.9 However, even if the documents 
could be retrieved, the rationale behind the decision-making is not available in the documents. 
 
4.4.4.3 Information cannot be used without additional knowledge 
At the company notes are often stored in a central Document Management System, according to 
interviewees these notes are not interpretable by other reliability or maintenance engineers 
without extra knowledge on the specific asset (see figure 4.2).  Asking experts who were involved 
earlier did also not always solve the problem as they often could only partially recall the exact 
circumstances in which they did the FMEAs. 
 
4.4.4.4 Maintaining high quality information: costly and complex 
Another complicating factor for the case study company is the management of large datasets with 
(e.g. failure and process) information on thousands of components. It is a major effort to 
accurately register and maintain all asset information, at the case study company multiple 
terabytes of asset data are available and being maintained.  
 
When asset data (see table 4.2) are used for analysis it is needed to review the data to make sure 
that the data is usable. Examples of such use are filtering techniques and data acquisition 
techniques, e.g. running queries to integrate data from different information sources in order to 
find patterns of failures. There is however no guarantee that the data will be usable as the data 
has not been entered and maintained with future data analysis needs in mind.  
 
                                                 
9 Documents containing FMEAs were stored in several different proprietary formats on the Document Management 
System and the software needed to read the proprietary formats was not licensed to the asset owner but to the 
Maintenance contractors who performed the FMEA sessions. 
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In our research we focused some questions on the use of asset failure data. Interviewees 
responded that there are substantial difficulties with using these data. Causes of the 
inaccuracy of failure data are according to interviewees: (a) failures are not appointed to 
the right functional location, (b) failure modes are not determined or not correctly 
assessed, (c) preventive maintenance actions are incorrectly registered as ‘failure’ in the 
CMMS. For a meaningful assets analysis it is very important that the failures are 
connected to the right functional location and failure mode.  
 
Causes inaccuracy of asset failure data 
The first reason for the inaccuracy of asset failure data is according to the interviewees 
that the registration for future maintenance analysis is not (perceived as) a core activity 
by the maintenance operators. Maintenance operators are more focused on registration 
for daily operations and execution of maintenance processes, in which inputs don’t need 
to be as specific as for failure analysis.  
 
A second reason is that the maintenance operators get limited feedback on the actual use 
of the failure details they have registered. A third reason lies in the extra effort and 
knowledge it takes to improve the registration. Often a failure cause is not precisely 
known, it takes a lot of additional to determine the cause of asset failures. 
 
The case company did much to improve accuracy of registration, the maintenance 
operators were trained and were informed about the importance of good data 
registration. As a result the data quality did improve but there is still room for further 
improvement.  
 
At the company not all root causes and failures are sufficiently important such that they 
need to be traced. Non-critical parts do not require the same tracking/tracing attention as 




4.4.4.5 Heterogeneity of storage 
Asset data needed for feedback (e.g. failure information, process information, supplier 
data and FMEA reports) is in principle available but these data are stored in different 
systems which need to be integrated before an analysis can be made.  
The quantity of data available (e.g. process data) stimulated the case study company to do 
supply-driven information analyses, i.e. the easy retrieval of data makes data analysis 
tempting. For a large number of functional locations process data is automatically 
collected and stored in a data warehouse.  
 
Despite the large volume of process and failure data available, there is however no 
guarantee that the right data of sufficient quality is available. Interviewees could provide 
us with many examples in which data analysis was only partially successful because of 
data that was lacking or not sufficiently accurate. 
 
4.4.4.6 Information process disconnects  
A closer investigation at the case study showed that from a process perspective the 
problems are caused by several information process disconnects. Process disconnects are 
primarily the results of inadequate information management, e.g. loss of information and 
knowledge during time. 
 
The identified disconnects are: (1) between the RCM/FMEA sessions and RCM/FMEA 
report, (2) between the RCM/FMEA analysis report and quantitative/ qualitative data 
analysis design and (3) between designed data analysis and actual data collection (see 
figure 4.3). 
 
1) First process disconnect 
A first (information) process disconnect exists between the knowledge and information 
discussed in the FMEA sessions and the final FMEA report that is written. In the FMEA 
reports of the company the full rationale behind the criticality assessments are not 
described. Only the RPN (Risk Priority Numbers) are put in the CMMS and some 
personal notes are kept by the reliability engineer, the full rationale behind the criticality 
assessments are not described. This kind of reports may be expected because the 
description of the rationale behind the criticality assessments is not part of the FMEA 
method. The absence of the rationale in the FMEA reports makes it difficult to appraise 




According to interviewees, the reliability engineer responsible for the FMEA makes some 
personal notes during the FMEA sessions. At the company these notes are not 
standardized in any way, at the moment the engineer leaves the organization this 
knowledge is often lost or hard to interpret. This is in line with earlier research that shows 
that FMEAs are not been prepared with the idea of re-use in mind, and are viewed as a 
one-time only exercise (Braaksma et al., 2012a, Teoh and Case, 2005). 
 
2) Second process disconnect 
The second information process disconnect exists between the original FMEA report and 
the design of later data analysis studies. At the time the FMEA reports were written the 
case study company paid no attention to later quantitative and qualitative feedback 
analysis as it was not in the scope of their activities. Accordingly, there is no accurate 
usable list or data structure of failures mechanisms which is made available after the 
FMEA analysis.  
 
An interviewee responded that a simple data structure of some failure modes (which is a 
higher aggregative level than failure mechanism) is available in the CMMS. In practice the 
maintenance engineer often enters the category: failure mode unknown. A more advanced 
analysis is often only performed for failures of high consequence, high repair/down time 
cost, or failures occurring significantly more frequent than what is considered “normal” 
for the piece of equipment or unit class, .i.e. worst actors.  
 
With this approach it can however take some time before the equipment is recognized as a 
worst actor and it prohibits later failures to be properly related to failure modes / failure 
mechanisms distinguished in the FMEA. Consequently, it is not clear at later stage 
whether actual failures correspond to those foreseen in the FMEA or not. For example; an 
air filter causes problems. This can be caused by problems with the quality of the filtering 





3) Third process disconnect 
A third information process disconnect exists between analysis to be conducted in the 
future and the current collection of data (for the future analysis). Because there has been 
no planning for future data analysis, data is collected but not explicitly for the purpose of 
updating the FMEA. Analysis is primarily relying on: (1) what happens to be available in 
the databases of the CMMS and (2) what can be retrieved from the databases built from 
process data outputs. At the case study company a large amount of data was available. As 








Figure 4.3: Process disconnects between RCM/FMEA and feedback 
 
4.5 Design principles for continuous FMEA-based improvement 
Based on the information management problems identified in literature and the extensive 
exploration of these five main problems in the aforementioned case study we propose five 
design principles. The design principles are aimed at solving the five main problems. 
 
4.5.1 Describing rationale behind FMEA decision-making 
Without correctly describing the supporting arguments used to determine the criticality 
of assets it is not possible to correctly review the FMEA. The rationale behind FMEA 
assessments: key assumptions and uncertainties of the assessments should be 
documented.  
 
Selvik and Aven (2011) describe how uncertainties can be documented. The description of 
the rationale helps to recall the circumstances in which decisions have been made and 
lowers the amount of additional expert knowledge on the assets to interpret and improve 





















(1) (2) (3) 
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The better availability of maintenance knowledge makes feedback on the used inputs in 
the decision making process possible and helps  to determine if additional information 
gathering is possibly and worthwhile and helps to reduce uncertainty of future 
information needs. Which on it its turn helps to focus data collection efforts.  
 
The rationale behind failure modes, failure mechanisms, estimated impacts of failures, 
etc. should not only be registered with regards to the outcomes of the FMEA process (i.e. 
RPN calculation) but should be on all steps of the FMEA process (see figure 4.1). 
 
4.5.2  Pro-active registration of data 
To bridge the mentioned process and information system disconnects we propose a (pro-
active) approach. The suggested approach is pro-active because data collection is already 
organized before the data is actually needed or used for analysis. By following this 
approach the right asset data can be collected on time for the intended data analysis. 
 
For an effective data collection one needs to identify which assets should pro-actively 
receive feedback and what kind of data feedback is needed on which element used in the 
FMEA process, e.g. with regard to the identification of failure modes, failure mechanisms, 
the assessed criticality, the number of expected occurrences, etc. 
 
For example the CMMS could be set up in such a way that the engineer or operator  sees a 
special code attached to the asset or asset part which signals how much information 
should be registered on the failure cause, failure mode and failure mechanism. For other 
non-critical assets a registration is made without special remarks on the failure cause or 
failure mechanisms.  Other possibilities are the preparation of failure trees or failure 
structures, or specific instructions for diagnosis which help the engineer or operator to 
make a good failure registration. 
  
With this pro-active information it is possible to plan the integration and exchange of 




4.5.3  Criticality based information management  
A pro-active feedback approach will only be adapted in practice when it is worthwhile to 
do. At this moment (in theory and at the case study company) there is no differentiation 
in the data collection, this means that all components (thousands) are in principle treated 
equally. However if one concentrates on the most critical pieces of equipment which are 
currently analyzed at the company this number is limited to only 20 to 30 components at 
the time. Depending on the FMEA process and results there is a different need for 
feedback. For a basic quantitative MTBF analysis the data needs are different than for a 
more advanced analysis requiring the registration of possible explaining variables. It is 
suggested to start with the critical assets and look for short-term benefits which is 
comparable with the RCM approach (Moubray, 1992). The focus on critical assets or 
assets with the largest improvement potential can reduce cost of maintaining asset 
information while improving quality of critical asset information.  
 
The data collection itself can also be more focused, for example on certain failure modes 
of selected assets. This helps to reduce the data collection effort. The exact data needs can 
then be communicated to maintenance operators as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
4.5.4  Demand driven analysis 
By determining the needs before the data is actually collected, the data collection becomes 
demand-driven instead of supply driven. In a supply driven approach the analysis results 
are often unsure. 
 
A demand driven approach helps to objectify data collection by a clear business case 
Because the demand of data is made more explicit in an early phase it enables focused 
communication towards maintenance operators entering and registering asset (failure) 
data. 
 
The smart use data sources is very important (e.g. process and failure data) for advanced 
reliability analysis. The use of standards can help in integrating the various data sources 
(Braaksma et al., 2011, Dreverman, 2005). In addition the use of business intelligence 
tools can help to organize data analysis. By using business intelligence tools it is possible 




4.5.5  Storage of contextual data 
Important for enabling a criticality based approach is the knowledge of which data is 
more important and should, audited more frequently or entered more frequently and 
helps to maintain high quality asset information data.  
 
The importance of data should be available in the used information system, optimally an 
CMMS should store contextual data, in which data purposes and data collection needs are 
described (Pot, 2007, Tsang et al., 2006).  
 
Adding attributes to ‘data critical’ assets gives the possibility to differentiate in data 
management and focus on critical assets of which data collection is to be expected most 
worthwhile. Secondly it helps to communicate the importance of these assets to 
maintenance operators.  
 
4.5.6 Implementation maintenance feedback planning process and 
supporting information system 
The mentioned solution principles only help when they are implemented together and 
institutionalized in the maintenance processes and supporting information systems. The 
traditional Reliability Centred Maintenance analysis process should therefore incorporate 
the aforementioned design principles. A specific maintenance feedback can help to 
improve institutionalizing these principles.  
 
Besides the processes an extended FMEA database should be set-up which registers: the 
FMEA outcomes, the rationale behind the maintenance decision making, the 
maintenance planning outcomes and rationale behind changes (preferably FMEA-based) 
in the maintenance planning. 
 
A consistent description of data is therefore very important. One initiative aimed at the 
standardization of asset information is the open standard MIMOSA, which releases and 
maintains the so-called OSA-EAI library consisting of data models for open exchange of 
asset data. The MIMOSA data models can be used to set-up a asset information database 
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Figure 4.4: MIMOSA-EAI Core Registry Model (Bever, 2012) 
 
4.6 Design of a maintenance feedback analysis (MFA) method 
Based on the design principles identified in section 4.5: (1) Describing rationale behind 
FMEA decision-making, (2) Pro-active registration of data, (3) Criticality based 
information management, (4) Demand driven analysis, (5) Storage of contextual data and 
(6) Implementation maintenance feedback planning process and supporting information 
system. 
 
We propose a Maintenance Feedback Analysis approach aimed improving the current 
asset information management and extending on the current RCM/FMEA approach. This 
helps to connect the RCM/FMEA outcomes with future data analysis and feedback and is 
intended to bridge the identified process gaps.  
 
The MFA gives early focus on the review and improvement of the FMEA and RCM 
planning by establishing a data collection and analysis program before the assets clearly 




4.6.1 The proposed approach as extension of the RCM/FMEA method 
The proposed approach is an extension of the RCM/FMEA method, step (7.) (see figure 
4.5). The best moment to determine the future possibilities for feedback is at the moment 
RCM/FMEA sessions are being held and should be done with the same experts. Because 
that is a very good moment to assess the possibilities for improvement and future 
feedback. 
 
Afterwards the Maintenance Feedback can be improved in iteration cycles. For some 























Figure 4.5: RCM/FMEA extended with MFA which enables feedback 
loop, amended from Picknell (1999) 
6. Use RCM logic  
to select appropriate maintenance 
or engineering actions  
and determine task frequencies 
FMEA 
1. Identify and select 
equipment 
2. Determine asset 
functions 
3. Describe functional 
failures  
4. Describe failure modes 
5. Describe failure effects 
and calculate RPN 
7.Use of feedback analysis  to 
select appropriate information 
management actions and 
determine feedback frequencies 
8. Document results and 








4.6.2 Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) steps explained 
The proposed Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) (see figure 4.6) consists of 4 steps 
which can be executed directly after the RCM/FMEA as part of an extended FMEA : (1) 
determine if (pro-active) feedback is worthwhile, (2) determine data analysis 
requirements for feedback, (3) organize data collection and (4) assure execution of the 
MFA outcomes. The outcomes of the MFA should be used to organize a focused data 
collection and data analysis which in turn can be used as feedback to improve the 









Figure 4.6: MFA steps as part of continuous improvement of maintenance 
 
In the appendix of this chapter an example of a normal FMEA sheet based on the 
standard FMEA sheet which is provided by MIL-STD-1629A (DoD, 1980) and FMEA 
sheet including the MFA extension is provided and shows how the MFA can be integrated 
in a normal FMEA approach.  
 
Step 1: Determine if Maintenance Feedback is worthwhile 
In this step it is determined if there is an opportunity to improve the FMEA analysis for 
(the failure modes) of the most critical asset (parts). Pro-active feedback should be 
organized for the asset (parts) with the most significant improvement potential by 
determining the uncertainties and important assumptions used in the assessments of the 
RCM/FMEA analyses.  
 
Main objects which should be evaluated by using MFA include failure modes and failure 
effects. These are both intermediary results of the FMEA and but have high impact on the 







































Questions STEP 1 
1. Describe the most important assumptions and uncertainties in the information or 
knowledge used in the FMEA assessment 
2. Determine if there is improvement potential to reduce the identified uncertainties, 
(does detailed data collection or analysis reduce the uncertainties?)   
3. Determine if it is worthwhile to reduce the identified uncertainties (yes/no, else 
stop) 
 
Outcomes of step 1 are: (1) Uncertainties and causes and (2) improvement potential. 
 
 
Step 2:  Determine data analysis requirements for feedback 
If it is worthwhile to gain more insight in the failure modes of the asset, then the next step 
is to decide on a data analysis strategy. Data analysis can be both qualitative or 
quantitative, e.g.  (1) qualitative analysis, e.g. based on the experience of maintenance 
operators, reports of occurred failure modes, etc., or (2) quantitative analysis such as 
MTBF, MTTR, or MTTF or more advanced quantitative analysis techniques using 
explanatory variables, e.g. process analysis and condition based analysis. 
 
Questions STEP 2  
1. Determine what sort of data analysis should be done in the future (quantitative of 
qualitative) 
2. Determine the data requirements for an effective analysis 
3. Determine if it is worthwhile to do the determined data analysis (yes/no, else stop) 
 




Step 3: Organize data collection  
By doing this third step the data collection needed for feedback analysis is organized and 
evaluated. If cost-benefit is negative then change the desired feedback analysis or data 
collection. 
 
Plan organizational and technical data collection actions  
Make sure possible failure modes are entered in the CMMS, e.g. the right functional 
locations are available. Outline the importance of data collection for the selected critical 
assets (register this in the CMMS) and data needed to improve performance and 
maintenance of this asset. Perform a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed data collection 
and decide on additional data-collection actions required. This third step may also involve 
the design of additional information systems components e.g. to plan the preparation of a 
data warehouse if needed and design queries for future reports. 
 
Questions STEP 3 
1. Determine to what extent the needed data is already monitored or collected 
2. Determine which additional actions are needed to ensure that the desired data is 
collected 
3. Determine if it is possible to undertake the intended actions from a cost-benefit 
perspective (yes/no, else stop) 
 
Outcomes of step 3 are: (1) available data and (2) additional actions data collection.  
 
Step 4: Assure execution of MFA outcomes 
Important for the method is that the MFA is actually carried out.  Besides the analysis 
itself, the answers to the above questions of the analysis are registered in this step 
together with the decisions taken. Furthermore, these decisions have to be implemented 
and appropriate organizational measures (such as budgeting, training, rewarding) should 





4.7  Conclusion and discussion of the results 
We showed in our literature review and case study that because of several difficulties in 
asset information management the maintenance planning is directly updated without (re-) 
use of RCM/FMEA logic. By using the case study we further explored the context in which 
the FMEA is conducted and tried to be re-used. The case study  identified a number of 
process disconnects. Process disconnects which are primarily the results of inadequate 
information management, e.g. loss of information and knowledge during time. We proposed 
design principles and design requirements enabling re-use of RCM/FMEA. By using the 
design principles we have proposed a Maintenance Feedback Analysis method extending 
the current RCM/FMEA approach. 
 
By using MFA we first determine if feedback will be worthwhile, then the requirements for 
data analysis are determined in the second step, the data collection is organized in the third 
step and finally in step four the reporting and planning of the data analysis which assures 
MFA is being conducted is done. After the actual data collection and analysis the results of 
the data analysis can be used as feedback to the existing FMEA analysis. 
 
The presented MFA method might be contextually-sensitive (Wang and Hannafin, p. 6) as it 
is designed for use in the process industry. In further research the MFA method and design 
principles should be as part of the used design based methodology empirically tested in 
different contexts. The presented method may be used as a starting point to develop better 
methods. The quality of (asset) information and its relationship with criticality and cost are 
proposed topics for further research as better insight in this relationship can improve 
information feedback. Finally the exchange of asset information (e.g. semantic 
interoperability of asset information), very important for integration of various data sources 
deserves more extensive research. The exchange of asset information is also discussed in 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A review of the use of asset information 
standards for collaboration in the process 
industry  
 
In this fifth chapter the use of asset information standards for collaboration in the process 
industry is reviewed based on a survey of the literature and two case studies. The 
investigation shows that the process industry appears to have had only limited success in 
introducing such standards so far, despite significant efforts. Since information hand-over 
between asset life cycle phases is important, lack of information standardisation suggests 
that collaboration costs are higher than necessary. Reported causes can be grouped into 
standard related causes (slow development of standards, stability, complexity, cost, 
quality/ ontological problems), organization related causes (lack of direct financial 
incentives, organizational readiness, resistance to change) and business environment 
related causes (legal aspects, level of adoption, limited governmental enforcement and a 
lack of dominant actors in the process industry). It is also shown that initial local 
configuration of a standard may lead to successful acceptance of the standards, but may 
hinder later external use. The contribution of this chapter is insight into the use of asset 
information standards and the causes for lack of pervasiveness. This is necessary for 
improving the use of standards in collaboration in the process industry. The chapter 




5.1  Introduction and background 
The process industry covers a wide range of activities, from continuous facilities in the 
petrochemical industry, to large batch manufacturing in steel production or glass 
manufacturing to small batch manufacturing in the food and pharmaceutical industry 
(Van Donk and Fransoo, 2006). Process industries are defined as adding value to 
materials by mixing, separating, forming, or through chemical reactions (Wallace, 1984). 
Processes may be either continuous or batch and generally require capital intensive 
installations, the design of which is relatively important and complex when compared to 




There are several ways to differentiate between asset types and their use (Schuman, 2005, 
Bahill and Gissing, 1998, Chang et al., 2008, Stavenuiter, 2002, ISO, 2006). The ISO 14224 
standard (ISO, 2006) offers two main taxonomies for the petrochemical process industry, 
whereby distinctions are made between asset hierarchical class (e.g. installation, plant/unit, 
section, equipment unit, subunit, etcetera) and asset type (e.g. heat exchanger, compressor, 
piping, pump, boiler, etcetera with appropriate subunits for each hierarchical class). Many 
authors base their reviews on a distinction between life cycle phases (e.g. 
design/engineering, procurement, construction, operation and maintenance, phase-out) 
(Schuman, 2005, Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998). The activities in these phases require 
different specialists and are often carried out by different departments or even different 
companies. Due to the often complex nature of the assets in the process industry and the 
multi-disciplinary nature of the design and optimization processes (Schuman, 2005), 
successful exchange of asset (design) information between disciplines and parties is in turn 
a prerequisite for success (Gallaher et al., 2002, Shell, 1996). Asset information standards 
allow the interpretation of values that are shared between different business partners within 
and across different business processes, e.g. in exchange messages according to business 
protocols or in commonly used databases (Bengtsson, 2004, Burgess et al., 2005, Tolman, 
1999, Wilkes, 2005). Figure 5.1 shows asset life cycle phases. It highlights some typical 




Figure 5.1: The Asset life-cycle phases amended from Blanchard and Fabrycky (Blanchard 
and Fabrycky, 1998) 
 
In the current chapter, the use of asset information standards in the process industry is 
reviewed. As will become apparent from the review, the pervasiveness of such standards 
is still limited. Therefore known causes and consequences of the apparent limited use of 
asset information standards in the process industry are investigated and described. In 
addition, also the use of information standards in the aerospace and automotive 
industries is reviewed for purposes of comparison.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 provides the introduction and Section 2 the 
methodology used. Sections 3 (literature) and 4 (case studies) describe the role of asset 
information standards in the process industry and the causes for the lack of uniform 
adoption and pervasiveness of the standards in the process industry. Section 5 compares 
the adoption of standards in the process industry with other industries. Section 6 contains 














This chapter provides insight into the use of asset information standards in the process 
industry and the causes for lack of pervasiveness. The chapter starts with discussing a 
classification of asset information standards, followed by a comprehensive description of 
all relevant asset information standards followed by trends in using the standards. As will 
become apparent from the existing literature, the standards appear to be less well used 
than intended. The first step towards developing a solution for this problem is to find the 
causes. This is done in the current chapter, through a literature survey and case studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Meredith, 1998, Yin, 1994), and by using inductive and deductive 
reasoning (Holmström et al., 2009, Fawcet, 2006). The result is insight, based on which 




The aim of the case studies is to examine the causes for success or failure in using asset 
information standards in the process industry, as reported in the literature. The case 
studies will therefore provide a first evaluation as well as practical background and detail 
to the findings from in the literature survey.  
Both the literature survey and the case studies are still exploratory (Van Aken, 2004). 
Two case study companies were selected, primarily based on their maturity with regards 
to information management, which was established from independent reference 
(described below). The three main questions during the case studies were: (1) what are 
the reasons/ success factors for these two organizations to use (an) asset information 
standard(s), (2) what were the inhibiting factors and (3) how did the success factors and 
inhibitors found in practice correspond with the causes found in the literature? 
 
The following criteria were set for selecting and carrying out the case studies (PDES): (1) 
external validity, (2) internal validity, (3) construct validity, (4) reliability. These were 
detailed as follows: 
(1) External validity was sought by comparing cases of asset information management 
practice at companies with comparable practice. Two companies were eventually 
selected for further inspection: Stork GLT, a consortium of contractors working for is 
the natural gas-industry and Akzo Nobel Botlek, a process plant producing chorine 
products. Both organizations have internally standardized their asset information 
processes by making use of asset information standards.  
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The organizations were selected on the grounds that they have a reputation for 
mature information management processes. This was established by interviewing the 
Director of USPI-NL, the Dutch association of process industry firms. The choice was 
made to study these companies with significant maturity, because they are most 
likely to have made structured/ conscious decisions on the use of the standards. 
Companies without any use (some of which we have also met), simply did not show 
any interest and time, or were unaware of the standards. Further analysis of the lack 
of use would then be likely to result in speculation.   
(2) Internal validity was sought by explanation-building during the case studies. The two 
case studies empirically investigate the context and direct reasons that impacted the 
use of asset information standards in the organizations. Both case studies are 
retrospective to the earlier engineering and construction phases. The research aim is 
to explore the practice of asset information standardization over the different stages 
of the lifecycle and its impact on the management and exchange of information inside 
and outside the organization. Special attention was given to the hand-over of asset 
information from construction to operation and maintenance. 
(3) Construct validity was sought by establishing multiple sources of evidence within 
each of the two case study companies. This was done by using both interviews and 
inspection of the actual use of the asset information standards if and where 
applicable. 
(4) Reliability or repeatability was ensured in two ways: by listing and adhering to a case 
study protocol and uniform storage/ reporting of the case study results. The next two 
sections provide a summary of these results. The case study protocol entailed the 
following main steps: (a) General preparation by conducting desk research of the 
case study companies and the asset information standards used in the industry. (b) 
Detailed preparation by listing interview questions, derived from the questions posed 
above, i.e. to investigate the causes for (lack of) use of asset information standards, 
with a particular comparison to the literature review. The questions were related to 
the organization, the design of the standards and the business environment. Sections 
3.6.1, 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 are structured accordingly. (c) Determination of the persons to 
be interviewed and the sources/systems to be inspected. In both cases, persons were 
selected based on actual involvement with the use of the asset information standards 




5.3 Literature survey on asset information standards in the process 
industry 
Asset information standards in their most basic form are standardized lists of properties 
(e.g. the height of an object measured in millimetres). These can be defined as data 
models for unified description of information relating to assets or products. Most asset 
information standards are so-called ‘neutral’ standards, which can be used as an 
intermediary (exchange) format to make collaboration between different information 
systems possible. It is also possible to automate information exchange without using a 
neutral standard. However, for these so-called ‘dedicated interfaces’ a new interface has 
to be designed for each and every new communication (Van Renssen, 2005). Our review 
is limited to the use of neutral standards, since these are most suitable for extensive and 
dynamic collaboration (Van Renssen, 2005). 
 
5.3.1 Classification of neutral asset information standards 
Literature on specific asset information standards is not always clear about possible 
distinctions between the standard described and other standards. This makes it difficult 
to value and interpret them. This chapter creates insight by comparing the standards, 
which is a complicated task because of the sheer size and scope of some of the standards 
and also the fact that each of the standards have a different perspective on data modelling 
(Siltanen and Pärnänen, 2006). 
 
An early classification to differentiate asset information standards was developed by 
Teeuw et al. (Teeuw et al., 1996) and later amended by Van Renssen (Van Renssen, 
2005), who bases his classification of asset information standards on ‘semantic richness’. 
The semantic richness of a standard is determined by the types of relations that can be 
described by the standard. A lower-level standard can be used as sub-set of a higher level 
standard. Table 5.1 summarizes six levels. Level 1: Vocabulary, a list or collection of words 
or of words and phrases usually alphabetically arranged and explained or defined. Level 
2: Dictionary, a reference source containing words with information about their forms, 
functions, and meanings. Level 3: Taxonomy, orderly classification of (parts of) assets 
according to their presumed hierarchical relationships, Level 4: Knowledge models, 
conceptual possession of aspects, Level 5: knowledge models with product structure, adds 
conceptual (possible) assembly relations. Level 6: a product model with any assembly 




Level Name Examples of asset information standards 
1 Vocabulary ISO15926-4, ISO22745, NE100/PROLIST, eCl@ss 
2 Dictionary ISO15926-4, ISO22745, NE100/PROLIST, eCl@ss 
3 Taxonomy ISO15926-4, eCl@ss  
4 Knowledge models without 
product structure 
ISO13584-501/522, NE100/PROLIST, eCl@ss 
(partly) 
5 Knowledge models with 
product structure 
ISO16926-7, ICAAMC compressor model 
6 Individual product models Gellish for modeling the actual data of an individual 
existing product or asset, e.g. K-101 the first 
compressor in unit 100  
Table 5.1: Classification of asset information standards, after Van Renssen (Van Renssen, 
2005) 
 
Another way to distinguish standards is by viewing the functional areas of asset 
information covered by the standards. Fowler (Fowler, 1995) grouped the functionality of 
one of the most extensive asset information standards (STEP/ISO10303) into: (1) 
geometric description of parts, (2) configuration management, e.g. version and revision 
control, authorization, release status, supplier identification, (3) specifications, e.g. 
surface finish, material, design, process and (4) product structure. 
 
We studied the literature on a large number of asset information standards for the 
purpose of our review. Most of these standards are listed in Table 5.2, which will be 
discussed throughout this chapter. Table 5.2 describes differences between standards. We 
commenced by using the taxonomy by Van Renssen (Van Renssen, 2005) to describe each 
of the standards discussed. As is visible in the table, some standards are all-encompassing 
(for example ISO15926 covering Van Renssen (Van Renssen, 2005) levels 1-6) and other 
standards are limited and simpler (i.e. PROLIST/NE100 and eCl@ss). Standards are 
often similar in structure and (technical) functionality. This may be partly explained by 
the fact that standards are often built on (parts) of older standards (Table 5.2). Therefore 
multiple standards can be used for the same purpose. This makes the taxonomy of Van 
Renssen useful, yet insufficient for our purpose. We have therefore added information 
based on type of asset (ISO, 2006), the asset hierarchical class (ISO, 2006) and the life-
cycle phases/ focus areas in which the standard is used typically (Schuman, 2005, 




5.3.2 Collaboration in the process industry  
Since the early 90’s there are, and have been, many asset information standardization 
initiatives in the process industry. Urban & Rangan and Betz (Urban and Rangan, 2004) 
describe that significant effort was put into the development of asset information 
standards, however compared with aerospace no really dominant standards exist. The 
earlier standards were developed by or under guidance of ISO, the International 
Organization for Standardization. ISO developed the ISO13584 PLIB (product library) 
standard for procurement, the STEP/ISO10303 standard which included geometric 
description of parts and the more recent ISO15926 standard, which includes an extensive 
reference data library and is specifically designed for the process industry (oil and gas). 
Because of the generic design, the aforementioned standards can also be used in other 
industries. Later asset information standards are less comprehensive and are designed for 
more specific purposes, e.g. PROLIST/NE100, ecl@ss, OSA-EAI and ISO14224 (see Table 
5.2, column 3). Inspection of the individual standards reveals the close interdependence 
between (ISO) standardization initiatives; Table 5.2 highlights relationships between the 
standards. Older standards such as STEP/ISO10303 have been very important in that 
they have provided better insight into standardization requirements and thereby have 
pushed the emergence of newer standardization initiatives such as the development of the 
ISO15926 series (Van Exel, 2002).  
 
5.3.3 Standards for different phases of the lifecycle 
The role of asset information standards in different phases of the life cycle is the same, i.e. 
to standardize the way information is stored and exchanged. However, the information 
needed for the processes in different life cycle phases is different. For example in the 
maintenance phase a maintenance engineer is interested in reliability data for 
maintaining the asset whereas in the engineering phase a design engineer is interested in 
specification and construction data. For a process plant the amount of asset information 
exchanged is greater in the Engineering, Procurement & Construction (EPC) phase than 
in the Operation & Maintenance phase, which is the primary reason why standardization 
efforts have predominantly focused on the EPC phase (Lee et al., 2007).  
Recently the Operation & Maintenance phase has received extra attention. An example is 
the sponsorship by software vendor SAP of the development of OSA-EAI, a standard 
currently under development by Mimosa (Mimosa). Part of OSA-EAI is ISO 13374/OSA-
CBM, which aims to specify a standard architecture and framework for implementing 
condition-based maintenance (CBM) systems, simplifying the integration of commercially 
available condition monitoring systems.  
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On a Systems engineering level (INCOSE, INCOSE, Rhodes, Bahill and Gissing, 1998), the 
INCOSE initiative plays an important role in achieving standardization. System 
engineering standards aim to automate the interfaces between enterprise and control 
systems. A significant development consists of the ANSI/ISA95 and IEC/ISO 62264 
standards (Chang et al., 2008, IEC/ISO). Together with the description of equipment 
hierarchies, these standards contain functional data flows and operations activity models 
relating to the equipment. The goal is to reduce the risk, cost and errors associated with 
implementing the interfaces (Chang et al., 2008, IEC/ISO). Similar to OSA-EAI, the 
ANSI/ISA95 standard is actively sponsored by SAP. 
 
5.3.4 Trends 
Teeuw et al. (Teeuw et al., 1996) describe trends for EPC environments: (1) the growing 
amount of asset data, as a result of increasing asset complexity, (2) the need for tighter 
collaboration in the engineering phase, because of the need to achieve a shorter time-to-
market, (3) the need for a mechanism to effectively reuse data which is the result of a 
need to support product customization and product families, and (4) the tendency of 
organizations to focus on their core business only because assets are becoming more 
complex and having a shorter life cycle. Consequently the co-operation of an organization 
with its suppliers and customers intensifies.  
A more current trend influencing the need for standards is the growing attention for 
safety and the environment especially in the maintenance and operations phase 
(Dreverman, 2005). This is often associated with the ‘license to operate’, which entails a 
company’s duty to manage existing and potential external liabilities, such as meeting 
health, safety, security and environmental (HSSE) requirements. An important aspect of 
the license to operate is asset integrity, which requires up-to-date available and easily 
accessible technical drawings, technical documentation, certificates, operating manuals 
and other (vendor) documentation. Asset information standards can help to maintain the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3.5 Use of standards in the process industry 
During the 1990’s there was an important increase in the development of asset 
information standards. This was fostered by a number of separate and international 
(pilot) projects concentrating on STEP/ISO10303 within the sector (Fowler, 1995). 
However, the initially reported momentum did not lead to sustained success (Gielingh, 
2008) and the use of standards such as STEP/ISO10303 remained limited (Gielingh, 
2008) to a small number of successful protocols only. From about 1996 much of the effort 
of the process industry was concentrated on ISO15926. The latter standard is actively 
supported by consortia such as USPI (NL), FIATECH (USA) and POSCeasar (Norway). 
However, Dreverman (Dreverman, 2005) reported that there were only few commercial 
implementations of ISO15926. Simpler standards (Table 5.1 levels 1-4) such as NE100 
developed by PROLIST in Germany (this standard standardizes device and system 
properties) and eCl@ss (a standard for grouping products and services corresponding 
properties) appeared to have had more success in terms of actual usage. 
 
Other more recent (pilot) project activities reported by USPI (Van Exel) are: (1) the 
harmonization of SAP definitions (2003-2006) by Shell, Statoil and DSM (Asset owners) 
by mapping these definitions to a common (precursor of) ISO15926-4 reference library. 
These SAP definitions are used for management of asset information in the maintenance 
phase mainly for procurement of parts. (2) The adoption of PROLIST/NE100 by BASF 
(Chemical asset owner) and Endress and Hauser (Instrumentation and DCS Equipment 
vendor) for procurement of electrical devices such that the engineering specification can 
be used throughout the plant life cycle. (3) The application of the Gellish standard for 
process installations in tunnels by Croon TBI Techniek (large EPC contractor) and (4) the 
development by ICAAMC, a global group of compressor manufacturers, of a smart 
dictionary based on ISO15926-4 and Gellish for the engineering specification of a 
compressor system such that it can be used throughout the plant life cycle. 
 
5.3.6 Causes for lack of pervasiveness 
Based on literature observations, there appear to be a number of possible causes for the 
lack of common adoption of asset information standards in different industries. These 
will be discussed below, using a grouping proposed by Wapakabulo et al. (Wapakabulo et 
al., 2005), who made a distinction between the following success factors for standards: (1) 





5.3.6.1 Organizational causes 
This section discusses the organizational causes for lack of pervasiveness of asset 
information standards. 
 
Lack of (insight into) direct financial incentives  
Perhaps one of the most important causes is the difficulty for industrial companies to judge 
their individual business case (costs and benefits) of adopting asset information standards. 
(Gallaher et al., 2002, Gielingh, 2008, Teeuw et al., 1996). The degree to which the benefits 
of standardization can be achieved depends on the degree of investment done by the 
collective industry in the development of the standard and by the software industry in the 
development of interfaces in their software. Therefore, for an individual company it may 
still be difficult to justify investments in standardization.  
Gielingh (Gielingh, 2008) explains that the actors of which investments are required (i.e. 
the software vendors) are not the same as the ones benefiting from the investments (i.e. 
industrial end-users). In addition, for software vendors already offering integrated solutions 
and in possession of a substantial market share, it may be unattractive to invest in solutions 
that make integration with their competitors’ products more attractive. If software vendors 
are willing to be standard-compliant, they will only invest if there is a clear market demand 
through a requirement by the users for inclusion of a certain standard.  
Standards do not bring benefits by themselves. Benefits are indirectly related to the use of 
the standards. Asset information standards should be seen as an enabler of plant life cycle 
management. The challenge of ‘measuring’ costs and benefits can therefore be compared to 
that of other business enablers, such as ICT applications (Soh and Markus, 1995). 
 
Organizational and industrial readiness 
A natural prerequisite for an organization to use an asset information standard for the 
exchange of information with other organizations is that it is actually capable of using the 
standard (Smith, 2006). It requires understanding, preparation and discipline (Van Exel, 
2002). Some authors have argued that an organization first needs to be ‘ready’ to use the 
standard for internal information exchange before it can be ready to successfully and 
consistently use it for external information exchange (Gielingh, 2008, Van Exel). Gielingh 
(Gielingh, 2008) explains that all collaborating organizations must be ready to produce and 
use the data, adopting the same version of the same standard and at the same level of detail. 
Readiness requires management support and commitment. Also resistance to change is not 
an uncommon challenge when it comes to implementing the use of asset information 
standards (Wapakabulo et al., 2005). 
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5.3.6.2 Standard related causes 
This section discusses the causes for lack of pervasiveness of asset information standards, 
related to the standards themselves. 
 
(Slow) development of asset information standards 
An asset information standard is a product of consensus (Dreverman, 2005, 
Kannengieser and Gero, 2007). Before a new asset information standard is accepted, 
extensive design work and discussion has taken place (Kannengieser and Gero, 2007). 
The reason for the (need of a) thorough process of consensus is that standards will be of 
higher quality, more complete, and more reflective of broad industry requirements, 
instead of attending to special interests (Eisenberg and Melton, 1998). Fowler (Fowler, 
1995) states that ‘STEP has been as much a research project as a standardization activity 
for much of its lifetime’. However, time-consuming development processes can lead to 
standards lagging behind the practices and technological developments in the industry. 
This can weaken the commitment of sponsors and users (Eisenberg and Melton, 1998, 
Tolman, 1999).  
 
Revisioning process of asset information standards (stability of the standard) 
Asset information standards are regularly revised. A case study of Wapakabulo et al. 
(Wapakabulo et al., 2005) on the STEP/ISO10303 standard in the UK Defense industry 
suggests that the revision process has a negative impact on the adoption of the standard. 
Because newer versions lack backward compatibility with earlier versions, rework is to be 
done with every new version. In practice, the introduction of a different, new standard 
appears to have been regularly favoured over the migration of the existing standards to 
the latest version. This may, for example, lead to using a complex mix of old versions of 
some standards in combination with other, newer standards (Wapakabulo et al., 2005). 
In aerospace, some standards provide users with tools to map older versions to newer 
versions (e.g. the S1000D standard) (S1000D). 
 
Complexity of the asset information standards 
The case study of Wapakabulo et al. (Wapakabulo et al., 2005) on STEP/ISO10303 





Smith (Smith, 2006) discusses the ISO15926 standard as an example of other asset 
information standards, and depicts ISO15926 as modelled ‘counter intuitively from the 
perspective of the general users’. Mathew et al. (Mathew et al., 2006) mention in their 
review on the use of the recent OSA-EAI/ISO13374 standard, that one of the primary 
issues encountered for system development is the complexity of the data model. 
Simplification of the data model is proposed as a result. Some software suppliers claim to 
reduce the complexity of a standard by the way the standard is incorporated in their 
software (Siemens). 
 
Lack of accessibility to the standard (cost of the standard) 
Other potential reasons for differences in popularity appears to be the lack of accessibility 
to the specification of the asset information standards (Smith, 2006, Wapakabulo et al., 
2005). This is because license fees had or have to be paid for usage of many asset 
information standards, as is the case with  STEP/ISO10303 (Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
and ISO15926 (Smith, 2006), which are copyrighted by the International Organization for 
Standardization, from where it can be purchased. Although the fees are small it is felt as a 
practical obstacle. The incorporation of standards in software, e.g. S1000d in Siemens 
PLM software (Siemens), reduces the need for an end-user to have access to the original 
standard.  
 
Quality of asset information standards  
a. Ontological problems 
An asset information standard is the end-result of many decisions and is therefore often a 
compromise. Smith (Smith, 2006) discusses some (ontological) mistakes, which occur in 
the development of asset information standards which may influence the user-
friendliness and usability of the standards. Smith takes the ISO15926 asset information 
standard as an example. Smith (Smith, 2006) mentions the following problems: (1) 
terminological confusions, expressions such as ‘instance’, ‘entity’, ‘object’, ‘represent’, etc., 
are used in different ways by different communities, and (2) the employment of logical 
tools in a counterintuitive way.   
 
A problem of ontological choices with some asset information standards is that they 
cannot be reversed easily; asset information standards such as ISO15926 are built like 
houses on foundations. Past choices can hinder or block future progress, for example 
information systems, which rely on predefined structures can have problems if data is 




There appear to be two traditional solutions for solving this problem: to add new sections 
to standards or to design new (versions of) standards, e.g. instead of changing the 
architecture of STEP/ISO10303, a new standard ISO15926 was developed. Such solutions 
might also complicate things. Future research on (automatic) mapping of different asset 
information standards or versions of standards appears to be promising for solving this 
problem (Bellatreche et al., 2006, Kannengieser and Gero, 2007, Li et al., 2005, Silva et 
al., 2005). 
 
b. Poor performance of asset information standards 
Gielingh (Gielingh, 2008) mentions the poor performance of current asset information 
standards. The exchange of data using neutral files is not without errors which is 
illustrated by three exchange projects in which serious loss of the original design-content 
(geometric data) occurred. Remarkable was that the applications involved applied the 
standard correctly. Gielingh (Gielingh, 2008) concludes that errors cannot fully be 
avoided. Anomalies in the exchange appear to differ from application to application and 
from translator to translator. 
 
c. Asset information standards not really neutral models 
Gielingh (Gielingh, 2008) explains that asset information standards are not really able to 
fulfil the collective requirements of many specific collaborations (made specific by the 
exact nature of the information exchange). In his view, the result is that the focus of asset 
information standards has shifted from one area, i.e. dedicated interfaces, to another, i.e. 
customizations of standards, e.g. ‘conformance classes’ and ‘AP’s’ (=Application 
Protocols, large and comprehensive data specifications that satisfy the specific product 
data needs for use in specific industry segments). This would also help to explain why 
vendors are reluctant to develop standard-compliant commercial applications, since 
standard-compliancy may not guarantee that the applications are actually fit for purpose 
in many situations. 
 
5.3.6.3 (Business) environment related causes 
This section discusses the causes for lack of pervasiveness of asset information standards, 




Extent to which asset information standards are already adopted (e.g. in industry)  
An important enabler of adoption of asset information standards mentioned by 
Wapakabulo et al. (Wapakabulo et al., 2005) is the extent to which asset information 
standards are already adopted. This phenomenon is also supported by network analysis 
theory (Wapakabulo et al., 2005), whereby it of the utmost importance to gain 
momentum. After the mores in a particular industry are (more or less) set, further 
adoption will be easier. This may be initiated by so-called dominant actors; large 
companies or governmental bodies enforcing the standards. Lack of dominant actors 
enforcing a standard may be one cause for limited use (Dreverman, 2005). 
 
Legal aspects 
A barrier for the uptake of asset information standards mentioned by (Gielingh, 2008) 
are legal aspects. Legal processes usually assume the usage of paper documents. 
Electronic documents may be acceptable, if they are printed or made available in a widely 
accepted format. This is further complicated by liabilities and contractual dependencies. 
The application of an asset information standard requires a contractual agreement 
between two industrial parties who intend to exchange product data. The performance of 
this exchange depends on (contractual) commitments between industrial parties and 
their vendors. Secondly the actual exchange requires translation between source and 
target-applications. If anything goes wrong with the exchange and if it is not directly clear 
what causes the problem, it will therefore be difficult to hold one of the parties liable for 
problems with standards based data exchange.  
 
5.4 Two Case studies (Stork GLT and Akzo Nobel Botlek) 
This section presents the two case studies, in which the causes for success/failure in using 
asset information standards in the process industry as reported in the literature are 
examined further.  
 
5.4.1 Case 1: Stork GLT 
Stork GLT VoF is a consortium consisting of five contractors and suppliers, which are 
committed long-term to the engineering, renovation, maintenance and modification 
activities for one of Europe’s largest gas assets. The asset is operated by NAM, a joint 
venture between Shell and ExxonMobil. NAM is organized as an operating company of 
Shell. Production facilities consist of 20 installations throughout the northern part of The 




The close cooperation between NAM and the consortium Stork GLT and within the 
consortium has intensified the need for information exchange and standardization. Stork 
GLT makes use of neutral asset information standards (STEPlib; part of STEP/ISO10303) 
which is actively used for classification of documents, the plant breakdown structure and 
the unique numbering of asset parts. Although the standard is used to a considerable 
extent, there was more functionality available in the standard than was selected (e.g. 
complex product models). Through structured interviews, the causes for the decisions in 
the use of the standard were established. These are summarized below, structured in the 
same way as the results from the literature review. 
 
5.4.1.1 Influence of the Organization 
This section lists the aspects found during the case study related to the organization. 
 
Insight into direct financial incentives 
At the time that the choice was made to implement asset information standards (in the 
design and engineering phase) there were no clear business cases or reports of estimated 
benefits available. As an interviewee said ‘There was a belief, a vision that the use of 
standards would bring benefits in the efficiency and effectiveness for the information 
exchange within the consortium.’ This may be explained by how the consortium is 
organized and managed from the beginning. Within the consortium the organizations are 
able to propose the best solutions within the functional specification provided by NAM, 
instead of merely being allowed to work in a prescribed way and execute tasks within 
technical specifications (Sietinga et al., 2008). This resulted in strong ownership for the 
best solution and processes, including asset information management. 
 
The application of the data management standard (STEPlib part of STEP/ISO10303) 
proved useful, not so much in the communication with third parties but more in the 
internal communication between disciplines and applications. For example, when design 
data had to be imported into the SAP maintenance system, the names and data structures 
were already consistent, which simplified the data-import (Sietinga et al., 2008).  
 
Organizational and industrial readiness 
Because Stork GLT had to start from scratch (in 1997), it was possible to implement the 
standards in a green-field environment. There was a common belief that standardized 
registration would benefit the organization, therefore there was little resistance to the use 
of the standards.  
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Later, when Shell and NAM standardized information management (through the use of a 
SAP-based system) there was some natural resistance of the consortium members to 
change to this new standard. The benefits for the internal processes of Stork GLT was 
expected to be limited, since the existing standards worked well. The change would 
however bring standardization benefits to Shell and NAM, and the communication 
between Stork GLT and NAM. Because the information management was already 
internally standardized it was not too difficult to adapt to the new standard.  
 
5.4.1.2 Influence of the Standard design 
This section lists the items found during the case study related to the design of the asset 
information standards used. 
 
Complexity of asset information standards 
The implementation was not seen as a complex task. Reasons given for this are the fact 
that the standard could be implemented in a newly founded organization (green-field), 
together with the pragmatic approach chosen by the organization. Making sure the 
standard is used consistently over a long time period despite changes of personnel and 
lifecycle phases is seen as a ‘far more difficult task’.  
 
Accessibility to the standard 
There were no reported problems with access to the standards, which may be the result of 
some consulting contacts with experts within the community, which produced the 
STEPlib standard. Gaps or difficulties with regard to the specifications were bridged by a 
pragmatic implementation of the standard. This had as a consequence that some of the 
neutrality of the standard was lost in the implementation process. With neutrality we 
mean the possibility to easily exchange the internal standardized information with 
external communities (outside the consortium) which are also using the STEPlib 
standard. 
 
Quality of asset information standards 
There were no reported problems with the implementation and use of asset information 
standards, one of the reasons might be the fact that Stork GLT chose to only implement 
the most elementary parts of the STEPlib library. Another reason may be that Stork GLT 
makes use of a central engineering database, in which most engineering details can be 
accessed/progressed by all consortium employees. The use of the standard is embedded 
in the use of this system, which is prescribed and controlled centrally.  
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Quick development of asset information standards 
Stork GLT was at the time of implementation, in the late 1990’s, aware of the development 
of the STEP (ISO10303) standard. Early contacts with experts taking part in the STEP 
development led to the decision to develop and implement the STEPlib standard internally 
with a small group of key people by using a pragmatic approach. Only the parts which were 
really needed in the view of the organization were used. When there was discussion about 
the way the standard should be implemented, the organization chose for a pragmatic 
solution which was most simple to implement but also led to abandoning the standard 
sometimes. This way of working facilitated a quick development and implementation of the 
standard. 
 
5.4.1.3 Influence of the Business environment 
This section lists the items found during the case study related to the business environment. 
 
Existence and influence of dominant actors 
Asset operator NAM can be seen as a dominant actor influencing the use of standards in 
general. They did not force the adoption of specific asset information standards in the 
engineering phase but were very active supporters of standardization in the start-up phase. 
NAM as an organization was actively participating in standard development and aware of 
potential benefits of asset information standards. 
 
5.4.2 Case 2: AkzoNobel Botlek (MEB) 
AkzoNobel Botlek MEB (Membrane electrolysis) primarily produces chlorine, caustic soda, 
and hydrogen. The company is an example of an organization in the process industry that 
internally standardized many of its asset information management processes and slowly 
defined their own internal (asset information) standard. The internal standards are often 
based on national or international standards, for example ISO3511 for Piping and 
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID). 
 
The activities of AkzoNobel Botlek cover all processes in the asset life-cycle from 
engineering to construction, operation and phase-out. This means that it is possible to 
implement and stimulate the use of a shared asset information standard. Examples of 
information carriers for which asset information standards are used are piping and 




5.4.2.1 Influence of the Organization 
This section lists the aspects found during the case study related to the organization. 
 
Insight into direct financial incentives 
AkzoNobel Botlek did not explicitly measure the financial benefits of the use of standards. 
The engineering organization, driver of the use of the standards, again worked from a 
common belief that it would be beneficial. The recent outsourcing of maintenance 
activities to a maintenance contractor made the importance of stringent standardization 
even more clear. As one interviewee said: “Standardization was something done by the 
internal engineering department and was being done because this just seemed to be a task 
they had to do.” When AkzoNobel Botlek selected the external maintenance contractor, 
the contract was not clear about the responsibilities for information maintenance and the 
use of standards. “This has led to configuration management problems, some of which 
have yet to be resolved”. 
 
5.4.2.2 Influence of the Standard design 
A side effect of the choice of AkzoNobel Botlek for a pragmatic implementation of the 
asset information standards is the loss of neutrality. In fact by tailoring the asset 
information standard a new local standard is established. This has not been regarded as 
an issue by AkzoNobel Botlek yet as almost all asset information exchange within the 
organization is standardized to the tailored version of the standard. However, AkzoNobel 
Botlek has recently outsourced activities to a partner which does use a (neutral) asset 
information standard. This means that a translation is necessary.  
 
The problems related to ‘loss of neutrality’ are explained through a simple fictitious 
example (not directly related to AkzoNobel Botlek):  
 If one company uses a dedicated standard for denoting a percentage (e.g. “.50”) and a 
partner company uses the exact notation as dictated by the neutral standard (e.g. 
“50%) then a mismatch will occur. In this case the solution is straightforward: a 
simple translation between the dedicated format and the neutral standard format is 
sufficient.  
 If the partner would also have used a customized standard (e.g. with notation 
”0,50”), than a second choice would be necessary: either translation between 
customized and customized, or with translations to the neutral standard as an 
intermediate step (e.g. “.50” to 50% to “0,50”).  
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 The decision and implementation will be even more complex if information would go 
lost in the translation (e.g. “.501” to “50,1%” to “0,50”). 
 
5.4.2.3 Influence of the Business environment 
This section lists the items found during the case study related to the business 
environment. 
 
Existence and influence of dominant actors 
For a long time, the use of the standards was mainly internally. This was driven by 
Engineering, which in turn acted upon the demands of the Engineering function of the 
group AkzoNobel, of which AkzoNobel Botlek is a subsidiary. In this way, Engineering 
and the group-company became the dominant actors. Initially, there was limited drive for 
stringent use of the standards in communication with external parties. However, there 
have been some changes recently, which included the outsourcing of some of the 
maintenance activities and also the vision that, if (internal) standardization was to be 
maintained, also the (new) external/contracting parties are to work according to the 
standards. This was made explicit by agreeing that the contractors would work in the 
AkzoNobel Botlek engineering database.  
 
Legal aspects 
There are no reported problems with regard to legal aspects, which may be because of the 
sharing of interests within AkzoNobel Botlek internally so far. 
 
5.4.3 Comparison 
The two case study companies were primarily selected for their maturity in using asset 
information standards, which was established from independent reference. We know 
from the literature that asset information standards are not used pervasively in the 
process industry. The three main questions during the case study were: (1) what are the 
reasons/ success factors for these two organizations to use an asset information standard, 
(2) what were the inhibiting factors and (3) how did the success factors and inhibitors 




(1) Success factors  
In both cases, the organizations did not have a clear idea of the direct financial incentives. 
Rather, the implementation was initiated from a belief or a sense of duty. In both cases, 
there was a governing organization (the client in one case and the parent-company in the 
other) acting as dominant actor in encouraging and facilitating the implementation. 
Organizational readiness proved sufficient in both cases, which is not surprising, since the 
companies were selected for their maturity in information management. In both cases, 
the standard was at first mainly used for purposes of internal information exchange. 
Later, external influences enforced the need to also exchange external information in a 
standardized way. The initial implementation was therefore selected and configured, and 
in case 2 also tailored, to suit the needs of the company and the users. This helped 
acceptance of the standards, but also introduced a (potential) inhibiting factor. 
 
(2) Inhibitors 
After successful implementation predominantly for internal use, both case companies 
were forced to also facilitate external information exchange in a standardized way (albeit 
for different reasons). The initial success factor (i.e. locally made choices and therefore 
acceptance in the organization) now became an inhibitor: the use of the standard had to 
be broadened. This led to additional effort in both cases. This raises an interesting 
question: would it have been possible to configure the standards for local use and 
acceptance in such a way that later global use would not have cost additional effort? 
 
(3) Comparison with the literature 
Both organizations claim to benefit primarily from improved internal communication 
(engineering-procurement-construction-operation/maintenance) and later, or to a lesser 
extent, from improved external communication. This is consistent with the business 
needs and how they evolved over time: at first, the organization had to be streamlined 
internally, after which external communication and/or outsourcing could be organized.   
 
Both organizations were pragmatic in the way (sections) of asset information standards 
are implemented. This appears to have aided the use and acceptance of asset information 
standards in both organizations. In the case of Stork GLT the green-field start and use of a 
central database also stimulated the use of asset information standards. For AkzoNobel 





In conclusion, there appears to be a paradox with regard to successful implementation 
of the standards. The pragmatic use of standards (which may include local 
configuration/ customizations) may lead to successful use and acceptance locally, but 
does not make it easier to have different communities connect to each other. In fact, 
one could say that new, local standards are created. This apparent paradox touches 
upon the classic discussion of centralization and decentralization (Negandhi and 
Reimann, 1973). 
Further research could perhaps aid in the development of standards which allow such 
customizations whilst still preserving the pervasive potential of the standards.   
 
5.5 Adoption of asset information standards in other industries 
In order to investigate other possible causes of lack of adoption, as well as possible 
solutions, a comparison was sought with other industries, in which asset information 
standards are important (and important progress was made): the aerospace industry 
and the automotive industry. 
 
5.5.1  Aerospace 
The aerospace industry can be viewed as leading when it comes to asset life cycle 
management and adoption of asset information standards (Lee et al., 2007). For 
example, parts of the STEP/ISO10303 standard were successfully implemented by e.g., 
Boeing, Lockheed Martin and NASA, who were all reported to use several STEP 
Application Protocols (AP) for collaboration (Smith, 2002, PDES). Integration between 
the processes governing the life cycle phases of aircraft was adopted in aerospace 
because of several reported reasons, which are primarily based on the fact that the 
lifespan of an average airplane is long (more than 30 years), which leads to 
opportunities for investments in design and optimization processes. This in itself is not 
different from the long lifespan and significant opportunities in designing and 
optimizing a process plant. However a process plant is often built as one-of-a kind 
whereas aircraft are made in series, which enlarges the opportunities for fruitful 
investments in design and optimization processes. 
In addition, pressure of governmental safety regulations forced or stimulated the 




The proprietary (and in principle non-neutral) aerospace standard iSpec2200, which 
was developed by ATA (Air Transport Association), is also successful. iSpec2200 is 
based on the earlier ATA 100 spec and ATA 2100 spec standards. These contain format 
and content guidelines for technical manuals written by aviation manufacturers and 
suppliers and are used by airlines and other segments of the industry in the 
maintenance of their respective products (Wikipedia). iSpec2200 is a suite of data 
specifications and data models for the digital representation and exchange of technical 
data. Functional areas are: the industry-wide ATA numbering system (based on ATA 100 
Spec), maintenance requirements (e.g. scheduled maintenance and maintenance 
planning), maintenance procedures (e.g. maintenance manuals), configuration 
management (e.g. aircraft, engine and component configurations), training, flight 
operations (e.g. master minimum equipment list) and a flight crew operating manual 
(ATA). The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) has made the ATA numbering system 
(ATA 100 Spec) mandatory (FAA), aiming to make aviation safer.  
 
Similarly, aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, were able to force and direct the 
industry suppliers into wide adoption of their standards. For example: Boeing ensures 
that the same edition of the standard for geometric design is used by all partners involved 
in the design of the Dreamliner aircraft (Duvall and Bartholomew, 2007). It appears that 
in the aerospace industry, wide adoption was caused by enforcement by governmental/ 
safety bodies, and was aided to a large extent by the fact that the industry is dominated by 
just a few major aircraft manufacturers and airline associations, who are able to enforce 
or endorse the use of standards, even if they are proprietary. However, despite of this, 
further work is still required, for example of standardization of the flight operation 
manual (Bourgon). 
 
iSpec2200 and S1000D 
Besides iSpec2200 there is another prominent aerospace standard: S1000D, an 
international specification for technical publications, was initially developed by the 
AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (S1000D). The functionality the 
standard is in principle comparable to that of iSpec2200. S1000D was initially designed 
for military aircraft while iSpec2200 is intended for commercial aircraft (CEN). However, 
the scope of S1000D was extended in the last years and is still evolving (including 
functionality for both military and civil products) and might even be used in e.g. the 
process industry (S1000D). It was also suggested that S1000D may replace iSpec2200 in 
the future (S1000D), (CEN).  
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One of the reported reasons (by CEN, (CEN)) is that S1000D is regarded more flexible 
when it comes to re-use of data. This might be due to the fact that iSpec2200 was 
designed from the needs of the end-user, based on the specifications of the technical 
publications (Greenough and Williams, 2007), whereas S1000D was designed with the 
integrated use of data in mind (CEN).  
 
5.5.2 Automotive  
Dreverman (Dreverman, 2005) and Haag and Vroom (Haag and Vroom, 1996) show that 
also the automotive industry has had considerable success in adopting asset information 
standards, such as STEP/ISO10303 AP214. Adoption of asset information standards in 
automotive happened primarily in procurement and engineering processes. The adoption 
in the automotive industry was accelerated by a requirements-driven approach from an 
aligned user community according to Haag and Vroom (Haag and Vroom, 1996) and 
Dreverman (Dreverman, 2005). In 1991, five German organizations in the automotive and 
electro-technical industry started ProSTEP: ‘Development of Methods and Tools for 
Computer Aided Design and Production Facilities using STEP’. ProSTEP is an 
organization in which more than hundred European automotive companies jointly 
develop STEP standards. 
This pressured software suppliers to participate in implementation forums (Dreverman, 
2005). One of the most important requirements was (an information standard that would 
support) concurrent engineering (CE) (Haag and Vroom, 1996). Concurrent engineering 
is a systematic approach to the integrated, simultaneous design of both products and their 
related processes, including production. To use of CE effectively requires accuracy of data 
and a common architecture (Gunasekaran, 1998). 
 
5.5.3 Comparison  
It appears that the use of asset information standards is more developed in the aerospace 
and automotive industries than in the process industry. This is the reason why further 
research and implementation efforts have a high priority for leading standards consortia 
in the process industry, such as USPI (NL), POSCCaesar (Norway) and FIATECH (USA). 
Based on our preliminary findings, we have tried to compare causes for limited usage of 
the standards in the three industries. 
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One should realize that there are considerable differences in the industries and assets 
compared: the assets discussed in the automotive and aerospace industries are products, 
manufactured in series or through mass-production. The assets in the process industry 
are production plants, often developed or customized as one-of-a-kind, this means that 
the investment and return mechanisms may differ considerably. The way in which assets 
are produced also affects their variety. In the process industry, part of the assets (i.e. 
production installations) are one-offs, entirely engineered/ customized for the occasion. 
This may have affected the progress made in information modelling and exchange as the 
return on investment in information standards for parts and installations of which many 
are produced are much better than for one-off parts and installations even though process 
industry tries to use the knowledge from one installation to another. For this reason some 
progress was made with standards for specific components or sub-systems of process 
plants, the producers of which do try to standardize their processes (i.e. compressors, 
pumps, valves).  
 
Secondly, due to the large numbers of companies involved, the process industry appears 
to lack dominant actors compared to the aerospace industry (Dreverman, 2005, Tolman, 
1999), who could impose the adoption of asset information standards. An actor analysis of 
Dreverman (Dreverman, 2005) suggests that some actors in the process industry could 
perhaps stimulate the uniform adoption of asset information standards, but remain 
relatively passive, e.g. plant owners and software vendors. Also the estimated size of the 
investment to enforce one or more standards is seen to be as prohibitive for a single 
company (Dreverman, 2005). Dreverman (Dreverman, 2005) illustrates that plant 
owners should eventually become more active collectively in order to gain influence on 
e.g. engineering software companies, similar to the developments in the aerospace 
industry (Duvall and Bartholomew, 2007). Software vendors active in the process 
industry have not formed communities to agree on the use of standards (Dreverman, 
2005). The problem is further aggravated by a diverse landscape of competing asset 
information standards. This makes it difficult for organizations in the process industry to 
make a choice for a specific standard and to invest in it. 
 
A detailed comparison is summarised in Table 5.3. The summary is structured according 
to the aspects listed in the previous section, aspects related to the organization, to the 




 Process industries Aerospace industries Automotive 
industries 




momentum has not led to 
pervasive use of any 
standards throughout the 
industry (Fowler, 1995, 
Dreverman, 2005, Gielingh, 
2008). 
The aerospace industry is 
regarded as leading (Teeuw 




AP210, AP203 AP232 and 
AP209 (Smith, 2002, PDES), 
S1000D(CEN), ATA 100 
Spec, ATA 2100 Spec, iSpec 
2200, S1000D. 
The automotive industry has 
had considerable success in 
adopting asset information 
standards, such as 
STEP/ISO10303 AP214 
(Dreverman, 2005, Haag 




Difficulty in judging the 
benefits of integration, and 
the benefits of asset 
information standards 
(Gallaher et al., 2002, Teeuw 
et al., 1996, Gielingh, 2008). 
Not based on a business 
case, but rather on 
enforcement by 
governmental regulatory 
bodies and dominant actors. 
Not based on a business 
case, but rather on 
facilitation by an aligned 
community of key players 
and (later) software vendors. 
Organizational 
readiness 
Standards require  
understanding, preparation 
and discipline. This needs to 
be enforced (Gielingh, 2008, 
Van Exel, Wapakabulo et al., 
2005). 
Standards adopted, enforced 
by governmental safety 
regulations (Lee et al., 2007, 
Dreverman, 2005). 
Dominant actors, such as 
Boeing, are able to enforce 
the standards upon suppliers 
(Duvall and Bartholomew, 
2007). 
Adoption of standards 
driven by an aligned user 
community, developed from 
an initiative of five key 
players. Later software 
vendors started to offer the 
use of the standard as 
standard functionality 
(Gunasekaran, 1998, 








development of standards 
has weakened commitment 
of sponsors and users 
(Tolman, 1999, Eisenberg 
and Melton, 1998). 
Asset information standards 
such as iSpec2200 and 
S1000D were developed 
through commitment of 
dominant actors, e.g. aircraft 
builders and the cooperation 
of powerful bodies in 
aerospace e.g. ASD, AIA and 
ATA. 
In automotive the standards 
development was accelerated 
by a requirements-driven 
approach from an aligned 




stability of the 
standards 
Newer version of the 
STEP/ISO10303 standard 
lack backward compatibility 
(Wapakabulo et al., 2005). 
Newer version of the 
STEP/ISO10303 standard 
lack backward compatibility 
(Wapakabulo et al., 2005). 
S1000D provides users with 
tools to map older versions 
to newer versions(S1000D). 
Newer version of the 
STEP/ISO10303 standard 
lack backward compatibility 






STEP/ISO 10303 and 
ISO15926 seen as very 
complex/ counterintuitive 
(Smith, 2006, Mathew et al., 
2006). 
Supporting software 
suppliers claim to reduce the 
complexity of the use of the 
standards (Siemens). 
STEP/ISO10303 and 
ISO15926 seen as very 
complex/ counterintuitive 
(Smith, 2006, Mathew et al., 
2006). 
Supporting software 
suppliers claim to reduce the 
complexity of the use of the 
standards (Siemens). 
 
STEP/ISO 10303 and 
ISO15926 seen as very 
complex/ counterintuitive 
(Smith, 2006, Mathew et al., 
2006). 
Supporting software 
suppliers claim to reduce the 






E.g. STEP/ISO 10303 
requires licence fees. This 
may hinder pervasive use 
(Wapakabulo et al., 2005, 
Smith, 2006). 
E.g. STEP/ISO 10303 
requires licence fees. This 
may hinder pervasive use 
(Wapakabulo et al., 2005, 
Smith, 2006). 
Others, such as S1000D are 
provided free of charge 
(S1000D).  
The incorporation of 
standards, e.g. S1000d in 
Siemens PLM software 
(Siemens) diminishes the 
need for an end-user to 
access the original standard. 
STEP/ISO 10303 AP214 
requires license fees. This 
may hinder pervasive use 
(Wapakabulo et al., 2005, 
Smith, 2006). 
Similarly to the aerospace 
industries the standards are 
incorporated in software 
packages, e.g. Catia which 
may lower the need for an 
end-user to have access to 
the original standard.  
Quality of 
standards 
Several ontological and other 
problems in e.g. ISO15926 
(Smith, 2006). 
The problems discussed for 
ISO15926 are partly also  





Lack of dominant actors or 
governmental bodies or 
industry communities 
enforcing the standards 
(Dreverman, 2005). 
Standards adopted, enforced 
by governmental safety 
regulations (Lee et al., 2007, 
Dreverman, 2005). 
Dominant actors are able to 
enforce the standards upon 
suppliers (Duvall and 
Bartholomew, 2007). 
Adoption of standards 
driven by an aligned user 
community, developed from 
an initiative of five key 
players. Later software 
vendors started to offer the 
use of the standard as core 
functionality (Gunasekaran, 
1998, Dreverman, 2005, 
Haag and Vroom, 1996). 
Legal aspects Potentially unclear liabilities 
in data exchange and the 
correct use of the standards 
(Gielingh, 2008). License to 
operate (Dreverman, 2005). 
Managed as part of the 
above mentioned 
enforcement. 
Managed as part of the 
above mentioned facilitation. 





5.6  Summary, conclusions and research directions 
Other researchers have already stressed the importance of the design and optimization of 
the plant and equipment in the process industry for operational performance when 
compared to discrete manufacturing. Designing a process plant is usually a multi-
disciplinary activity, involving various engineering disciplines and suppliers. Also 
(continuously) optimizing a process plant tends to involve close cooperation between a 
number of disciplines and parties, including maintenance, design/engineering and 
equipment suppliers. Due to the often complex nature of the process plant and the multi-
disciplinary nature of the design and optimization processes, successful exchange of plant 
design information between disciplines and parties is important for the success of the 
design and optimization processes, and hence for the operational performance.   
 
Our exploratory investigation consists of a literature review and two case studies. The 
literature survey starts with providing a comprehensive overview of asset information 
standards (summarised in Table 5.2), categorised by semantic richness (Van Renssen, 
2005), asset hierarchical class and the typical use of the standard. 
The literature survey further shows that the process industry has had only limited success 
in introducing asset information standards, despite significant efforts. Since information 
hand-over between asset life cycle phases is important, lack of information 
standardisation suggests that collaboration costs are likely to be higher than necessary.  
For the case studies, two organisations were selected which have relatively mature asset 
organisation management processes. The cases both showed implementations whereby 
firstly the standard was embedded internally, and also used in the communication with 
(external) partners. It was demonstrated that the first use and acceptance of a standard 
can be enhanced by a ‘pragmatic approach’, whereby local customisations of the standard 
are allowed. This does not help the external use of the standard. 
 
Finally, the reported causes for the lack of pervasiveness were reviewed in a comparison 
between practices in the process industry and the aerospace and automotive industries.  
 
Causes for (lack of) adoption of asset information standards in the process industry were 
grouped into standard related causes, organization related causes and environment 























Figure 5.2: Causes for (lack of) adoption of asset information standards in the process 
industry 
 (Business) environment related causes 
- Extent to which dominant actors e.g. software vendors, 
government, plant owners force adoption ((Dreverman, 
2005, Tolman, 1999), industry comparison and case study in 
the current article) 
- Extent to which financial incentives stimulate investment in 
standards (Fowler, 1995, Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
- The extent to which economies of scale influence financial 
incentives (industry comparison) 
- Extent to which asset information standards are already 
adopted   
(Fowler, 1995, Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
Standard related causes 
- Slow standard development process (Eisenberg and Melton, 
1998, Tolman, 1999) 
- The extent to which standards are stable (Wapakabulo et al., 
2005) 
- Complexity of architecture of the standards (Fowler, 1995, 
Smith, 2006, Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
- Extent to which ontological problems hinder use of the 
standards (Fowler, 1995, Smith, 2006, Wapakabulo et al., 
2005) 
- Poor performance of asset information standards (Gielingh, 
2008) 
- Ease of access to the standard (costs of standard) (Smith, 
2002, Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
- Extent to which it is possible to test the asset information 
standard (Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
 
Extent to which asset 
information 
standards are used in 
the process industry 
Organization related causes 
- Complexity of implementation ((Smith, 2006, Wapakabulo 
et al., 2005) and current case study) 
- Amount of knowledge of asset information standards and 
related technology (Fowler, 1995) 
- Extent to which organizations align with requirements of 
standards e.g. people, processes, systems (Van Exel, 2002) 
- Resistance to change (Wapakabulo et al., 2005) 
- Extent to which the use of asset information standards is 
supported by senior management ((Wapakabulo et al., 
2005) and current case study) 
- Extent to which legal issues influence the willingness to 
share information  
((Gielingh, 2008), case studies)  
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The insight into the causes for lack of use of asset information standards in the process 
industry is necessary for eventual success in adopting asset information standards. 
 
In order to gain further in depth understanding of the possibilities to improve the current 
situation, it will be necessary to decide for each of the causes mentioned here to which 
extent they can be eliminated/ minimized. This leads to a number of conclusions and 
proposals for direction. Eliminating the environmental causes would require organizing 
governmental enforcement of the uniform use of the standards. Initiating and gaining 
momentum requires broad action. Governmental bodies may only be inclined to take 
such action if and it when it becomes apparent that the standardized regulations (and 
uniform use of standards) are feasible. This may require eliminating some of the other 
current causes for lack of adoption first.   
 
It appears from the descriptions of the organization related causes that these are 
aggravated by the complexity of the standards (i.e. the complexity of the implementation, 
the extent to which expert knowledge is required and the perceived ease of use of the 
standard all are related to the complexity of the standard). In addition, it was reported 
that the only successful initiatives in the process industry so far make use of small, 
relatively limited standards, or small parts of larger standards.  
 
The contribution of this chapter is insight into the use of asset information standards and 
the causes for lack of pervasiveness. This was made specific in the Figure 5.2 and Table 
5.3, which could be used by practitioners and researchers to select and develop the use of 
asset information standards. This in turn is necessary for improving the collaboration in 
the process industry. 
 
Research directions 
Future research work should be focused on causes which hinder the pervasiveness of asset 
information standards, in particular the complexity of the asset information standards, 
since this is likely to also positively influence the other causes, as became apparent in the 
case studies.  
 
This would entail two main research areas; first of all, e.g. the use of ISO15926 as a 




(1) Use of ISO15926 as a methodology: The currently available comprehensive standards 
designed for the process industry do constitute in theory all information relevant for 
successful and extensive collaboration in the process industry. The next step will be to 
investigate how e.g. ISO15926 can be used as a methodology (meta-concept) for designing 
and incorporating already available and successful smaller context specific standards (e.g. 
eCl@ss, Prolist/NE100, OSA-EAI/CBM and ISO14224). New standards should be 
developed in such a way that context specific standards are much easier to apply and 
enforce, while still being fully compliant with the ‘parent-standard’ ISO15926. The latter 
is of particular importance, since many new, small standards would otherwise be 
developed based on different principles and in different ways, instead of working towards 
having uniform work methods.  
 
In our view, this way of development has the potential to enable the future adoption of 
uniform principles in asset information standards in the process industry. One could 
learn from successful examples of such developments in other industries, e.g. S1000D in 
the aerospace industry.   
 
(2) Automatic mapping of standards: A second promising area for further work related 
to the standard related causes would be the automatic mapping of different asset 
information standards or versions of standards.  
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Appendix 5:  
Illustration of asset information standards 
 
To illustrate asset information standards in maintenance processes, two asset information 
standards are illustrated. First of all an example of the KKS standard also used by a case 
company in chapter 2 and secondly the relatively all-encompassing ISO15926 standard 
which is still being further developed.  
 
KKS 
KKS is defined as Kraftwerk Kennzeichen System indicating process plant designation 
system and is mentioned as being widely used in Europe (Shamsuddin, 2004). The 
system provides method to identify plant equipment and its operation. It also covers the 
buildings and structures. The classification system is founded on function of equipment 
or component or a part. The number allocated by the KKS system to equipment is broken 
down into a number of levels, see table x1 for the breakdown levels and table  x2 for level 1 
function code examples. There is a field or set of fields within each level and each field 
occupies a letter or a number according to a convention. The classification and 
identifications of plant equipment is taken as an example in figure 5a.1. 
 
KKS fields








Position code G F0 F1 F2 F3 Fn Fn A1 A2 An An A3 B 1 B2 Bn Bn
Type of character A or N N* A A A N N A A N N N A A N N  
 
Table 5a.1: Breakdown of Equipment in three levels, from function to equipment to 
components or signal (Shamsuddin, 2004) 
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KKS level 1 function code examples
A Grid and distribution systems
B Power transmission and auxiliary power supply
C Instrumentation and control equipment
D Not defined
E Conventional fuels and supply and residue disposal
F Handling of nuclear equipment
G Water supply and disposal
H Conventional i.e. mononuclear heat generation
J Nuclear heat generation
K Reactor auxiliary systems
L Steam water and gas cycles
M Main machine sets
N Process energy, e.g. district heating
P Cooling water systems
Q Auxiliary systems, e.g. air compressors
R Gas generation and treatment
S Ancillary systems, e.g. heating and ventilation
U Structures
W Renewable energy plants
X Large machines (not included in main machine sets)
Y Not defined
Z Workshop and office equipment  
Table 5a.2: KKS level 1 function code examples (Shamsuddin, 2004) 
 
Example for KKS breakdown level
 
Figure 5a.1: Example for KKS breakdown (level 1) (Shamsuddin, 2004) 
 
ISO15926 
Another example is the ISO15926 standard or ontology for description of asset 
information. The standard is based on concepts of the earlier STEP/ISO10303 standard. 
The ISO15926 standard can be used for classification but can also be used for other 
purposes such as the geometric description of assets.  
The following example shows the description of a pump by using the ISO15926 standard 
in the open and online accessible RDS/WIP library (2012).  
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The RDS/WIP library is a system for publishing definitions in ISO 15926 and related 
formalisms as a sort of collaboratively maintained library, using OWL/RDF and SPARQL 
for representing and querying the various volumes of data (RDS/WIP, 2012).With 
ISO15926 not only a physical object such as a pump can be classified but also be used for 




RDS/WIP URI  http://rdl.rdlfacade.org/data#R10310427332 
Label   RECIPROCATING POWER PISTON PUMP 
Description  A reciprocating power pump utilizing piston(s) driven by power from an 
outside source applied to the crankshaft of the pump. 





Designation  RECIPROCATING POWER PISTON PUMP 
Creation Date  1999.06.30 
Creator  u20683 
Status   Recorded 
Note   derived from Hydraulic Institute Standards 
 
Specialization 
 RECIPROCATING POWER PUMP  
 RECIPROCATING PUMP  
 POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP  
 PUMP  
 ARTEFACT  
 INANIMATE PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO-IS 15926-2 PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO 15926-4 POSSIBLE INDIVIDUAL  
 ISO 15926-4 THING 
 ISO 15926-4 INANIMATE PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO-IS 15926-2 ARRANGED INDIVIDUAL  
 ISO 15926-4 POSSIBLE INDIVIDUAL  
 ISO 15926-4 THING 
 INANIMATE PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO-IS 15926-2 PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO 15926-4 POSSIBLE INDIVIDUAL  
 ISO 15926-4 THING 
 RECIPROCATING EQUIPMENT ITEM  
 INANIMATE PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO-IS 15926-2 PHYSICAL OBJECT  
 ISO 15926-4 POSSIBLE INDIVIDUAL  







Conclusion and discussion 
 
This final chapter consists of the main conclusions and a discussion of the findings. The 
aim of this thesis was to contribute to the academic knowledge on asset information for 
FMEA-based maintenance. Four research themes were identified that address research 
questions that fill several gaps in current knowledge. In this section the main findings of 
the thesis will be discussed. Directions for further research and the societal relevance of 
the presented research are also discussed. 
 
6.1 Main findings 
In this first section the main findings of the research are discussed per chapter which all 
represent a chapter. Each chapter corresponds to a paper, published earlier or submitted 
for publication. 
 
6.1.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for maintenance planning: a 
multiple case study in the process industry 
 
RO1: To what extent are a number of common assumptions on the use of Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis for (preventive) maintenance supported by empirical evidence? 
 
The contribution of chapter 2 is an empirical investigation of a number of assumptions on 
the use of FMEA for maintenance planning in the process industry. Contrary to the 
original proposals on RCM/FMEA, but in line with recent literature, the companies 
studied followed a pragmatic approach in which only the most critical assets are identified 
and analyzed. FMEA is in practice regarded as a one-off exercise because of several 
(information) related problems. Maintenance engineers tend to update the maintenance 
plan, using e.g. feedback from the maintenance operators, without reference to the 
original FMEA findings, which then become outdated. 
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In addition, the FMEA-procedure is hindered in practice by operational problems (e.g. 
lack of a clear procedure) and information management problems (e.g. inaccuracy in 
failure reporting, relevant information distributed across various systems).  
 
6.1.2 A quantitative method for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 
RO2: How can the repeatability of the FMEA method be improved and the ability to 
continuously improve maintenance routines be developed? 
 
In chapter 3 our contribution is the development of a procedure which can serve to 
support the traditional method of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
improves the repeatability of FMEA. 
 
The enhancement is aimed at strengthening the traditional method: expert judgment is 
supported by taking into account the use historical failure data. The primary application 
of the model is to use the estimated probability of failure occurrence, combined with the 
expected cost to list the assets in order of decreasing risk. This list can be used in the 
traditional FMEA analysis. Also the so-called Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
analysis is demonstrated, in which the estimated probabilities are used to determine a 
better corrective/ preventive maintenance policy, which may be expected to result in 
lowest costs.  
  
6.1.3 Design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) method for 
continuous FMEA-based maintenance  
 
RO3: What are requirements and design principles for continuous FMEA-based 
maintenance? 
 
In chapter 4 the contribution is a further exploration of the context in which the FMEA is 
conducted and re-used. We concentrated on the problems relating to feedback and re-use 
of FMEAs. We therefore extended our previous case studies with one in-depth case study 
on FMEA-based information management and thereby acquired design requirements and 
design principles for continuous FMEA-based maintenance. Based on these design 
requirements and design principles we propose a Maintenance Feedback Analysis method 
extending the current RCM/FMEA approach. 
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6.1.4 A review of the use of asset information standards for collaboration 
in the process industry 
 
RO4: What are the causes for the lack of pervasiveness of asset information standards 
in the process industry compared to the aerospace industry? 
 
The contribution of chapter 5 is insight into the use of asset information standards and 
the causes for lack of pervasiveness. This is necessary for improving the use of standards 
in collaboration in the process industry in general and improving the exchange of asset 
information more specific.   
 
Comparison of the process industry with the aerospace industry and our case study 
results show that the process industry appears to have had only limited success in 
introducing such standards so far, despite significant efforts. This is confirmed by our 
literature review. Since information hand-over between asset life cycle phases is 
important, lack of information standardization suggests that collaboration costs are 
higher than necessary. Reported causes for the lack of pervasiveness can be grouped into 
standard related causes (slow development of standards, stability, complexity, cost, 
quality/ontological problems), organization related causes (lack of direct financial 
incentives, organizational readiness and resistance to change) and business environment 
related causes (legal aspects, level of adoption, limited governmental enforcement and a 
lack of dominant actors in the process industry).  
 
6.1.5 Contribution of the thesis as a whole 
During this research a number of aspects related to asset information management, an 
important enabler of effective FMEA-based maintenance, are investigated and proposals 
for improvement are stipulated. For this purpose, insight was gained into the use of 
FMEA in the process industry (chapter 2) and into problems with information 
management for FMEA-based maintenance. Acquisition of data from the assets is not 
always regarded as a useful (or cost-effective) activity (Moubray, 1992, Smith and 
Hinchcliffe, 2004, Garg and Deshmukh, 2006), which in turn makes analysis, feedback 
and improvement very difficult. This stalemate situation needs to be resolved. 
We therefore suggest two additions to the existing FMEA; a quantitative approach 
(chapter 3) and a Maintenance Feedback Method (chapter 4) based on the criticality of 
asset information which can help in pro-actively organizing feedback to earlier FMEAs. 
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And finally our study on the use of asset information standards (chapter 5) laid bare 
causes for the lack of pervasiveness of asset standards in the process industry, these 
insights can be used to improve the implementation and development of new and existing 
standards.  
 
6.2 Directions for further research 
In this section, directions for further research for the individual chapters and the research 
as a whole are discussed.  The case study on the use of FMEA led to some assumptions 
about the use of FMEA and maintenance planning, which guided further research for 
other chapters/ parts in this thesis.  
 
6.2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for maintenance planning: a 
multiple case study in the process industry 
This study yields a number of opportunities for further research. The study first of all laid 
laid bare a fundamental problem related to the nature of the RCM/FMEA procedure: 
FMEA is regarded as a one-off exercise by four out of the six companies investigated.  
Closely associated are operational and information management problems, such as data 
quality problems, e.g. accuracy of (failure) registration, cost of information.   
 
Future research should therefore be guided on the repeatability of FMEAs. In chapter 3 
we present a quantitative method which improves the repeatability and continuous 
improvement of FMEAs. 
 
To reduce efforts and improve return on investment the data collection of asset 
information may be focused on asset parts that have the highest ‘criticality’, a criticality 
based maintenance approach may be designed and used for this.  
 
The focus on critical asset parts is used as a design principle in chapter 4 in which the 
Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) method is presented. This method uses the 
determined criticality of assets to make a focused data collection effort possible.  
In Chapter 5, we review the use of asset information standards which can help to improve 
data quality and the accuracy of (failure) registration. 
Finally, this study might also be fruitfully applied in other industry segments outside the 




6.2.2 A quantitative method for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
The measurement of degradation is left for future research. In our approach, time and cross 
sections are taken as equal, i.e. all physical assets are assumed to be identical. However, if data 
for similar but different assets is available over a certain period, it is possible to relax this 
assumption. Consider the situation that assets have unobservable characteristics that cause 
differences in the failure rate (comparable to e.g. the problem of ‘Monday morning products’). 
There is a way to cope with such unobservable characteristics by using a panel logistic model. 
It is possible to estimate the logistic model with e.g. fixed effects (Allison, 2009). We have not 
explored this further since it is outside of the scope of this chapter, but it may serve as 
suggestion for further research. 
 
In a situation where failures are avoided, for example through Condition-based maintenance 
(CBM) (Veldman et al., 2010), it may still be possible to use approximate failure data by 
assuming that failure would have happened if the condition-based maintenance actions would 
not have prevented it. Such combined CBM-FMEA routines are outside of the scope of this 
chapter.  
 
In our model fixed time periods were used; future research could explore the influence of 
varying time periods and varying data sets on the results. In future research we aim to further 
investigate the relation between explanatory variables and asset failures in practice. 
 
In addition, we discussed our model using fictitious cost-ratios. For future research it is 
suggested to test our model using a dataset with cost data. Finally, we suggest to do further 
work on testing with small sample sizes, as in practice, companies may only have limited data. 
Data improvement techniques may be relevant to improve the quality of the data in this 
respect. More extensive validation of the model could also be done by examining the out of 
sample performance of the model. 
 
For the mentioned research directions, data collection is very important. In chapter 4 we 
propose a method which can be used to pro-actively identify asset information needs. The 
MFA analysis can be used to collect the needed data. 
 
For data analysis, the exchange of data is very important. Standards can support these efforts. 




6.2.3 Design of a Maintenance Feedback Analysis (MFA) method for 
continuous FMEA-based maintenance  
The presented MFA method might be contextually-sensitive (Wang and Hannafin, p. 6) as 
it is designed for use in the process industry. In further research the MFA method and 
design principles should be empirically tested in different contexts and if necessary 
improved. The presented method may be used as a starting point to develop better 
methods. The quality of (asset) information and its relationship with criticality and cost 
are proposed topics for further research, as better insight in this relationship can improve 
information feedback. Finally the exchange of asset information (e.g. semantic 
interoperability of asset information), very important for integration of various data 
sources deserves more extensive research. The exchange of asset information is also 
discussed in chapter 5.  
 
6.2.4 A review of the use of asset information standards for collaboration 
in the process industry 
Future research work should be focused on causes which hinder the pervasiveness of asset 
information standards, in particular the complexity of the asset information standards, 
since this is likely to also positively influence the other causes, as became apparent in the 
case studies.  
 
This would entail two main research areas; first of all, e.g. the use of ISO15926 as a 
methodology (meta-concept), and secondly the automatic mapping different standards. 
 
(1) Use of ISO15926 as a methodology: The currently available comprehensive standards 
designed for the process industry do constitute in theory all information relevant for 
successful and extensive collaboration in the process industry. The next step will be to 
investigate how e.g. ISO15926 can be used as a methodology (meta-concept) for designing 
and incorporating already available and successful smaller context specific standards (e.g. 
eCl@ss, Prolist/NE100, OSA-EAI/CBM and ISO14224). New standards should be 
developed in such a way that context specific standards are much easier to apply and 
enforce, while still being fully compliant with the ‘parent-standard’ ISO15926. The latter 
is of particular importance, since many new, small standards would otherwise be 
developed based on different principles and in different ways, instead of working towards 




In our view, this way of development has the potential to enable the future adoption of 
uniform principles in asset information standards in the process industry. One could 
learn from successful examples of such developments in other industries, e.g. S1000D in 
the aerospace industry.   
 
(2) Automatic mapping of standards: A second promising area for further work related 
to the standard related causes would be the automatic mapping of different asset 
information standards or versions of standards (van Blommestein, 2012).  
 
6.3 Societal relevance 
Our concepts to improve and standardize asset information and improve the accuracy of 
maintenance concepts can help to reduce maintenance cost and reduce safety margins. It 
is difficult to calculate the exact impact of these improvements, but given the significance 
of maintenance choices on operational excellence as well as health, safety and 
environment, the study may have a considerable impact.  
The research project was conducted in close cooperation with the industry by multiple 
case studies. The results can be used in the process industry and have the potential to be 
made applicable to other industries as well, since in other industries RCM/FMEA 
concepts are also in use. 
 
In this thesis the asset information is focused on the improvement of maintenance 
concepts in the maintenance phase, the same asset information can however also be used 
on other aspects of asset management, e.g. improving sustainability of assets and in other 
life-cycle phases (design and phase-out of assets).  




Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift is er op gericht te komen tot een verbeterde informatievoorziening over 
kapitaalgoederen ten behoeve van goed onderhoud en ten behoeve van gebruik van 
methodische onderhoudstechnieken. Onderhoud heeft een belangrijke rol in de bewaking van 
de integriteit van kapitaalgoederen en daarmee in de betrouwbaarheid, veiligheid en 
duurzaamheid van deze kapitaalgoederen. Deze thema’s zijn van groot belang voor de 
samenleving. 
 
Dit belang wordt ook duidelijk uit het bedrag dat jaarlijks aan onderhoud wordt gespendeerd. 
Volgens NVDO (2011) hebben de Nederlandse kapitaalgoederen een gezamenlijke waarde van 
400 miljard euro. Jaarlijks wordt gemiddeld 4% van deze waarde uitgegeven aan het 
onderhoud hiervan, in de procesindustrie is dit zelfs gemiddeld 6%. 
 
Het belang van goed onderhoud en de doelstelling om tot betere onderhoudstechnieken te 
komen en die te gebruiken is ook onderkend door Stork Technical Services, een grote 
Nederlandse maintenance contractor die dit onderzoek ondersteunt en zonder wie dit 
onderzoek niet tot stand zou zijn gekomen. Vanwege de karakteristieken van de 
procesindustrie, o.a. het relatief hoge bedrag dat wordt uitgegeven aan onderhoud en de focus 
van Stork Technical Services op de procesindustrie is er voor gekozen om het onderzoek op de 
procesindustrie te concentreren.  
 
Voor onderhoud  is een “maintenance concept” erg belangrijk. Een maintenance concept kan 
worden omschreven als het beleid of de benadering waarmee de hoeveelheid onderhoud en het 
type onderhoud voor een kapitaalgoed wordt bepaald. Bijvoorbeeld de keuze voor de 
hoeveelheid preventief onderhoud die jaarlijks wordt uitgevoerd. Een maintenance concept 
heeft in het verbeteren van eerdergenoemde doelstellingen daarom een belangrijk aandeel.  
 
Eén van de bekende methodieken die wordt gebruikt om maintenance concepten te 
ontwikkelen is Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM). Deze methodiek afkomstig uit de 
luchtvaart is gebaseerd op de criticaliteit van (onderdelen) van installaties. Een belangrijk 
aspect van deze methodiek is Failure Mode en Effects Analysis (FMEA), een methode waarin 
naast de wijze waarop een machine kan falen, de criticaliteit van een storing wordt bepaald. 
Deze informatie kan vervolgens gebruikt worden om een onderhoudsconcept te bepalen. 




Voor verbetering van een dergelijk onderhoudsconcept is herhaling van de RCM/FMEA 
methodiek en het leren uit opgedane ervaring erg belangrijk. In de praktijk blijkt dat de 
RCM/FMEA echter veelal éénmalig te worden toegepast: onderhoudsconcept wordt direct 
aangepast zonder naar de onderliggende (FMEA) onderbouwing van het bestaande 
onderhoudsconcept te kijken. Hieruit kan worden opgemaakt dat een groot aantal 
onderhoudsconcepten mogelijk niet optimaal zijn en dus verbeterd zouden kunnen worden. De 
omvang van deze verbeteringen zijn echter moeilijk in te schatten. 
 
Er is een aantal informatiemanagement problemen die hier mee te maken hebben, o.a. de 
onzekerheid over de toekomstige informatiebehoefte, toegankelijkheid van kennis, kosten en 
complexiteit van het onderhouden van data, informatie overdrachtsproblemen tussen 
maintenance en engineering en een gebrek aan het gebruik van  informatiestandaarden. 
De onderzoeksdoelstelling van dit proefschrift is dan ook het management van informatie over 
kapitaalgoederen voor FMEA gebaseerd onderhoud te verbeteren. In verschillende 
hoofdstukken die ten dele ook gepubliceerd zijn als artikelen in een aantal wetenschappelijke 
tijdschriften gaan we in op verschillende onderzoeksvragen.  
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt allereerst het gebruik van FMEA onderzocht in de procesindustrie, hierbij 
is er onderzocht in hoeverre een aantal aannames uit de literatuur over het gebruik van FMEA 
voor preventief onderhoud worden ondersteund door empirisch bewijs.  
Uit dit eerste onderzoek blijkt dat bedrijven een pragmatische benadering volgen waarin alleen 
de meest kritieke kapitaalgoederen worden geïdentificeerd en geanalyseerd. Dit staat in 
tegenstelling tot de originele voorstellen voor RCM/FMEA, maar is in lijn met recente 
literatuur. Daarnaast wordt RCM/FMEA in de praktijk meestal gezien als een eenmalige 
exercitie, en niet als een methode die herhaald moet worden vanwege verschillende 
operationele problemen (bijv. gebrek aan een heldere procedure) en diverse 
informatieproblemen. 
 
Deze informatieproblemen zijn de aanleiding om in verdere hoofdstukken ons te concentreren 
op herhaalbaarheid van de FMEA methodiek en de problematiek rondom informatie van 
kapitaalgoederen voor FMEA gebaseerd onderhoud. 
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In hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 4 worden twee methodieken voorgesteld waarmee de 
herhaalbaarheid van FMEA kan worden verbeterd. Deze methodieken kunnen beiden 
worden gecombineerd met de bestaande RCM/FMEA methodiek. Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in 
op de problemen rondom het gebruik van informatie standaarden voor 
kapitaalgoederen. Deze problemen beïnvloeden  ook de informatie-uitwisseling en 
hierdoor uiteindelijk ook de analyse en feedback op de FMEA van de betreffende 
kapitaalgoederen. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht in hoeverre de herhaalbaarheid van FMEA met behulp 
van een kwantitatieve benadering kan worden verbeterd. Dit onderzoek leidt tot een 
kwantitatieve methode die als toevoeging op de bestaande FMEA methodiek kan 
worden gebruikt. De methode is gebaseerd op het gebruik van historische data en kan 
als ondersteuning of aanvulling gebruikt worden op de inhoudelijke inschatting door 
experts. De methode is gericht op het verminderen van de te verwachten kosten van 
storingen en onderhoud van een kapitaalgoed. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt verder onderzocht wat de eisen en mogelijke ontwerp principes 
zijn om herhaaldelijk tot een verbeterd FMEA gebaseerd onderhoudsconcept te komen. 
We gaan hierbij in een aanvullende studie verder in op onze eerdere gevalstudies. Zo 
worden ontwerp eisen en ontwerp principes verkregen die kunnen worden gebruikt 
voor continue FMEA gebaseerd onderhoud. Gebaseerd op deze ontwerpeisen en 
ontwerp principes stellen we een Maintenance Feedback Analyse methode voor die de 
huidige RCM/FMEA methodiek uitbreidt. 
 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden oorzaken voor het gebrek aan verspreiding van kapitaalgoed 
informatiestandaarden in de procesindustrie ten opzichte van de luchtvaart onderzocht. 
Dit is noodzakelijk om het gebruik van standaarden voor de samenwerking in de 
procesindustrie in het algemeen te begrijpen en om het verbeteren van  kapitaal goed 
standaarden voor informatie uitwisseling meer specifiek te kunnen beschrijven. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 is gebaseerd op literatuuronderzoek en op een gevalstudie. In ons 
literatuuronderzoek is een vergelijking gemaakt tussen de procesindustrie en de 
luchtvaart industrie. Onze gevalstudie toont dat de proces industrie tot nu toe een 
beperkt succes in het introduceren van standaarden lijkt te hebben gehad ondanks 
significante inspanningen.  
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Gerapporteerde oorzaken voor het gebrek aan verspreiding van standaarden kunnen 
worden gegroepeerd in: 
 Oorzaken gerelateerd aan de standaard (trage ontwikkeling van standaarden, 
stabiliteit, complexiteit, kosten, kwaliteit / ontologische problemen),  
 Organisatorische problemen (gebrek aan financiële stimuli, organisatorische 
gereedheid en weerstand tegen verandering) en  
 Oorzaken, gerelateerd aan de bedrijfsomgeving (juridische aspecten, niveau van 
adoptie, beperkte overheidsdruk en een gebrek aan dominante actoren in de 
procesindustrie). 
 
Omdat de informatie overdracht tussen verschillende levenscyclus fasen belangrijk is, 
suggereert een gebrek aan informatiestandaardisatie dat informatie uitwisselingskosten 
hoger zijn dan noodzakelijk. 
 
Toekomstig onderzoek zou moeten worden gericht op het verbeteren en testen van de 
voorgestelde kwantitatieve methode, o.a. met verschillende data en de MFA methode. 
Voor verbeterde data analyse is het nodig onderzoek te doen naar de kwaliteit en kosten 
van kapitaalgoed informatie. Als laatste is er onderzoek naar standaarden nodig die de 
uitwisseling van kapitaalgoed informatie vereenvoudigen en daarmee ook de feedback 
op bestaande onderhoudsconcepten kan verbeteren.  
 
In zijn totaliteit geeft het uitgevoerde onderzoek diverse aanknopingspunten voor het 
verbeteren van kapitaalgoed informatie en voor het met behulp van RCM/FMEA 
verbeteren van onderhoudsconcepten.  
 
De toepasbaarheid van de voorgestelde methodieken en concepten zijn niet beperkt tot 
gebruik binnen de RCM. De voorgestelde methodieken en concepten worden toegepast 
voor andere op FMEA gebaseerde methodieken. Daarnaast kan het onderzoek door het 
generieke karakter van de uitkomsten zeer waarschijnlijk ook in andere industrieën 
worden toegepast. Ook is het onderzoek toepasbaar buiten de operatie en 
onderhoudsfase. Zoals in de ontwerpfase waarmee structurele verbeteringen aan 
kapitaalgoederen mogelijk worden.  
Het onderzoek draagt hierdoor bij aan effectievere productiemiddelen. Dit zorgt op zijn 
beurt weer voor een effectievere en efficiëntere productie, wat goedkopere productie en 





Promoveren kun je niet alleen, er zijn veel mensen die hebben bijgedragen aan de 
totstandkoming van dit proefschrift en die ik daar dan ook voor wil bedanken. 
Een belangrijke rol in de start van mijn promotie hebben Egon Berghout en Arnold 
Commandeur gehad waar ik voor een afstudeerstage bij UWV door werd begeleid. 
Dankzij hun inspanningen en enthousiasme over promoveren en onderzoek kwam ik in 
contact met Hans Wortmann en Warse Klingenberg.  
 
Hans Wortmann is voor mij als promotor erg belangrijk geweest, zijn ideeën en 
enthousiasme voor onderzoek in de volle breedte motiveerden mij altijd om steeds een 
volgende slag te maken. Gerard Gaalman mijn tweede promotor had een meer vaderlijke 
rol. Hij leerde me aandacht en precisie te hebben en dat ook na vele reviews een 
onderzoek nooit af is. Iets wat me heeft leren focussen op de echt belangrijke zaken in 
mijn onderzoek.  
 
Met Warse Klingenberg mijn co-promotor heb ik het meest intensief samengewerkt. Van 
hem heb ik de fijne kneepjes van het onderzoek geleerd. Warse wil ik dan ook bedanken 
voor zijn jarenlange inzet en ondersteuning. Door hem heb ik de schoonheid van een 
zorgvuldig geformuleerde zin of alinea leren waarderen. 
 
Dit proefschrift zou niet tot stand zijn gekomen zonder de bijdrage van Stork Technical 
Solutions. Stork heeft mijn onderzoek financieel ondersteund en ook toegang gegeven tot 
de kennis van veel verschillende medewerkers die ik allen wil bedanken voor hun inzet. 
Eén daarvan wil ik in het bijzonder noemen, Paul Casteleijn. Hij nam de tijd om zijn 
jarenlange ervaringen op het gebied van onderhoudsmanagement actief met mij te delen. 
Zo leerde ik ook door de bril van het bedrijfsleven naar onderhoud te kijken en zo de 
relevantie van mijn onderzoek te verhogen. Samen met Paul van Exel was hij één van de 
belangrijkste inspiratiebronnen voor mijn onderzoek.  
 
Paul van Exel, directeur van USPI, heeft mij de wereld van standaardisatie laten zien. Een 
wereld waarin het bereiken van consensus essentieel is. Paul leerde me hoe je mensen 





Tijdens mijn promotie zijn er veel bijzondere mensen op mijn pad gekomen zoals Aljar 
Meesters, Jasper Veldman, Chris Hicks, Tiedo Tinga en Leo van Dongen, die elk op eigen 
wijze bij hebben gedragen aan mijn promotie en ook mijn verdere carrière hebben 
beïnvloed. 
 
Mijn collega’s en mede PhD’s wil ik bedanken  voor alle borrels en koffiemomenten 
waarbij soms wel en vaak ook niet over de voortgang in het onderzoek werd gesproken. 
Mede dankzij hun is het een erg leuke tijd geworden. Samen met Boyana heb ik met veel 
plezier deel uit gemaakt van de SOM PhD commissie, waar we samen de gekste dingen 
georganiseerd voor de PhD collega’s. Boyana leerde me dat een goede PR en 
enthousiasme erg belangrijk is voor het succes van iets wat je organiseert. Daarnaast heb 
ik aan haar een goede vriendin overgehouden. 
 
De belangrijkste persoon in mijn promotie en die mij altijd heeft gesteund door dik en 
dun is mijn lieve vrouw Petra. Door haar werd ik altijd gemotiveerd door te gaan en ook 
positief terug te kijken naar wat al bereikt was.  
 
Zonder afleiding is het moeilijk om altijd door te gaan, mijn vrienden hebben er voor 
gezorgd dat ik me weer op kon laden.  
 
Ik wil ook alle personen en bedrijven bedanken die hun tijd beschikbaar hebben gesteld 
om mee te werken aan het onderzoek maar welke ik hier niet met naam heb genoemd.  
 
Bij deze wil ik natuurlijk ook mijn paranimfen Jeroen en Boyana bedanken. 
 
Maar zonder mijn ouders, mijn zus en familie was ik nooit zo ver gekomen, zij zijn het 
geweest die er voor hebben gezorgd dat ik deze stap in mijn leven kon maken. Zij hebben 
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